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ABSTRACT
This work positions Isaac Newton’s three areas of inquiry—Natural Philosophy, 
alchemy, and theology—as three inter-locked “literacies,” each with its own corrupt text 
and purifying method of reading. Newton’s natural philosophical literacy, a method of 
purifying reading the book of nature, is driven by coded concepts, including crypticity, 
Oneness, and purification, drawn from Newton’s heretical Christianity. Those concepts 
also drive his interactions with the Royal Society and his contemporary Enlightenment 
scientists. Newton’s alchemical literacy, a transmutative method of reading the book of 
self, is expressive of both Newton’s will to superiority and his ambivalent and complex 
placement of the female in his system of representation. Newton’s theological literacy, a 
purifying method of reading scriptures, employs a hermeneutics using criteria of 
Enlightenment science to purge scripture of idolatrous complexity. That theological 
literacy Newton extends to the world of politics in his work at the London mint, where he 
purifies the mint of inefficiency and the underworld of counterfeiters.  Newton’s overall 
method of working in seemingly opposed systems of representation is juxtaposed to Niels 
Bohr’s “Unity of Knowledge,” with both demonstrating a Kierkegaardian “dance of the 
absurd” in their productive use of contradiction. However, Bohr’s complementarity 
accounts for and goes beyond the limits of Newton’s approach. Employing Bohr’s 
complementarity as meta-epistemological frame, Walter Benjamin’s method of 
constellation, Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, and Kurt Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem are positioned as three post Enlightenment responses to 
Newton’s characteristics of science outlined in his “Rules of Reasoning.” Mutually 
x
exclusive yet interdependent, these epistemological complementarities are framed as 




In 1696, Sir Isaac Newton, already famous for his Principia, left his sinecure as 
Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Trinity College, and went to London to work for 
the national mint, where in a few years he would rise to the position of warden. 
Unsurprisingly, given his overt commitment to the principles of Enlightenment science, 
the obsessively methodological Newton began with time-management studies, carefully 
calculating each laborer’s tasks with an eye towards maximizing efficiency of the mint-
as-machine. Surprisingly, given Newton’s almost legendary withdrawal from social 
activities, he also developed and ran a kind of Gestapo aimed at ferreting out 
counterfeiters, even going as far as wearing disguises himself, and mingling with 
London’s notorious underclass (White 253-255).
For some, this small footnote of history is a sidelight to Newton’s life, much less 
significantly related to the development of his ideas. At worst, the incident is a cluttering 
of the view of Newton as the romantic genius par excellence, who by definition operates 
in a lofty isolation, free to contemplate the music of spheres, without the especially 
cacophonous noise of the lowly masses. However, if one begins with the assumption that 
the nineteenth century view of the Enlightenment genius is a deceptive construction 
allowing for a radical desocialization of the formulation of ideas, this seeming sidelight to 
the story of Newton takes on different, and certainly more sinister, significance. By 
looking at Newton’s work at the mint outside of the “terministic screen” of the Romantic 
genius, it appears reflective not of a tangent to Newton’s course as a major figure of the 
early modern period but as that course’s culmination, in that crucial elements of 
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Newton’s ideas, drawn not only from his much touted Natural Philosophy, but also from 
his more clandestine studies in alchemy, and more importantly, his highly secretive work 
in Arian theology, come to a kind of materialized fruition in this episode, and Newton’s 
hand is revealed: “he do[es] the police in different voices,” as T.S. Eliot first titled his 
Wasteland.
Eliot’s original title seems particularly apt for this work on several levels. First, 
implied in my general argument is that the modern—that which Eliot describes as a kind 
of desert of meaning, place, and agency—is informed greatly by Newton’s works and 
their reception. That the modern is in part a “wasteland” is due, given “Newtonism’s” 
unmistakable extensions into all disciplines, to Newton’s work itself as a system of 
thought that is easily appropriated for dehumanizing ends. Secondly, the recovery of 
Pound’s erasure of Eliot’s original title, a title conjuring not a grand image of devastation 
but the smallness of desperate people, chatting of the inconsequential as they drain their 
cups, is akin to what I am attempting to encourage in my analysis: to recover what could 
be called the erased title of Newton’s work: the “Mathematical Principles of  (social) 
Purification.”  Finally, the phrase itself captures the general methodological trend in 
Newton’s work: policing. This policing—this drive towards a radical purification—
describes both a central ideological force across Newton’s works and more critically 
helps explain that work’s emergence in a socio-rhetorical field characterized as employed 
in the implicit modernist project of  “domination and emancipation,” (Latour 10), as 
Bruno Latour notes, carried out in Enlightenment science in part through a process of 
conceptual purification. This process, Latour adds, leads to a proliferation of hybrids. 
Ironically, given my read of Newton’s method as a kind of covert hybridization (as well 
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as a kind of hybridization of co-versions), Newton’s work both exemplifies Latour’s 
description of the Enlightenment project and complicates it, suggesting not so much a 
supplantation of the premodern by the modern but instead a double move of remixing 
premodern principles and a simultaneous denial of those principles’ genealogies.  
Latour’s sense of purification is pervasively and forcefully apparent within Newton’s 
science, his alchemy, and theology. Where Newton complicates Latour’s 
conceptualization of modernist purification is how he constructs these seemingly isolated 
and partially opposed systems of representation: Between them, he employs a curious 
method of hybridization, in which ideas from one system inform another. However, this 
is always (and perhaps already) a hidden hybridization, and it is always (and certainly 
already) a directional hybridization, as it seeks to identify, through systematic removal of 
corruption, the God the Father of Newton’s Arian theology.  
Much more so than the apple-on-head story of the development of the theory of 
gravity, Newton’s work as Warden of the London mint provides a productive figure that 
elaborates, in the very material world of money, men, and politics, what I see as crucial 
factors interacting to provide the context for the emergence of what has become known as 
Newtonian science and modern empiricism. These factors include a general method of 
rhetoric marked by sophisticated deception, a social context in which that rhetoric 
emerges characterized by dangerous struggles for power and class standing, an implicit 
yet persistent misogyny, and, finally, a drive for radical purification that necessarily 
presupposes pandemic corruption. It is the last—the drive for radical purification, 
whether of the physical world, as in Natural Philosophy, or of the self, as in Alchemy, or 
of the Book of God, as in Arian theology—that best describes Newton’s efforts.  
4
The central argument of this study is that Newton’s work can be reconceived as 
rhetorical, in which he attempts systematic purification of a number of figurative and 
literal texts, including the book of nature, the book of self, and the book of God.  What 
the mint episode reveals in part is what is at stake in this complex interplay of ideas: a 
very real set of consequences for lived experience, and those consequences include how 
we view and act on the world, our “selves,” and our relationships with and conceptions of 
a higher being. Until relatively recently, Newton’s ideas and the texts that demonstrate 
them have been subject to a curious process of construction in which Newton’s Natural 
Philosophy—his “remarkable achievement” as I. B. Cohen says in his introduction to the 
Principia—has been treated not only as the primary contribution of Newton, but as more 
or less isolated from his “unfortunate” time-wasting in alchemy and theology (. More 
current “popular” biographies at least mention Newton’s interest in alchemy, as well as 
his religiosity. For example, see Gale Christianson’s Isaac Newton and the Scientific 
Revolution. This contemporary text, part of the Oxford Portraits in Science series, goes a 
long way to place Newton’s ideas within the social matrix of his time. However, its 
overall presentation is modern: it implicitly isolates Newton’s systems of representation 
from one another, and devotes the bulk of its presentation to his scientific studies, with a 
brief nod to his other endeavors.
What characterizes the traditional approach is a consistent down playing of 
connections across these systems. Conceptual inter-relationships are mostly ignored, 
hidden perhaps, under the overarching shadow of Newton’s natural philosophical 
success. In short, the traditional approach creates a Newton thoroughly “modernized,” so 
much so that he, and his method of science, have become nearly synonymous with the 
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modern. As late as the mid 1930’s, Newton papers on alchemy and theology once offered 
to the Royal society were still classified as “not fit to be printed” (Dobbs and Jacob 11) 
and having “no scientific value,” allowing them to be sold at auction as curiosities (White 
3), demonstrating both the strength and the institutionalized nature of Newton’s 
reception-as-exemplar-of-modern. Diagrammatically, traditional approaches to Newton’s 
work in his three fields of study can be represented as in Figure One.
FIGURE ONE: TRADITIONAL STRUCTURING OF NEWTON’S REPRESENTATIONAL SYSTEMS
This approach is best exemplified by biographies such as Gleick’s recent Isaac 
Newton, and Berlinski’s Newton’s Gift: How Sir Isaac Newton Unlocked the Secrets of 
the World, and to a lesser extent, Westfall’s The Life of Isaac Newton.  In the traditional 
approach, Newton’s theology and alchemy are either ignored entirely, as in Berlinski’s 
work, or at best frequently noted, as with Westfall, but not treated as a serious, much less 
critical, part Newton’s systems-of-systems. 
However, strands of Newton scholarship began to emerge that reconfigured the 







FIGURE TWO: CONTEMPORARY STRUCTURING OF NEWTON’S REPRESENTATIONAL SYSTEMS
Not until Dobbs’ innovative scholarship examined the influence of alchemy on 
Newton’s physics did this view of the thoroughly natural philosophized Newton begin to 
break down.  In recent works, such as Markley’s Fallen Languages, more deconstructive 
treatments have appeared that examine influences of both alchemy and theology on 
Newton’s thought, as well as situating his work within the social and ideological 
processes of his time. Figure two best represents Dobbs’ stance. Her approach is a kind of 
counterpoint to I. Leonard Cohen’s, who has persistently argued that Newton’s science 
was the result of deliberate isolation from other, especially “premodern,” systems of 
representation. For Cohen, the Newtonian system, as he calls it, the “Newtonian style,” is 
foundational in its isolation of systems of representation: 
The transformation Newton went through in relaxing the strictures 
of mechanical philosophy may have been in part motivated by alchemy, 
but it also required a new method that allowed him to continue 
maintaining the sharp distinction between experimental philosophy and 
the rest of philosophy, while nevertheless delving into the realm of unseen 
forces acting at a distance. I have called this new method the Newtonian 
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style, developed to a high degree in the Principia. The elaboration of this 
style was a fundamental; part of Newton’s basic philosophy that emerged 
in the 1680’s. (“Some General Aspects of the Principia” Principia 62)
Cohen’s framing of the issue of separation of systems is paradoxical. He admits that from 
the outset Newton’s intellectual “transformation” involved a “relaxing of the strictures” 
of  “mechanical philosophy,” even one motivated by alchemical reasoning. On the other 
hand, Cohen has Newton maintaining the “sharp distinction” between systems, to the 
extent that the “Newtonian style” is defined by such conceptual isolation:
In contrast, Dobbs and Jacob argue for a much more complicated Newton:
[Newton’s] method was not limited to the balancing of those approaches 
to knowledge that still constitute the elements of modern scientific 
methodology, nor has one any reason to assume that he would have 
deliberately limited himself to those familiar approaches even if he had 
been prescient enough to realize that those were all the future would 
consider important. Because his goal was a Truth that encompassed not 
only the “mathematical principles of Natural Philosophy” but divinity as 
well, Newton’s balancing procedure included also the knowledge he had 
garnered from theology, revelation, alchemy, history, and the wise 
ancients. (10)
Dobbs’ corpus of work devoted to Newton’s alchemy does go a long way to 
reinterpret Newton’s systems of thought, and their inter-relationships—his “balancing” of 
systems, as she says—but her emphasis is on the alchemical portion of his work, his 
“literacy of self” as I have been calling it, and she does not make, though she frequently 
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asserts, the larger argument that all his systems can be subsumed under his Arian 
theology.
More pertinent to this study is Markley’s work, Fallen Languages, where he 
argues that Newton’s Natural Philosophy resulted in a shift of authorizing power from 
God to the experimental method, while simultaneously denying the theological basis of 
the power in the first place. The larger context for Dobbs’, Markley’s, and even Latour’s 
respective approaches, is in an extension of the Enlightenment project into itself, at least 
into science’s genealogy. “Science” is open for analysis in a “scientific” way, in which it 
is viewed as bi-directionally over-determined by the cultural, social, and psychological 
influences of its day. An historical moment that recognizes the emergence of this loose 
collection of approaches is the publication of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
This type of history of science has progressed (a most un-innocent term) to the point 
Kuhn’s work itself is open for analysis via critical extension of the very method it 
employs. Implicit in what I am up to is such a general critique of Kuhn. He goes far in 
socializing science, but then retracts, especially in his “Postscript,” from what is 
suggested by his use of the term “community” in relation to paradigm formation and 
maintenance. Kuhn is provocative as far as he goes in “socializing” science to a radical 
extent of daring to suggest other factors—human factors—determined what passed for 
good science and what didn’t. For example, nearly avoiding entirely the issue of gender 
relations in his analysis, what emerges from his Structure of Scientific Revolutions most 
starkly is what is not signaled: at the minimum, a category “woman,” outlined by its 
absence. Class, as well, is handled implicitly in Kuhn’s analysis: I am left with a crude 
empiricism of adding up the players in science, estimating combined family income, and 
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realizing that whatever these Enlightenment figures were, they did not shop at 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries equivalent of Wal-Mart. Additionally, the whiteness 
of the enterprise of science perhaps went-without-saying in Kuhn’s treatment, but it 
shouldn’t.
However, I also don’t want to reduce Newton to any one of these complexes of 
influences of gender, class, or race. My sense is of a startling mix of these influences in 
Newton, at least in the sample of texts from his three “literacies.” To tease this sense of 
complication and complex admixture out, I have chosen samples of Newton’s writing as 
my primary evidence, and subjected them to a rhetorical analysis, and attempted to 
articulate that sense of purification and its attendant concepts. 
“Rhetorical” is a key term here, and I am mindful of it. By rhetorical I mean to 
use a method to look at artifacts of a symbol system for their means and ends of 
persuasion, a definition clearly close to Aristotle’s in On Rhetoric (36). However, such a 
definition avoids the larger issue of rhetoric: discourse’s ability, as Foucault says, to 
inspire:
respect and terror, to which all were obliged to submit, because it held 
sway over all and was pronounced by men who spoke of right, according 
to ritual, meted out justice and attributed to each his rightful share; it 
prophesized the future, not merely announcing what was going to occur, 
but contributing to its actual event, carrying men along with it, and thus 
weaving itself into the fabric of fate. (“Discourse on Language” 218.)
Note the characteristics of this “true” form of discourse: it exacts submission, it is tied to 
a person-speaker, it follows prescribed rules (“ritual”), it performs justice, and it 
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constructs the future. In short, it is a social act in the highest sense: “true” discourse 
largely creates, for better or worse, fate—and that is the fate of people themselves.
For Foucault, “true” discourse disappeared in the fifth century BCE, along with its 
practitioners, the Sophists, to be replaced by discourse where “the highest truth no longer 
resided in what discourse was, nor in what it did: it lay in what it said”[italics his] (218). 
That stance towards discourse disappeared, Foucault maintains, because discourse was 
perceived as “no longer linked to the exercise of power” (218). Significantly, Foucault 
doesn’t remove power itself from discourse; he only tracks the erasure of the belief that 
the most ideal discourse constructs social reality via overt exercise of social power. The 
overt exercise of social power that characterized “true discourse,” Foucault adds, was 
transformed into a “will to knowledge” that reached a kind of apex in Newton’s time:
A will to knowledge emerged [in the early Enlightenment] which, 
anticipating its present content, sketched out a schema of possible, 
observable, measurable, and classifiable objects; a will to knowledge 
which imposed upon the knowing subject—in some ways taking 
precedence over all experiences—a certain position, a certain viewpoint, 
and a certain function (look rather than read, verify rather than comment). 
(218)  
In many ways, Foucault is describing the reception of Newton’s approach, the extension 
of Natural Philosophy to encompass the whole of the human, even consciousness itself, 
which becomes the Enlightenment “self:” observed and observe-able, measured and 
measure-able, and classified and classify-able. 
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Newton’s own rhetoric—what I call his “literacies” in the language of this 
dissertation—only on the surface promotes this detached empirical, purely ocular self. 
Instead, taken as a whole and treated as overlapping systems of persuasion, Newton’s 
discourse, behind the veil of Natural Philosophy, attempts and in part succeeds in 
functioning as “true” discourse functions: it exacts submission to his will (e.g. he 
displaces contenders to his power such as Leibniz), it is authorized not by argument but 
by speaker (e.g. his ultimate authority is drawn from his placement of himself as God’s 
translator), it follows prescribed rules (e.g. the “rituals” of furthering self interest via 
increasingly complex applications of a “disinterested” truth-value determination system), 
it performs “justice” (e.g. it punishes those who transgress, from counterfeiters in London 
to counterfeiters in the Royal Society) , and it “constructs” the future, a future that 
includes Newton as a superhuman avatar of science.
What both Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric avoids and what Foucault’s 
description of “true” discourse necessarily postpones is the question of persuasion and 
inspiration to what ends. Though Foucault’s Sophists sound preferable to that which 
comes after, one lost attribute of true discourse—a holding accountable of the speaker to 
the polis—only describes a potential check against discourse inviting unethical ends, not 
a guarantee against subjectifying language. Therefore, my definition of rhetoric is more 
akin to Isocrates’. Isocratean rhetoric considers as central to rhetoric the formation, 
promulgation, and expressions of values. As Welch notes in the Contemporary Reception 
of Classical Rhetoric, “The corner stones of Isocratean rhetoric are the utilitarian appeal 
to many aspects of listener or reader and an emphasis on values, two ideas that diverged 
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from the Sophists, who sometimes confined themselves to exclusively utilitarian themes” 
(123). 
To frame Newton’s writing as “Isocratean Rhetoric” is to examine it for both its 
utilitarian rhetorical practices (its means) and for its expression of certain values (its 
end[s]), Framed in such a manner, Newton’s literacies emerge as both reinforcing and 
drawing a fundamental warrant from an inter-locked set of values. The primary 
“conceptual” end, of Newton’s writing, I maintain, is the embracing of one God the 
Father. The primary “social” end of his writing is the embracing a strict hierarchy in 
which Newton functions as a kind of pure human substance not only at near the top of the 
vertical continuums of corrupt to pure, base to celestial, female to male, but also as one 
authorized to purify the continuums. These two values, however, Newton necessarily 
hides in most of his writing: the former because it is at the center of the proscribed Arian 
heresy and the latter because of its opposition to the of Enlightenment ideal of  
“disinterested” science. 
To recover Newton’s rhetoric is re-place his texts as in conversation with the 
ideas and the social networks of the early Enlightenment period and treat them as 
rhetorical means to promote his value(d) ends.. The first problem one encounters in such 
a recovery is Newton himself, who goes far to hide his rhetorical tracks, both means and 
ends. At almost every public juncture, Newton isolates his most famous work—his 
science—from his other systems of representation, alchemy and theology. Additionally, 
Newton consistently in shared communications such as letters to members of the Royal 
Society claims his primary ideals are “disinterestedness” and “friendship.”
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That process of isolating Newton’s science from his other works, as well from the socio-
rhetorical field of his time, was continued after his death via the popularization of 
Newton’s ideas in the form of redactions, epitomes, and summary books aimed at the 
emerging semi-literate lower middle class audience of the late eighteen and nineteenth 
centuries (Markley). Even this presentation, distribution and promulgation of a narrowed 
view of his ideas in these texts for the  “masses” reflect Latour’s twin Enlightenment 
tasks of domination and emancipation (Latour). The resulting isolation of Newton’s ideas 
from the socio-rhetorical context serves to describe a science of both conformity and a-
sociality, keeping those “masses” restricted to a laborer’s practical application of laws, 
while also deceiving those masses into thinking the enterprise of science emerged outside 
of class structure. However, the very availability and accessibility of these redactions 
reflect the emancipatory task, in the democratizing of the “gist” of Newtonian science 
(Dobbs and Jacob 89-94).
It may be that for the modern scientist, the god term has become the experimental 
method, but for Newton himself, the experimental method is just one method of radical 
purification, appropriate for the corrupt natural world, but that draws its strength—its 
truth value determination validity—from a very un-modern sense of God, one that is less 
“crossed-out” in Latour’s sense, and more hidden. The task for Newton was the task of 
the translator, and that translator was confronted with an array of corrupted texts, each 
requiring nearly mutually exclusive and yet conceptually interdependent methods of 
recovery of truth.  That truth, as Newton states in the “General Scholium” to the 
Principia, is directly tied to discovering the real nature of God. Figure three depicts my 
overall context for Newton’s three “literacies.” 
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FIGURE THREE: NEWTON’S SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATIONAL SYSTEMS
In this approach, Newton’s alchemy and Natural Philosophy are subsets of 
theology. What theorists, of both rhetoric and the history of science, have only begun to 
do to date is to approach Newton primarily as a theologian, whose Natural Philosophy’s 
surface conceptual isolation from his other areas of interest and those other areas’ central 
assumptions of what constitutes truth is in reality only a semblance of conceptual 
isolation.  From Newton’s end, the isolation is more a smart response to the political, 
social, and even psychological fields in which he develops his ideas and commits them to 
text. In short, the conceptual isolation of Newton’s “science” from other systems at his 
disposal is as reflective of the particular discourse communities to whom he addresses his 
rhetoric as it is reflective of an implicit or explicit commitment to developing a grand 
system of knowledge manufacture. Two clusters of “facts” support my assertion. First, 
Newton faces deleterious material consequences for invoking ideas drawn from alchemy 
and Arian theology.  Alchemy is an “occult science” in relation to the nascent science of 
the seventeenth century, whose formal community is embodied in the Royal Society. 
Invocation of alchemical principles results in a two fold police action: The alchemists 






the Royal Society members—many of whom, like Newton, are more or less clandestinely 
involved in alchemical studies—actively police the discourses of its members for 
“occult” explanations. Newton’s theology is even more dangerous to invoke: it is a 
heresy in the eyes not only of the Anglican authorities of his time but of the quasi- secular 
authorities as well, such as Newton’s primary employer, Trinity College, whose very 
name proclaims its opposition to Arian antitrinitarianism. In many ways, Newton risked 
the designation of outlaw—an ideological criminal—in any overt attempt to invoke of his 
religion.
However, Newton does invoke these outlaw principles drawn from these two 
“unscientific” areas.  These “slippages” between nearly mutually exclusive systems of 
representation are the second cluster of  “facts” supporting my claim that Newton’s 
science is not only more than it appears: it actively if sneakily violates some of the 
characteristics most scientists would have us believe it asserts. Sometimes, as I will 
develop in the following chapters, he slips directly—and even bravely—in the case of the 
alchemical principle of “action-at-a-distance” to explain gravity, and more often 
indirectly, as in his radical emphasis on “oneness” in his “Rules of Reasoning” in the 
Principia in outlining a method of knowledge construction. 
Part of the problem with approaching Newton’s Natural Philosophy, and in 
particular its genesis in the fluxing socio-cultural rhetorical field of the Enlightenment, is 
its very remarkable success Cohen mentions in his “Introduction” to the Principia. The 
Newtonian system of representation not only works singularly well at representing the 
physical world in most instances without recourse to a theological metaphysics; it works 
that way in large part by overtly policing against such recourse. Even Karl Popper’s 
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focusing on falsification in the doings of science can be viewed as an elaboration of 
Newtonian science’s “faithlessness” taken to the extreme: phenomena earn their 
existence through the repeated structured interrogations of the experiment, and the 
experiment is the penultimate desert of the modern, without self, spirits, or God.
Not so with Newton: my argument throughout this work is that, regardless of the 
world investigated, Newton‘s ideas are puritanically theological (as well as theologically 
Puritan), requiring a hermeneutics of law enforcement, in which the books of nature, the 
self, and even of God are put on the rack of translation. The structure of this work reflects 
my own sense of hierarchy implicit in Newton’s endeavors. Newton’s “highest” system is 
theological: there, the text, the Bible, is more pure than impure. The next highest system 
is alchemical: that text, the self, is not so much more pure than impure as it is capable, in 
part as modeled by Jesus, God’s first “perfect creation,” of transmutation to a higher 
metal of being, so to speak. Newton’s “lowest” system is Natural Philosophy, his science. 
That text, nature herself, is far more impure than pure, and worse: unlike the alchemical 
“self,” nature, ever the fallen woman, cannot be redeemed. What can be redeemed are 
vestiges of perfection, and those vestiges, if one follows Newton’s rules of reasoning to 
their logical extension, are always global, always impersonal, always Platonic, in that the 
overall form of the law is privileged over its specific manifestations, which are rhetorical 
slaves to the master theory.
In light of my sense of the above hierarchy, I begin in Chapter Two by looking at 
Newton’s operations at the basest level, with the crudest text: Natural Philosophy. In this 
chapter, I approach Newton’s development of his science, especially as evinced in the 
Principia, as in part a consequence to psychological, social, and political forces at work at 
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the time. I begin with Newton’s first formal interaction with the Royal Society, 
describing his interactions with Robert Hooke, the Society’s Secretary. What emerges 
from a rhetorical analysis of a number of letters between Newton, Hooke, and other 
Royal Society members is a consistent presence of three key elements in Newton’s 
discourses: crypticity, a mode of rhetoric overtly referential and disinterested while 
covertly persuasive and self-interested; Oneness, a foundational belief in a radically 
hierarchicalized design of the world; and purification, a general pattern of method 
characterized by systematic policing of corruption to purify the physical, spiritual, and 
(psycho)social aspects of the world. These elements mark his Principia as well, and are 
taken to their highest—and deadliest—level in Newton’s treatment of Gottfried Leibniz 
over the issue of the calculus’ authorship.
In Chapter Three, I address selections from Newton’s alchemical work in light of 
the text under interrogation in that system: the self. Here, I argue, may be Newton’s most 
interesting text to be translated, and his strangest literacy. A “reading” of this text, in a 
Newtonian alchemical sense, requires the construction of an eldritch self: on the one 
hand, it is clearly a text “immaterial,” and therefore radically separate from the baser text 
of the world. On the other hand, the central activity of the alchemist is a transmutation of 
that self that is paralleled by a transmutation of concrete elements of that baser world. 
Strange gender relations, or at least strange deployments of gendered metaphors, 
pervade his alchemical work, as particularly demonstrated in his  “Commentarium” on 
and translation of “Hermes,” a central alchemical text for sixteenth and seventeenth 
century would-be transmutationalists. Newton’s focus on Oneness, in both his 
construction of his rules of consequence, and in his overall method justified in the 
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“General Scholium” to the Principia, also infect this system, further complicated by that 
Oneness’ identification with “God the Father.” Unlike his Natural Philosophy’s 
“literacy,” this method of purification results in a very odd dialectic between a priori
and a posteriori methods of truth-value determination. In this system, Newton is 
scholastic in the sense that he operates on the assumption of past knowledge, 
ascertainable through the reading—and literal translating of—alchemical authorities, 
and his method, obvious even at the level of asserting claims and then deploying textual 
“proof,” is overtly a priori. However, in the alchemical experiment itself, carefully and 
methodologically recorded in Newton’s numerous notes, this a priori knowledge is 
tested through a posteriori means. This play with opposing methods, which I trace in 
this chapter, is related to the goal of alchemy: change of the self.  That self, I argue in 
the chapter, is more than a theoretical construct:  Simply, it reflects well his own sense 
of position in family, society, and the universe at large. In the end, three pathologies 
emerge: one of Newton himself, who suffers what has been romantically termed his 
“Dark Year” of 1693. The second pathology is the construction of category woman in 
his female tropes. In that rhetorical patterning in his alchemical texts, Newton constructs 
for category woman a  “specificity and materiality of difference” reflective of his 
psychological ambivalence to women and his conceptual equation of female and 
corruption (Jarratt 9). The third pathology is of Newton’s overall system of systems 
itself, which is predicated upon a strict hierarchical relationship with the world, other 
people, and god. 
In Chapter Four, I approach a small sample of Newton’s overtly theological texts, 
especially works relating to methods of prophecy. With this literacy, Newton is reading 
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the highest level of text: the Judeo-Christian Bible, especially the Old Testament. This 
method of reading is Newton’s most politically dangerous, as he cannot directly assert 
his heresy.  Yet he is working at, what I claim throughout this book, the text containing 
not just the most purity of all but the only text inherently capable of expressing true 
purity, from which the lesser texts of self and of nature can at best only partially 
emulate. 
In these texts, the vertical continuums addressed in the prior chapters, of female to 
male, of a posteriori to a priori, of base to transcendent, of local to global, and 
particularly of corrupt to pure, are explored at their hierarchical peaks, so to speak. In 
this system, the bible is approached as a text akin to nature, and direct observation is 
more deductive than inductive, as it begins with the critical premise of a God the Father 
discrete from a god the son, and covertly observes from that conclusion as Newton’s text 
itself overtly appears to be arriving at that conclusion after analysis. What emerges is a 
totally masculinized single God the Father, who simultaneously stands unreachably 
above the baser texts, yet ultimately provides both their fundamental basis as well as 
their key for redemption-through-literacy. More importantly, Newton’s complex literacy 
of the book of God, when “materialized” in Newton’s work at the London mint, reveals 
itself as a method for and justification of a radically hierarchical social system, with 
Newton as the master geometer of society, controlling the force of society: money itself. 
What emerges in this analysis is the possibility of a fourth Newtonian literacy, one in 
which the text is people, and the translating also involves a programme of purification. 
In the fifth chapter I explore some of the limits inherent in Newton’s system of 
systems, by offering a counterpoint to his theory suggested by the work of Niels Bohr. 
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Using Kierkegaard ‘s concept of “dance of the absurd” as a starting point, I argue that 
both scientists practice a similar conceptual play in their respective approaches to 
seeming oppositions or contradictions, and both approaches are forms of Bohrian 
complementarity. In Newton, this complementarity is immature, as the vertical hierarchy 
of truth-value constitutions presupposes a ranking of “truths,” and these rankings are 
inextricably bound in assumptions about race, class, and gender. As such, Newton’s 
complex handling of multiple systems of representation remains more a demonstration 
of the limits of Enlightenment thought, especially science, rather than a model for future 
inquiry. In the end, Newton’s epistemology of epistemologies is contractive, “always 
and everywhere,” to appropriate his recurrent phrase from the “General Scholium” to the 
Principia, pointing back to a white, male, Old Testament God-the-father.
In contrast, Bohr’s horizontal hierarchy seeks a “unity of knowledge” rather than 
a “unity of truth,” and as such offers an expansive model of knowing, in which 
foundational truths are replaced by ensembles of seeming oppositions, open to a kind of
dialogic of understanding. Noting Plotnitsky’s comparison of Bohr’s approach to 
Bataille’s General economics and Derrida’s post-structuralism, I argue that not only does 
Bohr’s method carry with it much of the explicit critique of Enlightenment thought that 
these post-modern responses articulate, he also provides a check against excessive 
relativisms through an unclearly articulated yet nonetheless implicit redefinition of the 
relationship between knowledge, experience, and language. 
As is outlined in Newton’s “Rules of Reasoning” in his Principia, the natural 
philosopher must follow a “recipe for legitimacy,” and that recipe not only presumes but 
imperiously demands a radical “objectivity,” in which the experimenter’s ethos is directly 
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proportional to “His” invisibility. And throughout, the three primary characteristics of 
Enlightenment science that Schleifer notes—simplicity, generalizability, and 
verifiability—are implicit god terms (36). In the sixth and final chapter, I return to those 
principles and offer as “post modern responses” Walter Benjamin’s constellation, Werner 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty, and Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness. Using Bohr’s 
complementarity and his meta-epistemological concept of “Unity of Knowledge,” I 
position each of these responses as both expressions of and resolution of some limits of 
Newtonian science. Each response involves a three-fold move: an exposure of 
epistemological inadequacy, a re-introduction of the human into the system, and an 
expansion, rather than a displacement, of what could be called the epistemological frame.
Projecting a History of the Future
As in the beginning of this introduction with my presentation of the adult Newton 
at the mint, I use a single incident from Newton’s life as a kind of demonstration of what 
kind of man we have rewritten into a model of sustained “scientific” inquiry into the 
world. The incident is one from his childhood that Newton related in a letter to John 
Locke a quarter of a century later, and I quote at length here to offer a flavor of 
Newtonian science as performed by and on the man himself: 
I took a bodkin, and put it between my eye and the bone near to the 
backside of my eye as I could: & pressing my eye with the end of it (so as 
to make the curvature in my eye) there appeared several white, dark and 
coloured circles. Which circles were plainest when I committed to rub my 
eye with the point of the bodkin, but if I held my eye and the bodkin still 
though I continued to press my eye with it yet the circles would grow faint 
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often disappear until I resumed them by moving my eye or the bodkin. 
(qtd in White 61) 
Here, I argue, is an example of science outside of concern for the human, where the 
“clockwork” universe is extended, as it is to the workers at the London mint, where 
Newton machined both the workers’ behavior and that of the underclass of counterfeiters, 
and as it was at Los Alamos, where bets were made before the initial blast about whether 
the “experiment”—the objective structured and controlled observation of nature—would 
start a chain reaction which would end all life on the planet. Newton, White notes, in 
using such “pure” science nearly ended his career before it could begin (White 61). As an 
“embodied” metaphor for the practice of science on the body of humankind, the incident 
suggests there a very real possibility that a science without an implicitly compassionate 
ethics is likely to destroy that which it ostensibly desires to know: nature, both “the tiny 
fragile humans” and the rest of our kin, from trees, to animals, to the cerulean sky shot 
through with migrating geese. Newton’s recounting of the bodkin experiment, I maintain, 
reveals both the strength and the danger of extending empirical “objectivity” into the 
world of living things, of  “Putting nature on a rack and torturing out her secrets,” as 
Bacon would have it, without thought to the fate of most victims of torture: prolonged 
pain, followed by death.
Benjamin notes in “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man,” the act 
of language completes creation, a creation he assumes is begun, in part, in the writing of 
the same scriptures to which Newton devoted so much attention. Benjamin, as well, could 
be said to outlining a method of reading the book of nature, but what he says of nature is 
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shot through with a lyrical sadness, compassion, and responsibility. “If nature could 
speak,” he says, 
It is a metaphysical truth that all nature would lament if it were endowed 
with language. This proposition has a doubling meaning:  It means first: 
she would lament language itself. Speechlessness: that is the great sorrow 
of nature (and for the sake of her redemption the life and language of 
man—not only, as is supposed, of the poet—are in nature). This 
proposition means secondly she would lament, lament, however, is the 
most undifferentiated, impotent expression of language; it contains 
scarcely more than the sensuous breath…. Because she is mute, nature 
mourns. (329)
Benjamin exhibits the same feminizing of nature as did Newton and so many of the 
Enlightenment philosophers, but in Benjamin what is drawn out is not a chaotic sexuality, 
or an inherent weakness, or especially a need to be “tortured on the rack,” but instead an 
eerie focus on silence when creation itself is implicated in the use of language. This is a 
far cry from both the Newton-engendered report and the Bible as transcendent truth tale. 
I am taken with Benjamin’s material sense of history, and his critique of 
modernity in “Storyteller.” In that piece, Benjamin notes that after the World War I, men 
returned from the battlefield incapable of relating experience, and “information” replaced 
“wisdom” as a kind of currency borne by a language no longer functioning as the weave 
holding society together but instead as a means of deadening response-ability. WWI, for 
Benjamin, stands as a dramatic convergence of ideological forces, the technologies that 
spun off and reinforced those ideologies, and a marker of significant limits of 
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Enlightenment thought. Newton’s calculus, as just one example, provides the necessary 
language of ballistics, which reaches new heights of application and new depths of 
nightmare in trench warfare, so aptly described by Erich Maria Remarque in All’s Quiet 
on the Western Front. There, in the narrator’s alternatively dry reportage of discarded 
limbs and stomach wounds with his frenzied ravings that never quite match up to the 
described horror, despite their rhetorical intensity, the voice of the Modern is loudest. 
And that voice, with its detachment from body so hilariously parodied in Gulliver’s 
endless accounting of his daily output of shit and piss, is now not so funny as it attempts 
to keep up with the accounting of loss. There is no surprise to find at the end of All’s 
Quiet that the narrator is dead, and that this news is delivered as a statistic, a little error 
variance to be expected as he is just a part subsumed under the larger whole of the 
machine of modern warfare.
No wonder Kafka, in part in response to this horror, when asked if there was any 
hope is said to have replied, “Yes. Just not for us.” I agree with Kafka to an extent, but 
feel compelled to qualify that lost hope by saying that it cannot be found in the endless 
elaborations and recapitualitions that emerge as modern warfare, market-objectification, 
and an increasing sense that, as Benjamin says, we cannot speak of our experiences. Nor 
do I see any hope in a looking backwards to a long lost pre-modern, with its jungle world 
of purposeful rocks and geocentric astrophysics that serve the primary purpose of 
maintaining a hierarchy of folks. Instead my analysis of Newton is driven by its ends, and 
one of those ends is a concern with the extent that Newton lives on in all of us, at the 
more formal level of what constitutes good scholarship in the academy to the less formal 
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yet probably more crucial level of the lived experience of the “tiny fragile human body” 
of which Benjamin writes on “Storyteller:” you and me, all of our children. 
So my stance throughout this work, as much as possible, has been to emulate 
Benjamin’s image drawn from Paul Klee’s painting Angelus Novus, and to invite the feel 
of progress as wind that drives me farther and farther away from the series of actual 
catastrophes constituting the real subject, or at least the appropriate artifacts, for a 
Benjaminian way of doing history. My history is rhetorical in both the sense that I have 
approached his texts to uncover Newton’s means and ends of persuasion—his 
“rhetorics”—and I position Newton’s “rhetorics” as they elaborate in his literacies as 
covertly engaged systems of persuasion, all of which are implicated in the genesis of the 
what has come to be known as the Modern, especially modern science. I admit freely to 
participating in the same Enlightenment project for which we are both blessed and cursed 
by Newton. There is more than a little effort to “purify” the traditional view of Newton in 
the following pages.
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CHAPTER TWO
NEWTON’S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY: CRYPTICITY, ONENESS, AND PURIFICATION
There is yet another argument for a Deity, which I take to be a very strong 
one, but till the principles on which it is grounded are better received, I 
think it is more advisable to let it sleep. (Isaac Newton. “Letter I.” 1692. 
Four Letters from Sir Isaac Newton to Doctor Bentley Containing Some 
Arguments in Proof of a Deity. 291.)
To make this system therefore, with all its Motions, required a Cause 
which understood, and compared together, the Quantities of Matter in 
several Bodies of the Sun and Planets, and the gravitating Powers resulting 
from thence; … Planets could revolve about the Quantities of matter in the 
central bodies; and to compare and adjust all these Things together, in so 
great a variety of bodies, argues that Cause to be not blind or fortuitous, 
and very well skilled in Mechanicks and Geometry. (Isaac Newton. 
“Letter I.” 1692. Four Letters from Sir Isaac Newton to Doctor Bentley 
Containing Some Arguments in Proof of a Deity.  292)
So then it was one design of the first institution of the true religion to 
propose to mankind by the frame of the ancient temples, the study of the 
frame of the world as the true temple of the great God they worshipped… 
So then the first religion was the most rational of all others till the nations 
corrupted it. For there is no way (without revelation) to come to the 
knowledge of a deity but by the frame of nature. (Isaac Newton. Yahuda 
Manuscript. folios 6-7. 41) 
To sum up:
(1) We know, as a matter of record, that science under Fascism became 
sinister. (2) We are repeatedly being admonished that there is a high 
percentage of fascism in our own society. (3) Why, then, should there not 
be, in our society, a correspondingly high incentive to sinister science? 
(Kenneth Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 35)
The first quote is curious. Rev. Richard Bentley had received an endowment from 
Robert Boyle’s will to deliver a series of lectures using Natural Philosophy to prove or at 
least reconcile the idea of a deity with the dramatic findings of eighteenth century 
science. Bentley, a lifetime supporter of Newton, had requested Newton’s assistance in 
both reading the Principia and in using its material for the lectures. As last line of 
Newton’s first letter to Bentley concerning using the Philosophiae Naturalis Principia 
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Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) as part of a theological 
argument, it suggests Newton is either holding a “scientific” argument in reserve, or 
feigning such. The circumstances surrounding this quote make it even more curious. 
Bentley, one of the few contemporaries with whom, according to Westfall, Newton 
“exchanged honest theological opinions,” (238) would seem to be the best audience for 
any theological explanations. Yet Newton deflects Bentley’s questioning concerning god 
and science, both in this letter and in others. 
In contrast, in the second quote, taken from another of his series of letters to 
Bentley, Newton maintains that the initial Cause, the granddaddy of all subsequent rule-
based planetary motion, is neither “blind nor fortuitous,” and must be “very skilled in 
Mechaniks and Geometry.” And the third quote, taken from Newton’s unpublished 
theological writings, asserts boldly that two ways are possible for “knowing God”—
revelation, the specific subject of his theological writings, and “thru the frame of Nature,” 
the subject of Newton’s Principia, Opticks, and other Natural Philosophical writings.
A key that allows an understanding of these three quotes is hidden in the fourth 
quote, from Burke, who syllogistically arrives at the question/conclusion that science 
may be “sinister.”  “Sinister” Burke equates with fascism, conjuring up images of lab-
coated policeman, a clipboard in one hand and Billy club in the other, working mainly in 
secret to enforce a brutal order. This is far from the usual image of Isaac Newton, and 
even farther from any traditional sense of  “science.” On the face of it, Burke’s quote, 
though provocative, seems unrelated to Newton and science in general, with perhaps the 
exception of the horrifying practices such as Mengele’s Nazi-sanctioned experimentation 
on human subjects, but even then only as proofs—exceptions—of a general rule of  
“fascism-free” science.
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However, when the Principia and related texts are approached rhetorically, that is, 
as both ways to come to know God and as expressions of the specific social matrix in 
which Newton finds himself during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
then Burke’s quote makes sense. Simply, given Newton’s radical Arian Puritanical 
Heresy, coupled to his “fascistic” experiences with various members of the Royal 
Society, the Principia, the bible of science itself, emerges as a coded fascist manifesto, 
drawing its authority from a “hidden,” patriarchal God, obsessed with corruption and 
purity, and implicitly encouraging Bacon’s stark directive to “put nature on a rack and 
torture out her secrets.” More critically, Newton’s Natural Philosophy, arising as a kind 
of negotiation between systems of inquiry and the particular psychosocial matrix in 
which Newton found himself in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has significant 
implications for the state of the “tiny fragile human body” for which Walter Benjamin 
laments in “The Storyteller” (84). Those implications are both figurative, as Newtonism 
reinforces the trope of the machine-body, and literal, as Newtonism with its vast power of 
control of the material world, makes possible the very technology underlying the 
machinery of modern warfare Benjamin viewed as a kind of catastrophe hiding behind a 
delusion of progress. 
On method
Several assumptions inform my hermeneutics. First, the issue here is neither 
science nor theology. Rather, it is the human; that is, if both conceptions of nature and 
conceptions of God offer potential semiotic contrasts and combinations for construction 
of the category “human,” then neither a scientific nor a theological approach is 
productive, except as further examples of semiosis. Secondly, given the first assumption, 
a productive analysis of Newton’s work is then necessarily rhetorical, that is, looks to 
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uncover constructions of category human inferred or directly invoked by displays of 
discovering “the available means of persuasion,” as Aristotle defines rhetoric in On 
Rhetoric (36). Thirdly, Newton demands a “brush against the grain,” as Benjamin asserts 
in “Theses on a Philosophy of History.” Benjamin writes in “Thesis VII,” 
There is no document of civilization that is not at the same time a 
document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of 
barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted 
from one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates 
himself from it as much as possible. He regards it as his task to brush 
history against the grain. (256-257) 
One of the elements of Benjamin’s historicism is a focus “on the image of enslaved 
ancestors rather than that of liberate grandchildren” (“Thesis XII” 260). This last 
assumption is not insignificant: it has been my sense throughout my reading of both the 
icon himself and his endless biographers, critics, and historians that there is both a 
tradition and a Newton-instigated trend to construct him as something more than human. 
This view of Newton as not a but the exemplar of science infectiously extends to science 
itself, making of its history, praxis, and process a supra-human enterprise. The 
elaborations of that suprahumanization of science are numerous, ranging from an 
educational process that stresses following in the prescribed footsteps of the greats 
(e.g.—endless replications of experiments for which we know the results, less exercises 
in knowledge construction than emulative and adulatory rituals with test tubes, fetal pigs, 
and Lilliputian pulleys), to the twin disdain for the “soft” (i.e.,, social) sciences and the 
humanities. To disrupt that process of suprahumanization, a new way of reading is 
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demanded. Cheryl Glenn1, in Rhetoric Retold, eloquently argues for a more open 
historicism:
We must risk, then, getting the story crooked. We must look crookedly, a 
bit out of focus, into the various strands of meaning in a text in such a way 
as to make categories, trends, and reliable identities of history a little less 
inevitable, less familiar. In short, we need to see what is familiar in a 
different way, in many different ways, as well as to see beyond the 
familiar to the unfamiliar, to the unseen. (7)
 Glenn’s approach underscores my sense that Newton’s work in the three areas of Natural 
Philosophy, alchemy, and theology involves more than an early scientist exploring 
multiple systems of representation, and then discarding two—alchemy and theology—in 
favor of the third: science. Instead, Newton’s system(s) are hierarchically arranged with 
multiple vertical continuums implicated, including corrupt to pure, female to male, 
ignorant to knowledgeable, and nature to heavens.  Newton’s systems viewed in this 
frame emerge not as in a Bahktinian dialogic relationship, with competing centripetal and 
centrifugal forces revealing a tension between “unitary language” and “social and 
historical heteroglossia” (Bahktin 272). Instead, the seeming contradictions in Newton’s 
1 There is a curious paucity of women writing on Newton’s rhetoric, particularly on his Natural Philosophy. 
The few whose analyses could be framed as close to “rhetorical,” such as Dobbs and Jacob, still take as 
their primary disciplinary stance philosophy and history of science. More overtly feminist rhetorical 
analyses of Enlightenment figures, such as Jamie Barlow’s, “Inventing a Feminist Discourse: Rhetoric and 
Resistance in Margaret Fuller’s Woman in the Nineteenth Century” and Annette Kolodny’s “Daring to 
Dialogue: Mary Wollstonecraft’s Rhetoric of Feminist Dialogics” tend to focus on the rhetoric of the 
women of the nineteenth century, rather than on the scientific “giants” of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Similarly, extended treatments of rhetoric and language of the Enlightenment, such as Catherine 
Hobb’s exemplary Nineteenth Century Women Learn to Read and Write, tend to focus on women’s gradual 
emergence as practitioners and developers of their own forms of early modern discourse, rather than on the 
rhetorics of the men. Hobbs’ Rhetoric on the Margins of Modernity is a notable exception, providing 
rigorous rhetorical analysis of the writings of early Enlightenment male figures that worked on the fringes 
of seventeenth and eighteenth century Natural Philosophy. One hopes for comparable treatments of Newton 
by women scholars in the future, perhaps employing similar feminist rhetorical methodologies applied to 
classical male rhetoricians/philosophers, such as Welch’s Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric
and Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists.
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texts only appear contradictory when “science,” perhaps Modernity’s core unitary 
language, is treated as the ostensible goal of Newton’s inquiry. Seeming dialogic 
tensions, such as the issue of the “occult” quality of Newton’s concept of action-at-a-
distance, reflect Newton’s success in keeping secret his larger agenda, as well as 
underscore the general reception of  “science” as a conceptually isolated system of 
representation. 
 If Newton’s approaches are conceived as types of literacies, each with both its 
corresponding texts as well as rules for ciphering and de-ciphering, what emerges in the 
analysis are consistent double-moves, in which a surface conformity to the overt literacy 
is subtly supplemented by slippages from the other literacies. By  “slippage” I mean a 
process whereby Newton invisibly deploys crucial and even foundational principles from 
one area of inquiry in another area of inquiry, and uses them not as ancillary concepts but 
as the crux of the other system’s authority to speak truth. The Newton that emerges from 
this complicated method of reading and writing the worlds of nature, self, and God is 
more than “not quite a Newtonian,” as Miller says in his “Introduction” to The Bentley 
Letters (277). Instead, he is always and already a Newtonian, an alchemical theologian, 
producing natural philosophic writings as a complex ensemble of multi-leveled codes that 
seek at the overt —and base—level to translate the “Book” of nature into a clear 
accounting of physical processes while at a covert—and apotheosic—level seeking to 
translate that Book into an authorizing text for Newton himself translating into something 
close to “perfect creation.”  Newtonian science, in the hands of its progenitor himself, is 
really a subservient part of a larger system of knowledge construction. That larger 
system, reflecting a fundamental belief in a “Unity of Truth,” (Dobbs and Jacobs 9) aims 
only superficially at knowledge for knowledge’s sake. Instead, Newton uses methods of 
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natural philosophic knowing as means to a theological end: the demonstration of a very 
peculiar and Newton-specific god. That Newton-specific god, as the constellation of 
grounding principles for all three of Newton’s literacies, provides a way to 
recontextualize Newton’s system(s) of knowledge to understand how “science,” as it has 
come to be practiced, lends itself to “sinister” and “fascist” applications, as Burke notes 
in the last quote above.
In this chapter, I examine moments in Newton’s natural philosophical and related 
texts where slippages from his other systems, alchemy and theology, appear most 
obvious. My approach throughout is not to begin with the assumption that Newton was 
“Newtonian,” in the sense of having a purely mechanistic, skeptical, and empirically 
grounded view of the world. In part, I am following up on Markley’s comment in Fallen 
Languages that Newton’s science, which he sees as one of several forms of  “Physico-
Theology” developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as it came to be 
defined initially drew its basic truth-value power from Newton’s Arian theology, but 
subsequent permutations of the system shifted that power to the experimental method 
itself, while simultaneously denying the theological basis of that power in the first place. 
This process, according to Markley, is not a simple matter of eighteenth century science 
becoming “more secular; theology is not exorcised from the corpus of Newtonism but 
repressed within it” (Markley 183-184). In this light, receptions of Newton’s ideas by 
scientists who came after him effected a crucial transformation of Newton’s complex 
theological-philosophical system, with its own ontology, epistemology, as well as ethics 
and aesthetics, into a cruder atheological philosophical system, in which categories such 
as ontology and epistemology collapse, and what we are left with is an empiricism whose 
powerful means could be said to almost overwhelm its articulatable ends. Ethics, in 
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particular, are simultaneously erased and reinscribed as a form of mechanical 
subjectification, with “scientific management” as just one example. Because of this shift 
of power from a transcendent authority to an immanent “authorizing,” a conceptual 
chasm develops in that Newton’s science, a complete philosophical system when viewed 
as a complex mix of science, alchemy, and theology, is reduced to just “science.”  Hence 
my method is more an attitude towards Newton, attempts to explicate and apply a context 
for understanding Newton that is driven by the end of making his entire works “normal,” 
that is, internally consistent, (psycho)logical, and socially-saturated. Those last two 
criteria—(psycho)logical and socially saturated—require positioning his texts as 
responses not only to eighteenth century natural philosophical questions but also more 
critically to the often socially dangerous demands of his peers, the emerging community 
of scientists. In that frame, three key elements emerge in Newton’s “discursive” 
interactions with his world.  One element is crypticity, a mode of rhetoric overtly 
referential and disinterested while covertly persuasive and “interested.” Another element 
is Oneness, a theologically based foundational belief in a strict hierarchical design of the 
world. The final element is purification, a general pattern of method characterized by 
systematic policing of corruption to purify all aspects of the world, including the 
physical, the spiritual, and the social.
On Arianism
Given my placement of Newton’s theology as at both the top of and subsuming 
his Natural Philosophy and his alchemy, it follows that Newton’s Arianism both 
influences the development of his science and also outlines the “ends” of all his 
discourses. Arianism, a heretical Puritan theology first taught by the fourth century 
Alexandrine monk Arius, maintained that God the father and Jesus were separate 
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substances, a point countered by the Bishop of Alexandra, Athanasius, at the council of 
Nicea in 325. The “official” resolution of this point of theological dispute was the 
adoption of the notion of Homoousion, that is, the belief that Jesus and God the father are 
the same substance or entity, by the Catholic Church, and maintained as well by most 
official branches of Protestantism (Westfall 123). In Arianism, Jesus, rather than being a 
commingled Son of God, and therefore not God, is instead God’s first perfect creation
(White 149). Since the official word, first promoted by Catholicism and then carried on 
by the Protestant reformation, is that the three-in-one God is the correct translation, the 
Arian heresy underscores both the “corruption” of texts via translation of those who 
would call themselves authorities on God, and the need for covert promotion of the truth.
 By the eighteenth century, Arianism was an underground religion, and an official 
heresy whose promulgation could result in variety of sanctions. Along with Roman 
Catholicism, Arianism was specifically excluded from the protections afforded by the 
Toleration Act of 1689 (White 234). Newton, as a fervid if underground advocate for 
Arianism, found himself in a dangerous position, especially as Lucasian professor at 
Trinity College, whose name itself reflects the secular and religious prescription of 
Trinitarianism, as well as the proscription of Arianism. Newton’s sidestepping of the 
requisite ordination that comes with the professorship, in which he managed an 
unprecedented dispensation from the king while never revealing his Arian protest (White 
150-151) demonstrates his overall strategy of covertly maintaining a radical theological 
stance while overtly seeming to be occupied with other interests, notably the burgeoning 
Natural Philosophy of the Enlightenment period. Even Newton’s written output broken 
down by field supports this claim: more of his overall writing, according to one estimate 
1,400,000 words, is devoted to theology than either alchemy or natural science, yet the 
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bulk of his published work, at least during his lifetime and until the latter half of the 
twentieth century, was in the least “written” area: natural science (73).
Partially because of the danger of publicly advocating for Arianism, Newton is 
invited to practice a method of reading-the-world characterized by rhetorical subterfuge. 
In Natural Philosophy, he is not so much working outside religious metaphysics as he is 
subtly avoiding promulgation of the directing of such inquiries towards the larger 
seventeenth and eighteenth century assumed goal of “proving” the existence of a very 
Christian and very Trinitarian god—Bentley’s task in fact.  This task Newton can neither 
support whole-heartedly nor completely avoid, as the opportunity is both for covert proof 
of an Arian God and for overt assistance with a discernible Enlightenment project, which 
at least in its early stages, involves the coupling of a Christian theology with the 
emerging Natural Philosophy (Latour 33). Newton, however, doesn’t deal only with the 
community of Trinitarians: he has to contend with the Natural Philosophers of his time as 
well, largely embodied in the Royal Society. Their book—the book of nature—has also a 
method of literacy, and that method could be said to read the world through the lens of 
generalizability, accuracy, and simplicity, as Ronald Schleifer describes the three primary 
characteristics of Enlightenment science in his Analogical Thinking . Established in 1660 
by Charles II, the Society took as its motto Nullius in verba (Not by word of mouth), 
highlighting from the outset the society’s belief in the experimental method, and not lore 
or anecdotal observation, as the method par excellence for determining the real.  
Structure of this Discourse
To get at the complex set of psychological, social, and philosophical factors 
giving rise to Newton’s Natural Philosophy, I somewhat arbitrarily divide my argument 
into three subsections. In the first section, I describe Newton’s first formal engagement 
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with the British Royal Society, arguing that Newton’s treatment by and of his peers 
invited Newton to perceive science as a competitive enterprise in which public 
expressions of scientific findings involved less persistence in objective knowledge 
construction than clever, if not brilliant, overt and rigorous scientific knowledge 
construction slaved to a larger end of social hierarchy manipulation. In the second 
section, I argue that Newton’s most famous Natural Philosophic text, the Principia, in 
light of its social surround, functions not only as an overt presentation of a complete 
system of knowledge construction but more importantly as a text designed to maintain 
Newton’s placement of himself at the top of the social hierarchy. In the last section, I 
argue that Newton’s treatment of Gottfried Leibniz when Newton is at the height of his 
career reflects Newton’s real agenda: to use the ostensibly disinterestedness of the 
scientific community to serve his self interest, specifically, his agenda to make himself a 
kind of lord of science.
Constructing Community I: Hooke(d) on Hierarchy
In his “Postscript” to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn, responding 
in part to “reiterated criticisms” of the text seven years earlier, defines a scientific 
community as follows:
A scientific community consists, on this view, of the practitioners of a 
scientific specialty. To an extent unparalleled in most other fields, they 
have undergone similar educations and professional initiations; in the 
process, they have absorbed the same technical literature and drawn many 
of the same lessons from it. Usually the boundaries of the standard 
literature mark the limits of a subject matter, and each community 
ordinarily has a subject matter of its own. There are schools in the 
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sciences, communities that is, which approach the same subject from 
incompatible viewpoints. But they are far rarer there than in other fields; 
they are always in competition, and their competition is usually quickly 
ended. As a result, the members of a scientific community see themselves 
and are seen by others as the men uniquely responsible for the pursuit of a 
set of shared goals, including the training of their successors. Within such 
groups communication is relatively full and professional judgment 
relatively unanimous. Because the attention of different scientific 
communities is, on the other hand, focused on different matters, 
professional communication across group lines is sometimes arduous, 
often results in misunderstanding, and may, if pursued, evoke significant 
and previously unsuspected disagreement. (177)
I quote at length because this definition, more than any other, presents both the idealized 
surface of the “scientific community” of Newton’s day, embodied in the British Royal 
Society, as well as hints at its behind-the-scenes social machinations.  This definition is 
scintillatingly dialogic. As Kuhn tries, with considerable centripetal rhetorical force, to 
make of science a “special” field, “unparalleled” in its adherence to a textual canon, 
where quick and decisive “competition” of ideas determines truth, and where the 
members “see themselves and are seen by others as the men uniquely responsible for the 
pursuit of a set of shared goals, including the training of their successors,” a counter 
centrifugal rhetorical force threatens the stability of the definition. Incompatibility does 
occur—though it is “rarer” than in, one might assume, less truthful fields. The idealized 
“full communication,” similarly, is sometimes “arduous,” resulting in an implied 
forgivable “misunderstanding.” The centrifugal dialogic of this definition reaches its 
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highest intensity at the very end of the paragraph: infelicities of communication can result 
in “significant and previously unsuspected disagreement.” 
The tension in Kuhn’s definition, I maintain, comes from his attempt to both 
“socialize” science while also denying its social nature. Instead, what is more apt is an 
inversion of Kuhn’s definition, where “competition” is between “men”—and in the case 
of the “model” scientific community, white, upper-class men—and not the ideas 
themselves. In that light, communication becomes covertly rhetorical, with “significant 
and previously unsuspected disagreement” indicative not of a conceptual conflict, though 
that may be the site where power is overtly played out, but of a human conflict. In other 
words, competition between men for status is negotiated in part by displays of ostensible 
“scientific inquiry.” 
Using Kuhn’s definition, one might assume that the most representative 
community of early Enlightenment scientists was the Royal Society. Indeed, Hooke, 
Boyle, Newton, Flamstead, Halley, Barrow, Oldenburg, and a host of others involved 
with the Royal Society are frequently treated by historians of science as the emerging 
model of scientific practitioners forming a community, as Margery Purver in The Royal 
Society: Concept and Creation maintains:
That the activities of the Royal Society enormously accelerated the 
development of the natural sciences is generally accepted; but that this 
was the working out of a conscious, deliberately conceived ideal has been 
lost to sight, and with it, the real significance of the early Royal Society’s 
contribution to science. Perhaps, paradoxically, it is some measure of the 
originators’ success that what they had pioneered came to be taken for 
granted. Those succeeding generations for which the society had so 
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tenaciously struggled to build a solid foundation for a new ‘Systeme of 
Natural Philosophy’ failed to see that strenuous action had ever been 
necessary, supposing that this undertaking was the unpremeditated, 
inevitable product of its age. (239)
Unlike Purver, who argues the Royal Society was the critical determinant in setting the 
stage for “the single most important turning-point in the story of man’s relationship with 
his physical environment” (239), Kuhn makes no mention of the Royal Society in 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. That omission is somewhat understandable, given 
that Kuhn’s sense of scientific community refers more to a group of people who are 
drawn together by a commonly held paradigm rather than a group established through 
formal inclusion in an “official” institution. Conversely, Purver’s general argument is 
almost at the other extreme. Modern science, for Purver, is the result of the Royal Society 
consciously going against ideas that were “antiquated, unrealistic and sterile” by acting 
on Francis Bacon’s call for a new method and cutting “away the whole existing system of 
natural sciences, and deliberately [beginning] the process of creating new sciences in 
which an organized body of related inductive knowledge, capable of continuous, 
unlimited development” for “the long term benefit of mankind” (235).
Both, I maintain, are partially correct—Kuhn with his sense of  “community” that 
underscores science as a social enterprise and Purver with her assertion of the 
prominence of the Royal Society in forming such a Kuhnian community. Yet both, I 
additionally maintain, are clearly blinded by an idealized view of the scientific enterprise. 
Kuhn would have us believe that objective truth wins the day, overwhelming psycho-
social factors, though they are involved, and Purver would have us believe that the Royal 
Society policed successfully against the confounds of psycho-social factors, offsetting 
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“the failure of some Fellows [of the Royal Society] to grasp the basic principles of its 
scientific policy, and a degree of dilettantism” (238). Implicit in both is a sense that 
“disinterestedness,” that is, freedom from human bias, is the primary stance of the 
scientist, who, to return to the concept of suprahumanization of science, somehow 
transcends the petty world of strivings for status and power, and sacrifices personal gain 
for the lofty goal of objective truth. In both, one almost gets a sense of two iterations of 
Lives of the Saints, with Kuhn’s approach focusing in a very Protestant way on scientists 
being infused with the holy spirit of objectivity, and Purver’s approach focusing on the 
“Father” church of the Royal Society. I am not being entirely glib with my religious 
comparison. According to Purver, the Royal Society was founded upon principles 
outlined by Francis Bacon, whose “vision of the new sciences was down to earth; the 
facts of nature were the subject of his study. Yet the impulse behind it was essentially a 
religious one, and the Royal Society, as a body, followed his precepts on religion in its 
relation to science” (143).
However, by Newton’s time the situation, in terms of the relationship between 
religion and Natural Philosophy, was complex. Shapin, in The Scientific Revolution,
argues for a more complicated relationship between early science and Christianity:
[…] the sense in which early modern changes in Natural Philosophy 
“threatened” religion or were animated by irreligious impulses needs to be 
carefully qualified or even denied. In speaking about the purposes of 
changing natural knowledge in the seventeenth century, it is obligatory to 
treat its uses in supporting and extending broadly religious aims.
There was no such thing as a necessary seventeenth-century 
conflict between science and religion, but there were quite a few specific 
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problems for the relations between the views of some natural philosophers 
and the interests of some religious institutions [Italics Shapin’s]. (135-136)
On the one hand, as indicated earlier, and as I explore at length in Chapter Four, 
Newton’s science and religion were inseparable, demonstrative of Shapin’s sense of 
science “supporting” and “extending” theological agendas. In many ways, Newton 
superficially fits this mold of scientist as engaged in a religious enterprise. However, 
given his psychology, which, as I argue in detail in Chapter Three, drives him to express 
an Adlerian “will to superiority” through an agonal approach to scholarship with an end 
goal of verification of his high status, and his embracing of his specific heresy, what we 
have with Newton at the time of his first major interaction with the Royal Society is an 
individual predisposed to view all communities as both tending towards spiritual 
corruption and threats to his status. In retrospect, it would have been nice, as Brett says to 
Jake in The Sun Also Rises (Hemingway 251), if Newton’s initial interaction with the 
Society was an example of both Kuhn’s sense of suprahumans devoted to truth, exclusive 
of human peskiness, as well as an entity devoted to consistently upholding 
disinterestedness.
What happened to Newton, sadly, is almost the opposite. In January, 1671, after 
having given the Royal Society, at their request, what was the most advanced telescope of 
the era, Newton received a letter from James Oldenburg, a Society Fellow, requesting 
that Newton send a detailed description of the telescope, in large part to “provide some 
meanes to secure this invention from ye Usurption of forreiners” (73). As Westfall notes, 
Newton seemed flattered by the letter –“fairly beamed as the warm glow of praise fell 
upon him” (83), and responded to Oldenburg in the affirmative, adding somewhat 
cryptically at the end of the letter that he “would testify to [his] gratitude by 
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communicating what my poore and solitary endeavors can effect towards ye promoting 
your Philosophicall designes” (80). Newton's “poor and solitary endeavors,” in this 
instance, referred to his work on light and the corpuscular theory, and in 1672, his 
account was published in the Royal Society's Philosophical Transactions. Robert Hooke, 
when the telescope is demonstrated at the Royal Society, dismisses Newton’s device. 
Society Fellow John Collins, who was at the meeting, recounts Hooke’s attack:
Mr Hooke moreover affirmed coram multis [in the presence of many] that 
in the year 1664 he made a little tube of about an inch long, to put on his 
fob, which performs more than any telescope of 50 foot long made after 
the common manner; but the Plague happening, which caused his absence, 
and the fire, which demanded his employments about the City, he 
neglected to persecute the same, be unwilling the glass grinders should no 
anything of secret. (Qtd. in White 178).
Hooke’s claim is extraordinary, given the nature of Newton’s invention. What Newton 
had developed was a telescope that made use of concave mirrors rather than a set of 
convex lenses, allowing the instrument to avoid the distortion in light inherent in the 
older design. Significant here as well is Hooke’s stated reason for not pursuing his own 
design: to keep secret the knowledge from what one imagines are “forrein” glass 
grinders. Despite the overt commitment of Royal Society Natural Philosophers to share 
knowledge and technology, in large part ostensibly so that experiments, observations, and 
other empirical demonstrations could be replicated, those in the know are a select group, 
not just of the same nationality but also of same class—the emergent “Royal” scientist.  
Most remarkable here is that Hooke’s comment is a blatant lie, a nearly parodic moment 
of word of mouth reportage.
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Hooke, apparently not content with belittling Newton’s mechanical efforts, also 
accused Newton of the greatest transgression of an Enlightenment scientist: the feigning 
of hypotheses. At issue was the nature of light, with Newton adhering to the corpuscular 
or particle theory, and Hooke to the wave theory. Newton’s work with prisms that lead to 
his presentation before Hooke and the rest of the Society seemed to indicate that light 
was composed of particles.  Specifically, Newton claimed in his 6 February 1672 letter to 
Oldenburg that he did not “mingle conjectures with certainties,” that “it can no longer be 
disputed whether light be a body” (100), directly affirming that his experiments had 
proven Newton’s corpuscular theory, and by extension, disproved Hooke’s favored wave 
theory. Hooke’s response to Newton’s ideas, sent to Oldenburg less than two weeks later, 
is unequivocally disdainful: “I cannot yet see any undeniable argument to convince me of 
the certainty thereof. For all the expts & obs: I have hitherto made, nay, even those very 
experiments which he alleged to do seem to me to prove that light is nothing but a pulse 
or a motion propagated through… a uniform or transparent medium” [italics added] 
(110). That “alleged” is no innocent term: Hooke is stating not only that he has counter 
empirical evidence, which by itself is just what we would expect a true scientist would 
use as proof, he also is implying Newton did not even conduct the experiments, an attack 
not on theory or on method, but on character. 
In June of 1672, Newton responded to Oldenburg, answering Hooke’s 
Considerations, the outline of his critique of Newton’s light studies published in the 
Transactions.  Newton writes:
But I must confess at ye first receipt of those Considerations, I was a little 
troubled to find a person so much concerned for an Hypothesis, from 
whom in particular I most expected an unconcerned and indifferent 
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examinations of what I propounded... But yet I doubt not but we have one 
common design, a sincere endeavor after knowledge, without valuing 
uncertain speculations for their subtleties, or despising certainties for their 
plainness. . . . Mr. Hook thinks himselfe concerned to reprehend me for 
laying aside the thoughts of improving Optiques by refractions. But he 
knows well ye it is not for one man to prescribe Rules to ye studies of 
another, especially not without understanding the grounds on wch he 
proceeds. Had he obliged me by private letter on this occasion, I would 
have acquainted him with my success in the tryalls that I have made of 
that kind. (171-172) 
What emerges in this “public” interchange is far less a model of gentlemanly scientists 
objectively discussing findings and methods than it is an example of an 
“institutionalized” moment of a more powerful member of a community retaliating 
against a potential contender for power, using in particular the idea of  
“disinterestedness” in a most self-interested way. A number of issues emerge here, not 
the least of which is the issue of public and private.  Letters between Society members, 
though ostensibly private, frequently form the basis for presentations read to the Society, 
and then are translated into proceedings in the Transactions. Additionally, the letters 
allow for an interesting handling of discourse: though the entire text of Newton’s June 11 
letter is a point-by-point response to Hooke’s criticisms, it is sent to Oldenberg, and 
forms the basis for yet another presentation at the Society, as well as another publication 
in Transactions. This use of a third party characterizes many of Newton’s letters, 
especially when they involve direct rivals such as Hooke and much later, Leibniz, and 
works as a kind of deflection of the real target. An early example is the letter quoted 
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above, where Newton, Westfall writes, not only outlines a “brilliant” argument 
concerning analysis versus modification, he also presents 
an argumentum ad hominem. Far from omitting Hooke’s name, Newton 
inserted it into the first sentence of the reply, in the last, and in more than 
twenty-five [27, by my count] others in between. He virtually composed a 
refrain on the name Hooke. Successive drafts of various passages passed 
through three or four stages, each one more offensive than the last. (92)
For Westfall, this exchange is undeniably agonal. Westfall’s martial metaphor as he 
continues is more telling than he knows:
[Newton] employed the broadsword instead of the rapier. Where Hooke’s 
observations had been irritatingly patronizing, Newton’s reply was 
viciously insulting. – a paper filled with hatred and rage. The Royal 
Society forebear to print Hooke’s critique lest it appear disrespectful to 
Newton. It did allow for Hooke to endure the humiliation, first of hearing 
the response read at a meeting, then of seeing it in print in Philosophical 
Transactions. (93)
What is especially interesting about Westfall’s presentation of this incident is a consistent 
framing of the incident as an understandable tit-for-tat episode that fails to highlight that 
Newton, by Westfall’s own analysis, soundly trounces Hooke—his elder and a powerful 
member of the Royal Society. Implicit in Westfall’s precise accounting is an overlay of 
justification for Newton’s rhetorical attacks: Newton ends up correct about light, ergo, 
the human squabble, always outside of real science, appears as a quirk rather than a 
significant factor in Newton’s discourse. The hidden move is a view of science working 
its way to truth through two men who happen to be squabbling rather than two men, both 
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conscious of rank and status, using “science” to manipulate those ranks. In this instance, 
the social fact is that Newton both is protected by the Society and has Hooke punished. 
The fact that Hooke loses status—endures public “humiliation”—comes off in Westfall 
as an inevitable consequence of backing the wrong idea, rather than having been 
outclassed by an upstart.  Newton’s expertise in idea construction invites that easy 
analysis, and certainly principles of science can be applied outside of such an agonal 
field. But it is that very outside-the-human-ness of science that especially invites a 
misappropriation of the authority of science to neglect or do social violence to the human.
Despite Newton’s success with Hooke—both in refuting Hooke’s science and in 
socially wounding him—he threatened to resign from the Society in 1673. Newton writes 
to Oldenburg in March:
Sr I desire that you will procure that I may be put out from being any 
longer fellow of ye R. Society. For though I honor that body, yet since I 
see I shall neither profit them, nor (by reason of this distance) can partake 
of the advantage of their Assemblies, I desire to withdraw. If you please to 
do me this favour you will oblige
Your humble servant
I Newton. (262)
Both of Newton’s reasons for withdrawing are typical of his frequent self-deprecating 
rhetoric that masks an angry superiority. Both, as well, are ironic. Newton’s continued 
engagement via letters with the Society after the Hooke episode, primarily through 
ostensibly “private” correspondence with third party Oldenburg, suggests he very much 
thought he had something to offer the Society. Relatedly, from the outset Newton hasn’t 
really taken advantage of the physical assembly, the public meetings. His approach 
49
throughout has been to act behind the scenes via the letters, letting the letters alone create 
his ethos, rather than manipulating directly as Hooke did. However, the continued 
criticisms of Newton’s ideas, from Society Fellows such as Christian Huygens, John 
Collins, John Gregory and others, Newton seems to treat more and more as personal 
affronts, though none beyond Hooke display anything but admiration, honest questions, 
and requests for clarification. Newton writes to Collins in May, 1673: 
Concerning the expenses of being a member of ye R.S.  I suppose there 
hath been done me no unkindness, for I met wth nothing in yt kind besides 
my expectations. But I could wish I had met with no rudeness in some 
other things. And therefore I hope you will not think it strange if to 
prevent accidents of that nature for ye future I decline that conversation 
wch hath occasioned what is past. I hope this, whatever it may make me 
appear to others, yet will not diminish your Friendship to me. (282)
In early June 1673, Oldenburg, seeming to think Newton’s withdrawal from the Society 
has to do with annual fees, offers payment of membership fees, along with apparently 
permanent waiver of such fees in the future. Additionally, note his almost pleading tone 
as he attempts to explain how the Royal Society really feels about Newton:
And I could heartily wish, you would pass by such incongruities, yet may 
have been committed by one or the other of the Body towards you, and 
consider, that hardly any company will be found in the world, in whc there 
is not some or other yt wants discretion. You may be satisfied, that the 
Body in general terms esteems and loves you, wch I can assure you of, 
fide viri bondi, who am with all integrity
Sir
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Your humble and faithful servt. (284) 
 In June 1673, Newton writes to Oldenburg an even stronger declaration of withdrawal, 
this time not only from the Society but from the very field of Natural Philosophy:
But I must, as formerly, signify to you, yt I intend to be no further 
sollicitouus about matters of Philosophy.  And therefore I hope you will 
not take it ill if you find me ever refusing doing anything more in yt kind, 
or rather yt you will favor me in my determination by preventing so far as 
you can conveniently any objections or other philosophical letters that 
may concern me. (294-295).
Westfall maintains Newton’s gradual neglect of interactions with other scientists 
following this exchange was mainly due to his being “absorbed in theology and alchemy" 
and therefore “distracted by correspondence and criticism on optics and 
mathematics”(133). White, interestingly, discusses Newton’s “silence” as the time when 
the ideas for the Principia began to come together: 
It was the beginning of a long period of isolation. Despite several attempts 
to draw him from self-imposed isolation, Newton maintained a brooding 
silence. Within the isolation of the laboratory at Trinity, the theoretical 
ideas that were to coalesce in the Principia were coming together. Newton 
believed he could not develop his intellectual masterpiece under the gaze 
of an unsympathetic scientific community—one whose members were so 
far behind him they could not even grasp his methods. (188-189)
Both Westfall and White seem driven to provide a rich yet essentially romantic view of 
the isolated genius scientist, with White’s analysis hinting at but not fully exploring, 
much less using a primary determinant, Newton’s perception of himself in relation to 
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other people, justified by and continually elaborated, through his studies in alchemy, 
Natural Philosophy, and Theology. Both have a handle on the facts of the situation at this 
time: Newton is, as Westfall notes, deeply involved with alchemy and theology, and the 
Principia’s ideas, as White indicates, do seem to be traceable to the period roughly 
between 1674 and 1684. However, more is involved here than avoidance of  “an 
unsympathetic scientific community.” Newton is demanding not equal treatment but 
something akin to adoration. Simply, putting aside the objective truth of Hooke’s and 
Newton’s respective scientific claims, both of which are correct, that is, capable of 
experimental demonstration (as I discuss in Chapter Five). Newton’s texts are also 
serious attempts at manipulating social power by deploying truths derived from the 
nascent science to damage a fellow “disinterested” observer’s social status, as Hooke’s 
recorded humiliation reflects.    
Despite Newton’s increasing “self-imposed isolation” following the Hooke 
incident, he continued to maintain correspondence with a number of Society Fellows, 
including Oldenburg, Collins, and Hooke himself. In 1679, Hooke writes Newton in a 
blatant attempt to draw him out: 
Sr
Finding by our Registers that you were pleased to correspond with Mr 
Oldenburg and having also had the happinesse of receiving some Letters 
from you my self make me presume to trouble you with this present 
scribble. Dr Grews more urgent occasions having made him Decline the 
holding Correspondence. And the Society, hath devolved it on me. I hope 
therefore that you will please to continue your former favors to the Society 
by communicating what shall occur to you that is Philosophicall, and in 
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returne I shall be sure to acquaint you wth what we shall Receive 
considerable from other parts or find out new here. And you may be 
assured that whatever shall be soe communicated shall be noe otherwise 
farther imparted or disposed of then you yourself shall prescribe. I am not 
ignorant that both heretofore and not long since also there have been some 
who have indeavourd to misrepresent me to you and possibly they or 
others have not been wanting to doe the like to me, but Difference in 
opinion if such there be (especially in Philosophicall matters where 
Interest hath little concern me thinks shoud not be the occasion of 
Enmity—tis not with me I am sure. For my own part I should take it as a 
great favor if you would please to communicate by Letter your objections 
against any hypothesis or opinion of mine. . . .(297) 
Hooke’s rhetoric here is compelling. First, he claims he represents the society, not 
himself, and is only writing because the official Secretary, Grews, was too busy. 
Secondly, Hooke seems to offer a fair exchange of findings from others, and promises 
that this time the correspondence will be kept private until Newton himself requests 
public dissemination. Finally, Hooke invokes the ideal of disinterestedness, claiming that 
the problems Newton had with him in the past were due to misrepresentation. Overtly, 
the goal of persuasion here seems to be let bygones be bygones, we disinterested 
scientists have work to do, and opinion, status, bias, and other violations of objectivity 
have nothing to do with this enterprise. The specific Natural Philosophical issues about 
which Hooke inquires following this lengthy introduction are Newton’s ideas about 
planetary motion, specifically about earth’s diurnal (daily rotation on its axis) rotation. 
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Newton’s response is typical, both in nearly parodic self-deprecations and in 
positioning himself as only interested in disinterested pursuit of knowledge:
Sr
I cannot but acknowledge myself every way by the kindness of your letter 
to concur with your desires in a Philosophical correspondence….yt I have 
had no time to entertain Philosophical meditations or so much as study or 
mind anything but Countrey affairs. And before that, I had for some years 
past been endeavoring to bend myself from Philosophy to other studies in 
so much yt I have long grutched the time spent in yt study unless it be 
perhaps at idle hours sometimes for a diversion: which makes me almost 
wholly unacquainted wth what Philosophers at London or abroad have of 
late been imployed about…. And thus having shook hands of Philosophy, 
& being also at present taken wth other business, I hope it will not be 
interpreted out of any unkindness to you or ye Society that I am 
backwards in engaging myself in these matters, though formerly I must 
acknowledge I was moved by other reasons, to decline as much as Mr 
Oldenburg’s importunity & ways to engage me in disputes would permit, 
all correspondence with him about them. (300-301)
Note Newton’s ostensible reasons for not “engaging” philosophy: he is out of touch with 
the community of scientists, he is busy with “country affairs,” and he is involved 
studying other matters. The first reason Newton proves unsupportable when he reveals 
later in the letter that he is, at least, aware of Hooke’s recent work on celestial motion. 
The second reason, “country affairs,” is laughable on the face of it: Newton has little to 
do with managing his mother’s estate, and spends the bulk of his time in his quarters at 
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Trinity College. Only the last reason—“other studies,” work in both alchemy and 
theology—is defensible from the historical record, though his work with both those fields 
is not to the exclusion of Natural Philosophy. More significantly, following this list of  
“reasons,” Newton then proceeds to answer Hooke’s specific questions, which concern 
the earth’s diurnal motion.
Unfortunately, Newton made a serious mistake in the mathematics supporting his 
argument.  As White notes, Hooke’s behavior after discovering the error suggests 
anything but the disinterested scientist kindly but firmly assisting a peer in the pursuit of 
knowledge. After discovering the mathematical error, White writes, Hooke breaks his 
promise of confidentiality and
immediately and gleefully read aloud Newton’s work at the next meeting 
of the Royal Society…. By publicly parading this error, Hooke had not 
only broken Newton’s trust but had deliberately tried to damage his 
reputation in the eyes of his scientific colleagues. Worse still, Hooke’s 
calculation had been based upon nothing but a lucky guess. (White 196-
197)
Again, White’s own contextualization of the incident makes Newton entirely the victim, 
and invites a view of Newton’s more rhetorical moments, such as when he claims to be 
ignorant of others’ work in Natural Philosophy when he has kept abreast, as merely 
defensive tactics. However, in 1675, after the initial confrontation over the telescope and 
theory of light, Hooke wrote to Newton after hearing Newton’s earlier letter to Oldenburg 
expressing  “An Hypothesis explaining the Properties of Light Discoursed of in Several 
of my Papers” (362-394) presented at the Society. Newton’s paper specifically attacked 
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Hooke’s wave theory. Hooke’s response to Newton’s successful efforts in demonstrating 
Hooke’s own errors seem less brutal than Newton’s responses to his attacks:
The Hearing of a letter of yours read last week in ye meeting of ye Royal 
Society made me suspect yt you might have been some way or other 
misinformed concerning me…. I do justly value your excellent 
Disquisitions and am extremely well pleased to see those notions 
promoted and improved upon which I long since began, but had not time 
to compleat. That I judge you cannot meet with any subject more worthy 
of your contemplation, so I believe the subject cannot meet with a fitter 
and more able person to inquire into it than yourself, who are every way 
accomplished to compleat, rectify and reform what were the sentiments of 
my younger studies[…].(412) 
The worst one can say of Hooke’s response, beyond the gratingly obsequious tone 
throughout, is that “sentiments of my younger studies” stretches the meaning of both 
“sentiment” and “younger.”  Hooke had been arguing strenuously for his theory of light 
as a demonstrable hypothesis right up to the time of Newton’s critique, suggesting at the 
minimum a very strongly held “sentiment.”  Additionally, Hooke’s 1665 paper 
“Micrographia,” to which Newton addressed the critique, was only a decade old, 
technically published during Hooke’s “younger” period, but not superceded by anything 
the “older” Hooke produced.
Newton’s response to Hooke’s effusiveness suggests the author is something 
more than a victim, as it contains a sentence, White notes, that “has been quoted so often 
yet has been largely misunderstood for over three centuries” (187):
Sr
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At reading your letter I was exceedingly well pleased & satisfied with 
your generous freedom, & think you have done what becomes a true 
Philosophical spirit. There is nothing which I desire to avoyde in matters 
of Philosophy more then contention, nor any kind of contention more than 
one in print…. And if there is anything else in my papers which you 
apprehend I have assumed too much, or nor done you right, if you please 
to reserve your sentiments of it in a private letter, I hope that you will find 
that I am not so much in love with philosophical productions but yt can 
make them yield to equity and friendship. But, in ye meane time you defer 
too much to my ability for searching into this subject. What Des-Cartes 
did was a good step. You have added much in several ways…. If I have 
seen further it is by standing on ye shoulders of Giants [Italics added]. 
(416) 
Again, as with Hooke, at the overt level, this letter seems a professed desire for peace, an 
offer of a friendly relationship, and a self-effacing admission of the historical and 
community dimensions of  “philosophical production.” Indeed, this letter has been often 
deployed to present a view of a humble Newton, the model scientist who seeks no glory 
for himself but only to add to the work of those—such as Hooke—who have done the 
giant’s share of effort. White, however, interprets the quote differently:
In that last sentence Newton revealed the truly spiteful, uncompromising 
and razor-sharp viciousness of his character, for Hooke, once described as 
“crooked” and “pale-faced,” was so stooped and physically deformed that 
he had the appearance of a dwarf. The phrase “standing on ye shoulders of 
Giants” was a perfectly double-edged comment, designed deliberately to 
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mislead. On the surface, it appears a compliment—Hooke is called a 
giant—but Newton meant quite the reverse. (White 187-188) 
White’s strong descriptors—“truly spiteful, uncompromising and razor-sharp 
viciousness”—hide the assumptions lurking around the term “character.” Rather than beg 
the question “how can such a smart man be so mean? it seems better to ask, “what 
framework makes logical a consistency between the smartness and meanness?” The 
answer, I maintain, to that question lies in Newton’s “perfectly double-edged” manner of 
commenting. Newton’s entire system of systems is suggested in this commentary. First, 
Newton’s hiding of the edge that cuts demonstrates his commitment to what I call 
crypticity that is, a discourse strategy characterized by a marked degree of 
indecipherability with a simultaneous avowal of self-evident clarity. In this instance, he 
hides his theologically based belief in a radically hierarchical society, where a sharp 
vertical continuum exists, from base to pure. The inverted allusion to Hooke’s stature and 
“ugliness” are both figurative of the continuum as well as a literal instance. The base 
looking man is closer to the base; and “to stand on” is also to stand over, in violent 
domination. The inversion, significantly, doesn’t only hide the very interested agenda: it 
overtly proclaims the opposite.  Related to crypticity is a belief in radical Oneness, of 
which Newton’s official belief in “Unity of Matter,” (Dobbs and Jacob) reinforced by 
both the science and the alchemy, is not so much the principle itself than an example of 
Oneness’ elaboration in the book of nature. That Oneness, significantly, doesn’t just 
operate at the conceptual level, where there can be only one demonstrable hypothesis, 
such as undulating vs. particulate light, but at the social level, where for Newton there 
can be only one lord of light, so to speak. That belief in Oneness, in turn, reflects 
Newton’s commitment to purification, which is a trend towards radical reductionism, at 
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the conceptual level of his science, and radical policing, at the social level. In the 
following section, I position Newton’ s Principia as a response to what Newton sees as 
the competitive, hierarchicalized community of scientists, covertly drawing the real 
authority for the text from a hidden God the Father while overtly appealing to the ethos of 
objectivity. As are Newton’s letters to Hooke, the Principia is characterized by crypticity, 
is founded on an assumption of Oneness, and employs a systematized method of 
purification.
Constructing Community II: Principia Mathematica Theologia 
Following Newton’s 1679 humiliation by Hooke’s communal exposure of 
Newton’s mathematical error in calculating diurnal rotation, he entered what many 
historians consider the most isolated period of his life as a scientist (Westfall 133; White 
188-189). Not until 1684 did he attempt another major presentation for the Royal Society, 
this time at Edmund Halley’s urging (Westfall 159-160). Samuel Pepys, having replaced 
Hooke as the Society’s Secretary, seemed more receptive to the work, and Newton began 
serious study of what would become the groundwork for the Principia.  The paper that 
resulted was De Motu Corporum in Gyrum (On the Motion of Revolving Bodies). 
Hooke’s more serious accusation—that  Newton feigned hypotheses—obsessed Newton 
in the development of the Principia, and, by extension, his method of doing science. He 
“reluctantly” submitted De Motu to the Society, and only after Halley’s repeated requests 
(White 211). In 1686, he had published the first edition of what could be called the bible 
of science.
Newton’s most celebrated work in Natural Philosophy is his Philosophia Naturalis 
Principia Mathematica. Boyer, in A History of Mathematics, calls it “the most admired 
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scientific treatise of all time” (398). Berlinski, in Newton’s Gift: How Sir Isaac Newton 
Unlocked the System of the World, is even more effusive:
Newton’s masterpiece is […] the Principia[…]. Nothing like the Principia 
had ever appeared before the seventeenth century; and in truth, nothing 
like the Principia has ever appeared afterwards. In very large measure, it 
was the Principia that ignited the furious dark energies that brought 
mathematical physics into existence and that have sustained its fires for 
more than three hundred years.(xiii-xiv)
In truth, one can open almost any book on Newton, general science, or history of 
science and find this nearly religious adoration of Newton’s text. However, this 
“masterpiece,” Albert Einstein notes, is “as austere and forbidding to the nonspecialist as 
it can possibly be” (“Preface” to Opticks xviii). For Einstein, the book’s difficulty is due 
to several factors, including the Principia’s “avoidance of speculation,”(“Preface” to 
Opticks xxxiii), its “archaic mathematical language,”(“Preface” to Opticks xviii-xix) and 
its initial publication in Latin (“Preface” to Opticks xxi). The title itself betrays its nearly 
audacious intent: to provide a method of reading the natural world that results in truthful 
statements about its structure, functions, and properties. In this work, Newton provides 
three books: the first concerns problems of motion that involve no friction or resistance; 
the second addresses friction’s effect on the motion of solid bodies in fluids, and the last, 
which with the even more audacious title of  “System of the World,” brings together 
Kepler’s laws, mathematical representation, and structured observation. The common 
notion of this book is that it is the work of a more or less isolated genius, written in order 
to present a coherent picture of the natural world and a systematic way of uncovering the 
laws of that natural world. However, given the social factors in play leading up to the 
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Principia’s development as demonstrated in the prior rhetorical analysis of Newton’s 
exchanges with Hooke, my argument is that that notion is more aptly descriptive of the 
“community of scientists’” reception of the Principia in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and 
early twentieth centuries than of its actual emergence in the seventeenth century. The 
book certainly lends itself on the surface to the traditional description above: Newton was 
arguably isolated during the work’s later stages; it does present a powerful account of 
nature using a prescribed set of empirical approaches; and it outlines, for the first time 
ever, laws of motion that can be both mathematically represented and experimentally 
demonstrated.
Inarguably, following its first publication in 1684, the book met with immediate 
acclaim. Expectedly, considering the role he played in expediting its publication, when 
the book is first published, Halley gives it a very positive though anonymous review in 
the Royal Society’s Transactions (White 223). Additionally, Halley’s “Ode on This 
Splendid Ornament of Our Time and Our Nation, the Mathematico-Physical Treatise by 
the Eminent Isaac Newton,” which appeared at the very beginning of the Principia, more 
lyrically conveys his praise:
O you who rejoice in feeding on the nectar of the gods in heaven,
Join me in singing the praises of NEWTON, who reveals all this,
Who opens the treasure chest of hidden truth,
Newton, dear to the muses,
The one in whose pure heart Phoebus Apollo dwells and whose mind he 
has filled
With all his divine power,
No closer to the gods can any mortal rise. (Halley Principia 380)
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Halley’s positioning of Newton as “closest” to God for his Natural Philosophic efforts is 
remarkable on a number of levels. First, it presents, however accidentally, what I argue 
throughout this dissertation:  Newton’s efforts in all fields of study involved making him 
“closer to God,” with the critical corollary that other “mortals” cannot rise “closer to the 
gods.” Secondly, Halley’s sanctification of Newton for the Principia, perplexing when 
one considers Halley’s private admission that he could not understand most of the book, 
dramatically underscores Newton’s success in achieving high status in large part via 
construction of a system of knowledge that maintains sharp vertical social hierarchies 
through deployment of language which deliberately and covertly excludes readers, while 
just as deliberately but overtly maintains any sense of exclusion is the fault of the lower-
status reader.  Newton’s book’s unintelligibility takes on almost legendary status at 
Trinity; an oft-told tale is of one undergraduate at the college remarking to another as 
they see Sir Isaac walk by is that there goes “the man that writt a book that neither he nor 
anybody else understands” (Qtd. in Christianson 83).
White is the most forthcoming about not only the book’s difficulty but also 
Newton’s intentional unreadability:
Present day scientists are keen to express their work to the layperson, if for 
no other reason that to popularize their subject in an effort to increase 
funding. Newton took the very opposite stance: He wrote the Principia in 
classical Latin and suppressed publication in English until the final year of 
his life. Furthermore the Principia was composed in the form of 
propositions which followed one from the other, so that the previous 
proposition had to be understood before tackling the next—it was not a 
book to dip into. (216)
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White’s description of the book is accurate, as is his argument that Newton intentionally 
wrote it to be inaccessible. However, his explanation—that Newton “was tired of 
unqualified individuals questioning his great pronouncements” (216)—is only part of the 
story. Ironically, Halley’s poem’s last line—“No closer to the gods can any mortal 
rise”—accidentally reveals Newton’s theological justification. In Newton’s system, 
social, philosophical, and spiritual rank orders are parallel: Newton’s crypticity in the 
Principia, in short, gives him unquestioned status as the lord of science, while preventing 
not only understanding of the scientific principles but also recognition of the Puritan 
heresy that gives the entire approach theological authority.
 By “looking crookedly,” as Cheyl Glenn describes her method of historicizing, at 
Newton’s rhetorical strategies, Newton’s Principia’s ostensible unintelligibility emerges 
as an other-ordered intelligibility, in which the work’s difficulty serves the purpose of 
allowing Newton’s ideas not only dissemination but eventual adulation, while also 
preventing its use as evidence of either heresy or occultism and creating an even more 
radical hierarchy than the old aristocracy or the emerging wealth-based stratification.  
Only Newton, in the end, can fully understand Newton. Newton’s crypticity is a passive 
form of policing, in that it cordons off readers, and sets up a radical stratification based 
not upon blue blood or overt material markers such as wealth but upon how well one can 
interpret the world and the interpretations of the world—of which the Principia stands, in 
this system I am arguing underlies Newton’s efforts, as the primary exemplar. To support 
this admittedly extraordinary claim, I first examine Newton’s discourse for evidence of 
crypticity. Following that, I position Newton’s “Rules of Reasoning” as an outline of a 
system of purification. Finally, I approach the “General Scholium” in the Principia as 
evidence of both Newton’s belief in theological authority driving the enterprise of science 
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and of his attempt to mask that theological authorization, both of which are indicative of 
his conceptual, psychological, and social commitment(s) to Oneness.
Crypticity
Newton’s commentary on his level of discourse in the “Scholium of Book Three” 
in the Principia is revealing:
On this subject [Natural Philosophy] I composed an earlier version of 
book 3 in popular form, so that it might be more widely read. But those 
who have not sufficiently grasped the principles set down here will 
certainly not perceive the force of the conclusions, nor will they lay aside 
the preconceptions to which they have become accustomed over many 
years; and therefore, to avoid lengthy disputations, I have translated the 
substance of the earlier versions into propositions in a mathematical style, 
so that they may be read only by those who have first mastered the 
principles. (793)
In this passage, Newton is addressing directly the particular problem of audience for his 
work. His mention of an earlier “popular” account, which a number of Newton scholars 
maintain was never written, suggests several rhetorical ends sought. On the surface, 
Newton by indicating a preference for a popular account seems to be building an ethos of 
egalitarianism. However, this egalitarianism is suspect from the start: he is really writing 
to the Royal Society, and RS wannabes. Halley and others are pushing him to publish 
within a particular rhetorical field composed of upper class white males—the scientific 
gentry in many ways—with access to education, leisure time, and essentially “servants.” 
Markley, in “Boyle Epitomiz’d” in Fallen Languages, argues persuasively that Boyle’s 
description of the building of an air pump that requires the employment of a veritable 
64
army of servants—“Mechanick People,” in Boyle’s words—to conduct the dirty work of 
constructing and setting up the apparatus to allow the elite, “class-specific” occupation of 
seventeenth century scientist to work. The short of it is that Newton’s audience from the 
outset is anything but “popular” in any real egalitarian sense, and is more on the level of 
equal-among-superiors. Newton’s statements following his rhetoric about really meaning 
to make the text accessible but discovering that it is not the writing but the subject matter 
itself that makes the material inamenable to clear accounting reveals his overall strategy 
of wanting to appear a mere conduit of knowledge while really—and covertly—creating 
a rigidly stratified society of readers-of-the world. The truly literate in this system “grasp 
the principles” and have “perceived the force of  [Newton’s] conclusions,” and have 
given up “the preconceptions to which they have become accustomed over many years.”  
In short, they have been persuaded—and not only of Newton’s conclusions but of his 
method itself, and not only of his conclusions and general method, but most importantly, 
of Newton’s “superiority-among-superiors” in “translating” specifically, the gist of his 
work into “mathematical propositions” that an audience who has “mastered” Newton’s 
principles can finally grasp. However, a higher-order translation is at work here: Newton 
is translating the text of the world via general principles of reading and then is translating 
those translations into yet another text, one that is finally “accessible”—to the masterful 
elite. Accessible, in actual reception, to the extent that Sir Isaac is famous for having 
“writt the book no one understands.” 
To get a feel of Newton’s crypticity at the sentence level in the Principia, I offer 
the following quote from “Book One, Part Three.” In this section he is describing how to 
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find the law “of the centripetal force tending to the focus of the ellipsis:” 
Let S be the focus of the ellipsis… Drop QT perpendicular to SP, and if L 
denotes the princi al lartus rectum of the ellipsis (or for 2BC2/AC), we 
shall have L x QR to L x Pv as QR to Pv, that is, as PE or AC to PC; and L 
x Pv will be to Gv x P as L to Gv; and Gv x vP will be to Qv2 as PC2 to 
CD2; and by (Lem. VII, Corol. 2,) the points Q and P coinciding, Qv2 is to 
Qx2 in the ratio of equality; and Qx2 or Qv2  is to QT2  as EP2 to PF2, that 
is, as CA2 to PF2, or (by Lem. XII) as CD2 to CB2. (Newton Principia 462-
463)
This quote and its preceding figure exhibit a number of provocative characteristics, 
which, taken together, reinforce the concept of crypticity. Newton is pressed not just to 
make his case for this particular principle, but for his whole authority in writing the world 
in such a way. One way in which he forces his authority is via the use of the imperative—
“Let S be….” The imperative mode is a commonplace in “scientific” writing, dating back 
to the emergence of mathematical reasoning in early Greek discourse. It is strongly 
associated with certain forms of what James Kinneavy, in A Theory of Discourse, calls 
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“reference” discourse, as distinguished from “expressive,”  “literary,” or “persuasive” 
discourses. For Kinneavy, although reference discourse is a broad category, “the 
assertions must be referential. This means the main concern  for the discourse must be the 
reality under consideration…. Therefore… the reader as a target of persuasion, emotional 
or otherwise, intrudes only indirectly and implicitly” (88). However, even though this 
quote is not only a sample but also an early model of reference discourse, which ranges 
from scientific treatises to technical writing, it complicates Kinneavy’s system of 
classification. The imperative mode alone is rhetorical: it slips what Aristotle in On 
Rhetoric calls the appeal to ethos from the speaker to the text itself, and literally 
authorizes the writer as one in command, as it is the mode of decree. Secondly, notice the 
use of the first person plural: “we have….” This choice of first person plural, also a 
commonplace in “scientific” discourse, has the rhetorical function, after acceptance of the 
author’s decree by the audience, of making of the reader and writer together the “reliable 
witnesses” to the truth of what is stated. Not insignificantly, it collapses the “I” of first 
person narration, certainly a marker of  “word of mouth” reportage, into a kind of 
collective word of mouth—into shared, consensual validation of what constitutes the real. 
Only this move is purely rhetorical: The ostensible adherence to the Royal Society’s 
motto of “not by word of mouth” is a construct dependent upon the reader’s acceptance 
of both the imperative mode’s authorization, and the invitation to participate offered by 
the collective first person plural. Additionally, the overtones of royalty invoked by the 
“we” invites another layer of persuasion, in which the community of reliable witnesses 
take on the status of the Queen or King, suggesting an interesting displacement of blue 
blood aristocracy with literate blood “scientists,” which parallels the early and mid-
enlightenment’s political move of supplanting the older hierarchy with a newer hierarchy. 
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What is retained is the power of privilege; what is changed is the source of that privilege, 
with the shift in pedigree-ization from a family tree of notables, to an academic VITA, in 
which one’s blood is a blue as the ink upon the university diploma’s parchment.
The imperative mode and the first person plural were commonplaces in scientific 
discourse, especially of the early Enlightenment. Where Newton’s quote goes beyond 
these commonplaces is in its astounding difficulty in decipherability, its crypticity, in the 
language of this dissertation.  First, the sentence is long; if each taken point or point(s) 
transformation (for example “Q,” “C,” and transformations such as “Qv2” are taken as 
“worded” morphemes, this sentence runs over 100 words. Length in itself is trivial: what 
is complex to the point of dizziness here is the compounded ideas Newton is requiring the 
reader, the truly “literate” reader-of-the-natural-world, to both understand and accept the 
new relationships, all towards the larger goal of persuading said reader of the truth of the 
statement, especially in the larger sense of being part of the argument that is the whole of 
the Principia. Note, for example, the latter two parenthetical inserts in this “sentence:” the 
first requires the reader to have read, understood, and accepted “all parallelograms 
circumscribed about any conjugate diameters of a given ellipsis or hyperbola are equal 
among themselves,” (436) as well as its second corollary—“all parallelograms described 
about any conjugate diameters of a given ellipse or hyperbola are equal to one another—” 
(458) in order to follow the mathematical argument. I am not taking issue with the “truth” 
of Newton’s sentence, nor am I taking issue with the larger tradition of geometrical 
and/or mathematical reasoning. I am enough of a Platonist to entertain the idea that there 
may be something like forms transcendent of time, place, person—physical constants 
more or less “outside” of culture (see Chapter five for a redaction of Gödel’s “Platonist” 
mathematics). Nevertheless, Newton is taking such reasoning to new heights, where an 
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overt commitment to disinterested observation, conceptually coupled to the 
Enlightenment discourse ideal of “perspicuity,” hides a covert agenda, which is interested 
and which is deliberately unperspicuitousness. Newton’s complex manner of expression 
makes even Swift’s satire of such language appear a reasonable alternative:
Let A B represent a line drawn cross the dominions of Balnibarbi: let the 
line cd represent the load-stone, of which let d be the repelling end, and c 
the attracting end, the island being over C; let the stone be placed in the 
position cd with its repelling end downwards: then the island will be 
driven upwards obliquely towards D. When it is arrived at D let the stone 
be turned upon its axel until its attracting end points towards E and then 
the island will be carried obliquely towards E; where, if the stone be again 
turned upon its axel until it stands in the position EF, with its repelling 
point downwards, the island will rise obliquely towards F, where, by 
attracting the attracting end towards G, the island may be carried to G, and 
from G to H, by turning the stone so as to make its repelling extremity 
point directly downwards. (203)
Additionally, the quote above’s rhetoric, when juxtaposed with other sentences more 
overtly rhetorical (i.e., “persuasive” in even Kinneavy’s classification), emerges as even 
more effectively rhetorical as it denies its rhetoricity. Consider the following from the 
“Scholium of Proposition II, Theorem III:” 
Since the uniform description of areas indicates that a centre towards 
which that force is directed by which a body is most affected and by which 
it is drawn away from rectilinear motion and retake its orbit; why should 
we not in what follows use the uniform description of areas as a criterion 
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for a centre about which all orbital motion takes place in free spaces? 
(Newton Principia 449)
Why not, indeed? Again, here is the deployment of the first person plural, innocently 
asking for leave to accept a certain logical relation—that there is such a thing as a 
“centre,” about which stuff circles. The seeming innocence of this statement is 
exacerbated by the use of a classic if extra deferential rhetorical question. In this instance 
of brazen deployment of a rhetorical strategy, Newton reveals his hand: what is at issue is 
gravity, especially Newton’s alchemical notion of “action-at-a-distance.” To accept both 
concepts, at least to the extent of allowing for a mathematical, theoretical, and direct 
observational synthesis which lends itself to such concepts’ acceptance by the society, 
one must—we must, to use Newton’s first person plural with its overtones of 
Aristocracy—first accept the concept of centre, which is something that exists not as a 
positive element but as a nexus of relationships—real only to the extent that it fits within 
a system of the world such as Newton’s. 
The reality of the centre of a body is no small thing for an Early Enlightenment 
scientist. First, Cartesian mechanics have allowed the removal of Scholastic “purpose” 
from things in large part by shifting conceptualization from depth to surface. The 
interaction of bodies in space, from a classical Cartesian frame, assumes a measurable 
medium for transference of cause and effect. Crudely, one body acts on another by 
somehow transferring energy via the aether. Newton’s system all but denies the existence 
of the aether, and replaces that concrete form of causality with “action-at-a-distance.” By 
itself, action-at-a-distance does not explain as much as describe bodies in motion. The 
concept of  “centre,” however, lets Newton use the mathematics of surfaces to authorize a 
kind of depth, while methodologically adhering to the opposition to Scholastic purpose. 
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That authorization of depth via “depthless” geometry allows Newton to introduce the 
concept of forces, including inertial, centrifugal, and centripetal, without direct appeal to 
God.
Leaving the issues of the centre aside, the complexity that emerges out of 
Newton’s sentences would be perhaps momentary aberrations, cases of the scientist just 
not yet finding the most perspicuitous manner of expression, or could be just moments in 
which that which is signified is so complicated even the clearest of statements, as nearly 
“perfect” medium of transparent transfer of information, will read as incomprehensible, 
even to the most literate of readers, in Newton’s instance, his Royal Society chums. 
However, the same general pattern of requiring a reader to understand each step of the 
argument fully before moving on to the next, and each step a world of a complex 
collusion of claims, drawn obviously from the semiotic universe of Natural Philosophy, 
but also as I am arguing, from alchemy and Arian Theology, is repeated in the overall 
design of the three books. The last book, beginning with the “Rules of Reasoning,” and 
ending with the “General Scholium,” to be fully understood requires full, step-by-
agonizing-step acceptance of the persuasion via incremental acceptance of each element. 
On the surface, this slow and careful building of an unassailable argument seems the 
ideal of rationalism, at least of logical positivism. However, when the central claims, the 
larger premises upon which the elaborate chain of logic is dependent, are drawn from a 
very different view of reality, then the reader is ultimately left relying on faith—and not 
her own, but Newton’s.  In short, Newton’s Principia requires very sophisticated (if not 
sophistical) hermeneutics; in the instance above involving the slippery centre, the 
argument both depends upon and is a step in a larger argument proving the concept of 
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action-at-a-distance, which requires belief not just in occult force but in a world which is 
designed in such a way as occult forces explain stuff. 
Again, all of the above features of Newton’s text—the neglect of a “popular” 
account, the complex building of a primarily analytic argument, and even the rhetorical 
question assuming the concept of action-at-a-distance—could be framed as merely 
conservative responses to Hooke et al.’s demands for scientific rigor. Additionally, 
Newton is writing at the beginning of modern science, where not only methods and 
findings but also modes of written communication were undergoing development. 
However, given Newton’s repeated claims that he is trying to communicate as 
persuasively as possible the “truth” of his statements, then one would assume that, given 
requests for clarification—in the language of this paper, given opportunities to help make 
his peers’ scientific literacy approach his own level—Newton would assist the reader in 
deciphering his text.  In 1691, Richard Bentley made a serious request for assistance with 
reading the book, with the ostensible end of providing an argument that would articulate 
the connections between Newton’s scientific findings and Christianity. Newton’s 
response, found written in Bentley’s hand with the title “Paper of Directions Given By 
Newton To Bentley Respecting The Books To Be Read Before Endeavoring To Read 
And Understand The Principia,” demonstrates crypticity at its most sophisticated:
Next after Euclid’s Elements the Elements of ye Conic sections are 
to be understood. And for this end you may read either the first part of ye 
Elements Carcarum of John De Witt, or De la Hire’s late treatise of ye 
conick sections, or Dr. Barrow’s epitome of Appollonius.
For Algebra read first Barthin’s Introduction & then peruse such 
Problems as ye find scattered up and down in ye Commentaries on Carte’s 
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Geometry & other Alegraical[sic] writings of Francis Schooten.I do not 
mean yt you should read over all those Commentaries, but only ye 
solutions of such problems as you will here and there meet with….,
For Astronomy read first ye short account of ye Copernican 
System in the end of Gassendus’s Astronomy & then so much of 
Mercator’s Astronomy as ye concerns ye same system & new discoveries 
made in the heavens by telescopes in the Appendix.
These are sufficient for understanding my book: but if you can 
procure Horologium oscillatorium, a perusal of that will make you much 
more ready. (155-156)
What Newton is requiring of the reader, in this specific instance, his “friend” and fellow 
Puritan Robert Bentley, is beyond most of the Royal Society Fellows themselves. His 
reference to Euclid’s Elements seems basic enough, until one realizes there are fourteen 
volumes. Having mastered those volumes, Newton is saying, though couching it in a tone 
suggestive of an easy afternoon’s work, is a fairly exhaustive set of readings ahead, 
ranging from formidable texts on conic geometry to extensions of Cartesian analytic 
geometry—all areas at the cutting edge, so to speak, of mathematics of Newton’s time. 
As if that were not enough, to merely begin reading the Principia, Newton adds in 
offhand way, one should read as well a set of specialized texts on astronomy. As a 
response to Hooke, these directions would perhaps make sense, as Hooke would be much 
more likely than Bentley to have read and understood the referenced texts, while also 
would be arguably deserving of an agonizing requirement of background material before 
Newton would concede Hooke’s understanding. Yet the recipient is Bentley, a 
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sympathetic theologian by all accounts supportive of not just Newton’s science but also 
his Puritan theology.
Purification
Since Newton’s brilliant use of crypticity to make Principia inaccessible even to 
potential religious allies such as Bentley, readers—even friendly readers seemingly 
sharing Newton’s theological goals—are left taking Newton on his word that the 
argument that is the Principia is sound and valid. However, where Newton is clear in the 
Principia is in indicating that Natural Philosophy is intermeshed with theology, as he 
concludes his discussion of God in the “General Scholium” with the comment that  “to 
treat of god from phenomena is certainly a part of Natural Philosophy” (33). The way to 
“read” the world of phenomena, in order to “treat of God” from observations is 
summarized in Newton’s “Four Rules of Reasoning,” also known as “Rules of 
Consequence.” These rules, I maintain, are not only clear expressions of the primary 
characteristics of modern science, they are also rules of purification, drawing their 
authority from a radically Puritanical understanding of God the Father. In Chapter Four, I 
trace how Newton uses very similar rules to purify the texts of the Judeo-Christian bible. 
Here, I position them as two-leveled arguments, which on the surface provide a very 
effective way of conducting empirical science, while underneath “authorize” the 
scientist-theologian to translate the self via the purifying act of translating into a 
substance approaching “perfection.” 
 Newton’s first “Rule” appears almost startlingly clear in comparison to Newton’s 
reasoning in Books 1 and 2:  “We are to admit no more causes of natural things than as 
are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances” (Principia 312). Following this 
statement, Newton offers an interesting argument, posing as almost an afterthought: “to 
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this purpose, the philosophers say that nature does nothing in vain, and more is vain when 
less will serve, for nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of 
superfluous causes.” On one level, this seems an innocent statement asserting the 
Enlightenment characteristic of simplicity. However, note the language he uses—the 
“philosophers” are invoked here as authorities, and nature is anthropomorphized, and 
covertly feminine. Again, both limited appeal to ancient authorities and feminization of 
nature are commonplaces among natural philosophers of Newton’s time, but read not as a 
deployment of a clichéd commonplace but rather as a serious statement, some intriguing 
possibilities emerge. This nature, idealized, is not vain but demure, and that demureness 
is equated with simplicity. Newton’s nature here is an economical nature, whose esthetic 
is coupled to its parsimony—true beauty here is the beauty of the minimal, arguably a 
“puritanical” obsession with policing for the corruption of excess—in this case, excess of 
causes themselves. Perhaps not insignificantly, Newton’s critique here of the “pomp” of 
nonsimple causal notions, sounds similar to his friend John Locke’s critique of a 
feminized rhetoric in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding:
Since wit and fancy find easier entertainment in the world than dry 
truth and real knowledge, figurative speeches, and allusion in 
language will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. 
I confess in discourses we seek rather pleasure and delight than 
information and improvement, such ornaments are borrowed from 
them as can scarce pass for faults. But yet if we would speak of 
things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides 
order and clearness; all the artificial and figurative application of 
words eloquence hath admitted, are for nothing but to insinuate 
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wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the 
judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats; and therefore… they 
are certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, 
wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are 
concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault….(719)
A number of oppositions operate in Locke’s passage: pleasure in discourse vs. 
information for improvement, judgment vs. passion, truth-telling vs. “cheating”, and—
implicit in Locke’s faculty psychology—ordered and simplified mechanism vs. 
disordered and complex organism. Additionally implicit, if not at the crux of the matter, 
is the opposition of philosophy, a general philosophy much in line with Newton’s Natural 
Philosophy, to rhetoric. Locke further invokes the opposition of gender in the ending 
lines of his harangue of rhetoric: “Eloquence, like the fairer sex, has too prevailing 
beauties in it to suffer itself to ever be spoken against. And it is vain to find fault with 
those arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived” (720). Locke’s vision 
of the ideal language—utterly masculinized in the sense of freedom from the seductions 
of pleasure, especially the pleasure of being deceived—is curious when compared to 
Newton’s first rule, with its idealized and demure feminine Nature—and ordered and 
clear woman, subject to the laws of the father, if to “treat of God” through an 
understanding of nature, a nature purified to her real essence, which is, like Locke’s 
clear-speak, free of  “pomp” and ornament—dry, hard truths, expectedly unpleasurable. 
What Newton and Locke want is “truth,” truth in expression in Locke’s system, truth in 
“making sense” of phenomena, in Newton’s system. Both rely upon a kind of violent 
decluttering of corrupt entities of language and nature. Locke even admits to being open 
to accusations of  “brutality” for in his treatment of rhetoric, suggesting, considering the 
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seductress trope deployed, a rape of language akin to the systematic violation implied by 
Bacon’s description of his ideal experimental science:  “We will put Nature on a rack and 
torture out her secrets.” 
That “truth,” in Newton’s system, is beyond an ideal of simple: it is, as expressed 
in the second Rule, transcendent of species, geography, culture, or even planet: 
“Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as much as possible, assign the same 
causes” (Principia 320). This statement encapsulates generalizability, particularly 
generalizability of the first rule’s simple cause.  Interestingly, Newton has it include 
processes in everything from respiration to planetary motion—and in doing so, outlines 
the expanding map of what was once the province of the sublunary, but in Newton’s 
“system of the world,” is stretched from the human to the reaches of vastly space.  
However, this doesn’t necessarily demand Latour’s “crossed out god” response; that is, 
the separation of  “spiritual” from material that is part of the conceptual constitution of 
the Enlightenment.  Instead, Newton’s design, given his hidden Arianism, doesn’t so 
much cross out god as “reduce” God to the “creator” of the ideal system, which despite 
its apparent corruption, hides a simple, generalizable, lawfulness of order, free of the 
deceptions of perception and experience. In a sense, a dual slippage from alchemy and 
Arianism informs Newton’s reasoning: God is the larger occult force who necessarily 
must “act” on the world; otherwise, his status as dominator is undermined. No—this God 
is in the midst of things, though not at first glance in any recognizable way because he 
isn’t, as Newton argues, experienced directly or through reflection but instead as a causal 
originator and perpetrator of this universe. This is the Arian patriarchal Jehovah who 
cannot be divided nor removed from the whole of it: the world must obey his laws, and 
obedience reflects simplicity and order, much as it would in a Puritan household. To 
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“purify” the text of the world is to reduce it to its simple order, and to know God’s 
simplicity and order is to transmute consciousness in such a manner, as it becomes a tool 
of structured observation. God in this system is the most alchemical and occult force of 
all: he acts not so much at a distance but with action-at-a-distance itself, at least in the 
case of gravity and the inverse square law. 
Newton’s third rule introduces the means whereby truth, and by extension, the 
Arian God, is known: experimentation. This rule first appears in the second edition, and 
“is of a different sort,” as Cohen says, than the first two (Principia 199). The concept of 
generalizability is given more detailed outline here, interestingly, as Cohen notes, by an 
indirect appeal to the late medieval doctrine of  “latitude of forms.” Newton states: “The 
qualities of bodies… which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our 
experiments, are esteemed to be the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever” (320). 
This quote appears to reaffirm generalizability, in this instance, generalization from one 
particular experiment to not just other experiments, but to phenomena outside the reach 
of experimentation. Newton follows this rule with the lengthiest passage in the entire 
“Rules” section. In this passage, he makes an argument for strong inference from 
experiments, mainly by operating in a radical mechanistic framework of inter-related and 
inter-changeable parts and wholes:
The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and vis inertia of the 
whole, result from the extension, harness, impenetrability, mobility, and 
vis inertia of the parts; and thence we conclude the least particles of all 
bodies to be also extended, and hard and impenetrable, and moveable, and 
endowed with their proper vis inertia. And this is the foundation for all 
philosophy. (321)
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What Newton is describing, as the “basis for all philosophy,” is a systematic 
approach to conceptualize “nature,” his ostensible object of study. At first glance, it may 
appear that the whole is valorized over the part, but Newton’s argument is for the 
authority of experiment, which isolates a part of the system, studies it, allegedly free of 
other complications involved in the system, and then makes a statement about the nature 
of that particular deliberately isolated moment of the system’s functioning. However, 
what Newton states in the third “Rule,” and to what he is devoting the majority of his text 
in the “Rules of Reasoning,” is an argument for a very liberal extension of the 
experiment’s findings: the part contains the whole, and we know the whole by its part. In 
the language of this paper, Newton would have us read the text of nature by isolating a
sentence, interpreting it, and then making a statement about the whole of it. Without a 
religious context, what we have is a radically objective science in the sense that we allow 
for no assumptions about what is true—other than the inherent truth of our method—to 
interfere with our discovery of real truths, as he says, we don’t refute our knowledge 
through “dreams and vain fictions of our own devising” (Principia 320). Karl Popper’s 
concept of falsification underscores that sense of radical objectivity, in which the 
emphasis shifts from demonstration, positive proof, in a manner, to what could be called 
demon-stration, in which the hypothesis is approached as the opposing argument, and 
refutation determines truth. Truth, in this system is what is left over after “rigorous” 
interrogation—negative proof, in the sense that truth is only that which cannot be dis-
proved. This method of purification—of freeing truth from bias—appears skeptical. 
However, given “Rule” this is a direct, if not grand denial of Hooke’s primary accusation, 
it also can be framed as a response to a skeptical refutation: what Newton significantly 
side-steps is where hypotheses come from in the first place. This reflects another 
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characteristic of Enlightenment thought: verifiability, only what is verified is from the 
outset treated as “questionable.” 
Newton’s fourth rule, appearing first in the third edition of the Principia, and 
which Cohen maintains is “the most important of all,” (Principia 2000), merges 
simplicity, verifiability, and generalizability into a seemingly complete scheme for 
knowing:
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by 
general induction from phenomenae as accurately or very nearly true, 
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such 
time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more 
accurate, or liable to exceptions. (Principia 321)
He follows this, the longest of all the “Rules,” with the shortest commentary: “this rule 
we must follow, that the argument of induction may not be evaded by hypotheses” 
(Principia 39). On one level, this appears a most radical of  “objective” sciences. The 
propositions collected by general induction are the global laws derived from the specific 
instances, and are akin to Platonic forms in their assumed universality, essentialness, and 
transcendence. This system excludes much—in terms of possible contributing or even 
contextualizing factors, notably what could be called “subjectivity,” that is, human 
influence, at its extreme the mental construction of imaginary things, truths, or even 
systems of truth-value determination—“dreaming,” “chimeras,” and “feigning 
hypotheses,” as crude examples, all frequently invoked, with obvious derogatory 
connotations, in Enlightenment writing from Descartes Meditations, to Locke’s Essay to 
Newton’s own work.
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Again, these “Rules,” one could argue, are exactly what they seem: clear, if 
somewhat quaintly expressed, characteristics of modern science. The “purification” 
involved is nothing but the systematic removal of preconceptions. However, note what 
this method excludes: the human as causal agent, except as “disinterested observer.” 
Carried to its extreme, this method carries an invitation to violent domination by 
approaching the world as a set of corrupt “things” whose true purity is revealed only 
through dispassionate dismemberment. Strong language? Consider Newton’s report of 
the following experiment he conducted in 1664:
I took a bodkin [from the illustration accompanying this entry in the 
Notebook, astonishingly, this appears to be a small dagger similar to an 
envelop knife], and put it between my eye and the bone as near to the 
backside of my eye as I could; & pressing my eye with the end of it (so as 
to make the curvature in my eye) there appeared several white, dark, and 
coloured circles. Which circles were plainest where I continued to rub my 
eye with the point of the bodkin, but if I held my eye and the bodkin still 
though I continued to press my eye with it yet the circles would grow faint 
often disappear until I resumed them by moving my eye or the bodkin. 
(qtd in White 61)
Here we have Newton the Natural Philosopher following implicitly all of his “Rules of 
Reasoning:” a simple explanation is being sought for the interaction of the human 
sensorium and the stimulus light, the relationship is being concretely tested via 
“experimentation,” and whatever the results, they generalizable to other “bodies.” 
White’s comment concerning this incident is indicative both of the incident’s problematic 
nature and White’s inability to account for it. White says,  “Youthful enthusiasm and 
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dedication are one thing, but most people would agree that sticking a blade into one’s 
own eye goes far beyond the call of duty. As a result, by nearly causing permanent 
blindness, he came close to destroying his scientific career almost before it had begun” 
(White 61). There is another explanation, but not that of the overly exuberant and 
dedicated scientist. Rather, this behavior is perfectly sensible to the deeply religious 
Puritan who believes understanding the workings of the universe will bring him closer to 
God. Violations of the physical integrity of one’s own body, which “most people” would 
find unthinkable even with the ostensible motive of discovering knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake, are doubly prescribed: overtly by the rigorous objectivity of the 
“Rules of Reasoning” and covertly by the demand to “know of God… through the frame 
of nature” (Yahuda Manuscript 41).
That demand, to know of God through Natural Philosophy, is to recognize the 
world is designed hierarchically, with the human’s place in that hierarchy negotiable via 
alchemical translation of the self from base to pure (See Chapter Three), religious text 
translation from corrupt to pure (See Chapter Four), and scientific “translation” from 
corrupt local activity (Newton’s sensorium responding to light, as in the above example) 
to pure global law. Newton’s “call of duty,” to use White’s cliché, is not to acquire 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake but to isolate, determine, and articulate God’s laws, the 
basest of which are the physical. In the “General Scholium” of the Principia, Newton, 
though still cryptic, provides the real outline of his duty, which is to recognize the 
Oneness of God and the hierarchy that underlies that Oneness:
He rules all things, not as the world soul but as the lord of all. And 
because of his dominion he is called “Lord god Pantokrator” (universal 
ruler). For “god” is a relative word and has referents to his servants, and 
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godhood is the lordship of God, not over his own body as is supposed by 
those for whom god is the world soul, but over servants. The supreme God 
is eternal, infinite, and absolutely perfect being; but a being, however 
perfect, without dominion is not the lord god. For we do say my God, your 
God, the God of Israel, the God of Gods, the lord of lords, but we do not 
my eternal one, your eternal one, the eternal 0ne of Israel, the eternal one 
of the gods, we do not say my infinite one, or perfect one. These 
designations (i.e eternal, infinite, perfect] do not have reference to 
servants. The word “god” is used far and wide to mean “lord,” but every 
lord is not a god. The lordship of a spiritual being constitutes a god; a true 
lordship constitutes a true god, a supreme lordship a supreme god, an 
imaginary lordship an imaginary god. And from true lordship it follows 
that the true God is living, intelligent, and powerful; from the other 
perfections, that he is supreme, or supremely perfect. (Principia 941)
This quote begins Newton’s long argument concerning the relationship of God to 
“nature,” or at least “nature” as is read through his Natural Philosophy literacy. The 
slippage constant here is from Newton’s Arianism, and the critical principle—the 
assumption with which Newton implicitly begins and ends up concluding— is that this 
God of his has a number of traits. First, a radical hierarchy governing relationships 
between things, people, and “God” is assumed, in which language functions as both 
proof and maintainer of the sharp delineation between these three separate but connected 
worlds. Note Newton’s deployment of  “servants” to make demarcations not just 
between God, and us but also between other “lords” and God. The greatest servant here 
is Jesus himself—a name notably not mentioned once in Newton’s entire argument, yet, 
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in light of Newton’s Arian heresy, the best example he could offer here, the one he could 
not have but in mind, is of Jesus, our Lord, God’s first “perfect creation.”  Secondly, this 
hierarchy involves a vertical continuum from imperfect to perfect, with god at the top, 
and “nature” at the bottom. The opposition to perfect in Newton’s system is “corrupt”—
and to extend the controlling metaphor of this paper, the task of the servant translator is 
to read the world free of corruption. Thirdly, Newton’s God has “universal dominion”—
as the quote above reiterates—and is single substance—as the Arian doctrine of 
Homoussianism maintains. Newton’s God’s universality is most radical: his God not 
only isn’t reducible to the sum of its local manifestations, the “laws” determined through 
the rules of consequence, it somehow also doesn’t actively participate in “phenomena,” 
the stuff of experiments, while simultaneously managing to outline the very “rules” 
those experiments uncover. Newton maintains: 
It is agreed that the supreme God necessarily exists, and by the same 
necessity he is always and everywhere, it follows that all of him is like 
himself: he is all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all force of sensing, of 
understanding, and of acting, but in a way not human, in a way not at all 
corporeal, in a way utterly unknown to us. As a blind man has no idea of 
colours, so we have no idea of the ways in which the most wise God sense 
and understands all things. He totally lacks any body and corporeal shape, 
and so he cannot be seen or heard or touched, nor ought he to be 
worshipped in the form of something corporeal. We have ideas of his 
attributes, but we certainly do not know the substance of any thing. We 
see only the shapes and colours of bodies, we hear only their sounds, we 
touch only their external surfaces, we smell only their orders, we taste 
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their flavors. But there is not direct sense and there are no indirect 
reflected actions by which we know innermost substances; much less do 
we have an idea of the substance of God. We know him only by his 
properties and attributes and by the wiser and best construction of things 
and their final causes, and we admire him because of his perfections. (941-
942)
Notice the semiotic definition of God in this instance; “He” is defined more by what he is 
not than what he is. He is not human, embodied, or “sensible:”  he cannot even be 
discerned indirectly by reflection off a surface. This God is overtly masculine, but not in 
a positive sense; instead the repeated uppercased masculine pronoun shunts aside any 
identity with the female, while still not defining a masculinity except as that which is not 
hot nature. This God is a most unCartesian God: he is ethereal in terms of his very 
pervasiveness, yet he stands so deliberately and unmeasurably outside the system over 
which he lords that he functions, rhetorically at least, as much more of a critique of the 
inadequacy of a purely Cartesian universe than as example of the kind of isolation of 
conceptual systems Shapin discusses. 
However, just as we know not the substance of things through reflections but 
instead only attributes and properties, we can know of this God to the extent that we see 
“the wiser and best constructions of things and their final causes.” The key here is what 
Newton means by “Perfection,” especially in opposition to “Corruption.” God in 
Newton’s system is more than perfect: he is the form—as well as the former—of 
perfection. The “true God”, as he says, is “supreme, or supremely perfect.” What 
constitutes the essence of this perfection, I maintain, is a radical Oneness. That Oneness, 
evocative of both isolation and supremacy, is for Newton a literal description of God, as 
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in  “God is one and the same god always and everywhere.” Conceptually, the Oneness
extends to conceive of God—to translate towards perfection—that starts and ends with 
the assumption of a law of the one, so to speak, which subsumes oppositions such as 
corrupt vs. pure, global vs. local, and simple vs. complex. These three oppositions, in 
particular, are at the crux of Newton’s slippage of Arian theology into his Natural 
Philosophy. This Oneness is also reflected in Newton’s belief in the “Unity of Matter,” 
that is, that all matter was initially of one pure sort—a concept Dobbs maintains was 
evident in both Newton’s Natural Philosophy and his alchemy (22-23).
Without Revelation
Given Newton’s crypticity in the Principia,  along with his “Rules of Reasoning” 
drawing their ultimate authrority as a system of purification from a complex God the 
Father characterized by Oneness, the book is a Janus-faced bible of science. On the 
surface, it appears a bible of secular science, as it provides a reasoned if obtusely 
rendered argument, mathematically and empirically supported, that models the very 
epistemological criteria presented in the “Rules of Reasoning.” Disproof, from that 
vantage, appears to be the methodological rule of the day. But from the depths of the 
book, especially in the “General Scholium,” emerges a less secular bible: a way to read 
the book of nature to reveal not just God’s laws but God as simple, generalizable, and 
verifiable lawfulness itself. What Newton’s method does, if we are to take his comments 
in the “General Scholium” seriously rather than as a Deist apology, is systematically 
“prove” God’s lawful design at each moment, and that design for the Arian is severely 
rank-ordered. 
Constructing Community II: The Calculus of Conflict
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In this section, I return to examination of Newton’s experiences with the Royal 
Society, again tracking in his letters the same three characteristics of crypticity, Oneness, 
and purification, evident in both his communication with Hooke and in the Principia. At 
issue is the “scientific community,” as it was with Newton’s earlier exchanges with 
Hooke. This time, however, Newton is no longer the young challenger from the 
hinterlands of Trinity College. Instead, he is the reigning Royal Scientist, in large part 
due to the reputation he began to construct with his earlier exchanges with Hooke, and 
brought to a level making him “closer to God than any other,” as Halley says, with the 
publication of his unreadable Principia. In  1703, at age 60, Newton was elected president 
of the Royal Society, where he immediately began to reform the nearly defunct institution 
(White 285). As White notes, “The Royal Society was saved not only by Newton’s 
impressive administrative powers (the positive side of his incendiary ego and hunger for 
power) but also by his own example as a paradigm for how science should be conducted. 
And he set the tone immediately” (285). Certainly, his first major presentation of 
scholarship to the society following his election, the Opticks, was, as Westfall maintains, 
his “second great work” (251) of Natural Philosophy. Additionally, under Newton’s 
direction the Royal Society became an entity more explicitly constituted as an institution 
of  “modern,” empirical scientists. Westfall writes,
Newton was aware that meetings lacked serious content, and he came to 
the presidency armed with a “Scheme for establishing the Royal Society” 
intended to cure the disease. …He went on to set down five major 
branches of Natural Philosophy, for each of which, presumably, he looked 
forward to appointing a pensioned demonstrator: mathematics and 
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mechanics; astronomy and optics; zoolology (to use our word), anatomy, 
and physiology; botony; and chemistry. (249)
To read White’s, Westfall’s and almost any account of Newton taking the reins of the 
Royal Society suggests he was applying, metaphorically, a kind of calculus of 
community, differentiating at each step the trajectory of the community, while 
simultaneously integrating the area(s) covered under that trajectory. 
However, Newton’s metaphoric calculus of community trajectory takes on a 
sinister tone when the issue is the real calculus itself, what Newton called  “Fluxions.” In 
keeping with the Principia’s crypticity, that is, in making the book overtly a “clear” 
scientific treatise while covertly thwarting a reader’s ability to understand and therefore 
critique Newton’s argument—and by extension, the author himself—Newton had 
deliberately concealed the particulars of his mathematical method (Westfall 280).  In 
1684, Gottfried Leibniz published his version of the calculus (Westfall 276), officially 
making not only public the method of integration and differentiation but also providing a 
symbolic notation so much less cumbersome than Newton’s that it is the notation in use 
by contemporary mathematicians and scientists.
Newton’s reaction is most ungentlemanly: he not only refused to admit the 
possibility that each scientist had developed the method on his own—the conclusion of 
the majority of historians of science—he used his position at the Royal Society to 
publicly humiliate the German philosopher. White’s interpretation of Newton’s motives 
is interesting:
Newton maintained an obsessive belief in his own uniqueness: he was 
convinced there could be only one Christ-like interpreter of divine 
knowledge in the world at any one time, and he never doubted he was the 
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chosen one. The idea that others could independently acquire the same 
insights and accomplish the same breakthroughs as he had was simply 
unacceptable to him. So Leibniz was a thief who had stolen the knowledge 
Newton has unveiled, and had then profligately displayed the material to 
the world. (White 331)
Again, White’s analysis of the factors giving rise to Newton’s behavior is primarily 
psychological, acknowledging the “madness” of Newton’s behavior yet still distancing 
that behavior—and the above motives—from the overall theological system Newton 
employs. That “madness,” I argue, is not merely “normal” but nearly inevitable when 
situated as a logically consistent part of Newton’s overall system of understanding the 
world(s), of his overtly discrete yet covertly entangled literacies, in the language of this 
paper. Newton as “Christ-like interpreter of divine knowledge” captures the covert 
entanglements of Natural Philosophy, with its Rules of Reasoning, of alchemy, with its 
commitment to transmutation of the self from base to pure, and of Arianism, with its 
hierarchical arrangement. Newton’s belief that others could not arise at the same 
knowledge he had is more than merely “unacceptable:” it violates assumptions 
foundational to Newton’s entire intellectual enterprise, threatening not just Newton’s self 
esteem but the very structure of the universe. In short, Newton’s notion of hierarchical 
arrangement excludes the reality of a truly “communal” understanding: to be consistent to 
his own system, Newton is forced to police the community of scientists, purifying the 
body “scientifique” of the worst form of corruption: idolatry.
What White does not explore in detail is Newton’s actual rhetorical tactics in 
purifying the Royal Society body of its “foreign” member, tactics not merely indicative 
of a “harsh” character but of Newton’s commitment to crypticity, Oneness, and 
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purification. The text that brings the issue to a head is a letter Leibniz writes in 1711 to 
Hans Sloane, Secretary of the Royal Society. In it, he responds to accusations made by 
both Nicholas Fatio de Duiller and James Keill, the latter’s accusation in the very public 
form of a published letter in the Society’s Philosophical Transactions. Significantly, both 
de Duiller and Keill were well known Newton apologists, with de Duiller attacking 
Leibniz in a 1699 monograph and supporting Newton, and Keill, intensely involved with 
revisions of the Principia, “Newton’s mouthpiece” (Westfall 282). Leibniz’s response to 
the published assertion that he may have plagiarized the calculus is unequivocably 
outraged:
Mr. Keill … has seen fit to renew this most impertinent accusation when 
he writes I have published the arithmetic of fluxions invented by Newton, 
after altering the name and style of notation. Whoever has read and 
believed this could not but suspect that I have given out another’s 
discovery disguised by substitute names and symbolism. …And because it 
may be frequently repeated by impudent or dishonest people I am driven 
to sek a remedy from your distinguished Royal Society. (97)
Newton’s official response, as President of the Society, is to have the letter read publicly 
and then present orally his own history of his development of the fluxions (Westfall 283). 
Keill, still acting as Newton’s mouthpiece, responded to Leibniz’s complaints in a letter 
to Sloane, again presented orally to the Society. In it, the issue of nationality arises:
Since he [Leibniz] possesses so many unchallengeable riches of his own, 
certainly I fail to see why he rishes to load himself with the spoils stolen 
from others. Accordingly, when I perceived that his associates were so 
partial towards him that they heaped undeserved praise on him, I supposed 
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it no misplaced zeal on behalf of our nation to endeavor and make safe and 
preserve for Newton what is his own. For if it is proper for those of 
Liepzig to pin on Leibniz another’s garland, it is proper for Britons to 
restore to Newton what was snatched from him, without accusations of 
slander. (143)
As Westfall notes, no direct manuscript evidence exists proving Newton’s involvement 
with the Keill letter, “but everything about it—its intimate knowledge of Newton’s early 
papers and correspondance, details of its argument... and above all its style… cries aloud 
of the hand that shaped it” (283).
That “hand,” however, does something well documented in the historical record: 
Newton calls for an investigation into the matter, publicly once again playing the role of 
the disinterested scientist wanting only the truth to come out. Behind the scenes, 
Newton’s manipulation of the Society reflects a very sophisticated form of crypticity,
driven by his commitment to Oneness, and characterized by justification of the 
questionable means of purification via policing towards the end of a “pure” community 
of scientists. Those means included a stacking of the investigative committee with 
Society Fellows sympathetic to Newton, denial of Leibniz’s right to present evidence, 
and Newton himself writing a draft of the report (White 337) which would become 
known as Commercium epistolicum D. Johannis Collins, et aliorumde analysi promota 
(The Correspondance of the Learned John Collins and Others Relating to the Progress of 
Analysis). Westfall, generally sympathetic to Newton, calls the Commercium epistilicum
a brilliant exercise in partisan polemics which testified to Newton’s 
continued mental vigor as he approached the age of seventy. …the total 
impact of the notes, the total impact of the whole volume in the absence of 
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anything in Leibniz’s defense, is devastating. Perhaps it is too devastating. 
Swept along by his own fury, Newton failed to recognize the value of 
moderation. No doubt the volume informed a particular public of events 
that Leibniz had not been forward to advertise. (285)
Westfall’s phrase “brilliant exercise in partisan polemics” is another way of saying that 
Newton’s skill in crypticity, that is, in maintaining an overt stance of the disinterested 
scientist while covertly promoting his self-interest, reached its apex in his treatment of 
Leibniz. Newton, by using first de Duiller, then Keill, and finally the Society itself 
rhetorically positions himself above the fray while actually manipulating the discourses—
even to the point of writing the document while denying its authorship.
The immediate result of this “secret policing,” Newton’s method of purification in 
the language of this paper, was exactly the end to which Newton’s system of systems 
unvaryingly aimed: maintenance of Oneness, in this instance, of a single Lord of science, 
standing over the lesser folks while ascending ever closer to God the Father. Leibniz, not 
surprisingly, responded repeatedly to the Commercium epistilicum, primarily through 
venues involving neither the Society’s meetings nor the Society’s Transactions (White 
338). However, as White notes, “Leibniz [sank] fast into fatal illness and neglect—a man 
equal to Newton intellectually but outclassed and outgunned in all other respects” (339).
In contrast to the short term success Newton’s tactics engendered, the longer-term 
results of Newton’s exercises in crypticity, maintenance of Oneness, and purification in 
creating an “ideal” scientific community are less than desirable. Boyer, in A History of 
Mathematics, describes the community aftermath of Newton’s machinations:
As a consequence of the disgraceful priority dispute [the issue of the 
calculus’ inventor], British mathematicians were to some extent alienated 
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from workers on the Continent throughout much of the eighteenth century. 
A penalty for the unfairness of followers of Newton towards Leibniz was 
thus visited on the next generation of mathematicians in England, with the 
result that British mathematics fell behind that of Continental Europe. 
Upon his death, Newton was buried in Westminster Abbey with such 
pomp that Voltaire, who attended the funeral, said later, “I have seen a 
professor of mathematics, only because he was great in his vocation, 
buried like a king who had done good to his subjects.” Nevertheless, 
despite the recognition accorded mathematical achievement in England, 
development of mathematics there failed to match the rapid strides taken 
elsewhere in Europe during the eighteenth century. (414)
Scholium Redux
Newton’s Natural Philosophical work, as I have traced, is anything but a system 
of thought that is exclusive and disproving of such premodern systems such as alchemy 
and Arian theology. Instead, Newton’s Natural Philosophy draws both divine authority 
and radical hierarchy from Newton’s hidden Arianism. By situating Newton’s within the 
community of Enlightenment players and his writing within the community of 
Enlightenment ideas, I noted certain radical concepts and strategies reflective of his 
hidden studies consistently emerging, including crypticity, Oneness, and purification. By 
foregrounding these principles as foundational assumptions concerning the nature of 
reality, I offered a framework for a rhetorical analysis of Newton’s work which suggested 
Newton’s Natural Philosophic studies, his literacy in reading the book of nature, on the 
surface a compelling model of secular science, is covertly driven by hidden principles 
that allow for certain subjectifications under the guise of objectivity. At the minimum, 
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Newton’s deployment of Natural Philosophic texts to manipulate and wield social power, 
with considerable success, suggests the discursive formations characterizing the practice 
of science meet ends both referential and persuasive, with the strength of the persuasion, 
ironically, determined in part by the degree of seemingly self-evident referentiality. In 
short, scientific discourse may be most effective rhetorically when it denies its own 
rhetoricity—what I have been calling crypticity.
At the maximum, Newton’s hidden theological conceptual support for his method 
of doing science suggests both a certain utility in what many would consider an 
inherently contradictory approach and a built-in limit of Newton’s method. That is, 
Newton’s very “Rules of Reasoning,” encapsulating in part the primary characteristics of 
modern science, may be less immutable criteria than partial frames for understanding the 
world, with Oneness, initially an invitation to productive epistemological development, 
now inviting a complementary response.   In light the productive nature of Newton’s use 
of seemingly opposed systems to provide a more exhaustive description of the world, in 
Chapter Five I examine in more detail Newton’s system of systems, juxtaposing it to 
Bohr’s complementarity, demonstrating that although both thinkers were similar in their 
revolutionary approaches to epistemology, Bohr’s complementarity, in the end, offers not 
only more possibilities for exhaustive description in itself, but more critically provides an 
epistemology of epistemologies that both accounts for and extends Newton’s science. In 
Chapter Six, I return to Newton’s “Rules of Reasoning,” arguing for a Bohrian 
complementary set of characteristics for post-modern science to provide potentially 
productive epistemological frames for development of both a human and a humane 
science.
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Finally, Newton’s Natural Philosophical work, situated within the social matrix of 
Seventeenth and early Eighteenth century England, contributed to potentially troubling 
subjectifications, including development and maintenance of an elite community of 
scientifically literate scientists and an invitation-to-sanctified-mechanization that allows 
for the part-whole relationship to extend to the citizen-community.  Of particular note, 
and in part the topic of the next chapter, is the subjectification implied in Newton’s nearly 
invisible category (and perhaps “category invisible”) “Woman.” To an extent, Newton’s 
Natural Philosophic literacy, based as it is upon a hypermasculinized ideal of God, is a 
method of reading that practices a violent purification of nature, stripping her of her 
femininity, and what remains is what constitutes “Knowledge.” In the next chapter I 
examine Newton’s alchemical texts, where the trope of the woman emerges from the 
shadows of his Natural Philosophy, and Newton “admits” her, much as a spider admits a 
delicious mate.
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CHAPTER THREE
FROM MOTHER’S LAP TO THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: THE FINE AND PRIVATE PLACE 
OF NEWTON’S BOOK OF THE SELF
Being of opinion you have endeavored to embroil me with women & by other means I 
was so much affected with it as that when one told me you were sickly & would not live  
I answered it was better if you were dead.
Letter to John Locke, 1693
& that by a strange metamorphosis done by magical virtue of nature & that after this rise 
she was naked, that is divested of impurities & beautiful & though a body yet she was all 
spirit & yet able  to endure without hurt ye greatest fires that can be made & in this state 
it is properly of matter in which vulgar chemists do not work & which is not to be found 
upon ye earth of the living, tis not the earth wee tread on but that which by sublimation 
hangs over our heads, and which the wise call terra virginea foliata.
 Isack Newton. “Praxis”. 
Isaack
received your letter and I perceive your letter from mee with your cloth but none 
to you your sisters present thai love to you with my motherly lov you and prayers to god 
for you I your loving mother.
Hannah
Hannah Newton. Letter to Isaack Newton., 1663-64. 
The Quintessence is …[the] essential presence of something or someone, the living thing 
itself that animated or gave something its deepest characteristics. The Quintessence 
partakes of both the Above and the Below, the mental as well as the material. It can be 
thought of as the ethereal embodiment of the life force that we encounter in dreams and 
altered states of consciousness. It is the purest individual essence of something that we 
must unveil and understand in order to transform it.
“Quintessence.”( Electronic Dictionary of Alchemy)
The first two quotes above date from 1693, Newton’s  “Black Year,” as historians 
later called it. The “Black Year,” as a kind of dark side of the Enlightenment genius, 
contrasts and complements Newton’s “annus mirablis, “the wondrous year,” the roughly 
1665-1667 period when Newton supposedly worked at the most revolutionary aspects of 
his Natural Philosophy, including the development of his “fluxions,” or calculus. These 
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two quotes are examples of Newton’s “mad texts.”  In the first quote, Newton is writing 
to John Locke and, according to Samuel Pepys, is exhibiting an obvious “discomposure 
in head, mind, or both” (Pepys 280). The second quote is taken from “Praxis,” a sort of 
Alchemical Principia, or at least Newton’s attempt to write an extended treatise similar to 
the Principia in comprehensiveness and contribution. Almost all contemporary receptions 
of “Praxis” treat it as at best a waste of effort, and at worst, as one historian says, as a 
“last-ditch effort at a unification produced from disparate alchemical threads…little more 
than a blend of naked delirium and false conviction—the work of a man on the edge of 
madness” (Pepys 280).  In short, both Newton’s scientific contemporaries and even more 
innovative contemporary historians of science, such as Michael White, treat these texts as 
“nonsense.”  However, both responses are dismissals—negations—in that by making 
these texts nonsense, the texts are only allowed to demonstrate exceptions to a certain set 
of rules, and those rules include a very modernist conception of psychological normality 
and an equally modernist conception of disciplinary normality—“science,” in this 
instance. These texts are now “read,” though mostly in the last half of the twentieth 
century, and even then as potential evidence of Newton’s turmoil over a suspected more 
or less latent homosexuality, in the case of his letter to Locke, or as evidence of a 
wayward intellect, rationalizing the fundamentally irrational, as in the case of his 
alchemical writings. In this chapter, I argue that another interpretation is possible: in 
those moments in his alchemical texts where Newton deploys the trope of the female he 
reveals he is working within interlocked and hierarchically arranged systems of 
representation. These systems, including Natural Philosophy and Arian theology, are 
brought together with alchemy as a bridge between a purifying translation of the feminine 
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book of nature (Natural Philosophy) and a purifying translation of masculine book of 
God (Arian Theology) in order to effect a purification of the text of the “self.” In that 
sense, Newton’s texts are sane to the extent that they at least consistently reflect his 
psychologically ambivalent stance towards not just women, but towards all people in 
general, with category women not just at the bottom of his human hierarchy, but with 
Newton himself at the top, so that all are beneath him. 
How Newton could gain not just such a negative sense of the female but of people 
in general is understandable in light of his first critical relationship—that with his mother. 
That relationship can be summed up in a word: betrayal. The initial betrayal, his mother 
Hannah leaving him with stern, puritanical grandparents from the age of 3 to 11, is really 
the result not of a negligent mother, but of a set of circumstances that invited Newton’s 
mother to survive as best she could following the unexpected death of Newton’s 
biological father, in 1642, just months shy of Newton’s birth. This unexpected death of 
the primary source of income left Hannah, though receiving a better than subsistence per 
annum, far less well off than she might have been had her husband survived. For three 
years, from Newton’s birth on December 25, 1642 to 1646, the two lived alone on the 
income, by all accounts an especially close mother-son dyad.  However, Hannah married 
Barnabas Smith, a moderately wealthy landowner over thirty years her senior, when Isaac 
was nearly four. Surprisingly, the aged new husband lived nearly ten more years and 
fathered three children as well. From the start, stepfather Smith wanted nothing to do 
with Isaac, and seemed to actively discourage contact between mother and son. The third 
quote above, the short letter from Hannah to Isaac, and the only textual artifact extant 
demonstrating her feelings for her son, dates to well after the abandonment period, during 
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his undergraduate years at Cambridge (White 248). To make matters even worse for 
Isaac, while separated from his mother, he is able to climb a tree in his grandparents’ 
yard, and see the steeple of North Witham’s Church, near the Smith estate, a painful 
reminder, according to Christianson, of how “agonizingly close” his mother was (12). 
Christianson notes that the loss of his mother “ate at him like an emotional cancer.  
…The abandoned son not only possessed a volatile temper, but he nursed grudges and 
would wait years, if need be, to gain revenge on those he believed wronged him” (12).
What are we to make of this fact of Newton’s atypically close relationship with 
his mother, followed by just as atypically abrupt separation? The scenario certainly lends 
itself to a crude Freudian analysis, in which the child’s symbiotic bond with the mother is 
first over-constructed and then too harshly violated, leaving the child not only generally 
mistrustful, but also specifically hateful towards the surrogate “father.”  Given some of 
Newton’s behaviors following his return to his mother, another frame is more 
appropriate, namely to see Newton in an Adlerian context, in which his initial 
relationship with his mother, where the “stranger in a strange land,” as Adler calls the 
infant, initially has not only his needs met, but is made into a kind of prince. Adler’s 
psychology is fundamentally a social psychology, in which initial family systems and the 
roles within those systems become models and predictors of a person’s behavior and 
worldview when the person reaches adulthood. At the crux of Adlerian psychology is a 
drive towards superiority, paralleled by a sense of inferiority. The basic response to the 
feeling of inferiority is  “compensation,” in which the will to superiority drives the person 
to achieve in areas in which superiority is possible (Hall and Lindzey; Corsini). 
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For Newton, a significant event in his life that demonstrates not only how he 
literally began to achieve a sense of superiority but how, from an Adlerian point of view, 
he began to see himself as superior, is his fighting with a bullying classmate. In 
describing this incident, Newton depicts himself at the time after his return to his mother 
as a poor student who was small and the frequent victim of schoolyard bullies. However, 
when the worst bully, who is also one of the best students in Newton’s class, attempted to 
beat Newton, he responded with a ferocious physical attack, soundly trouncing his 
tormentor. Further, after the trouncing Newton told the bully, as well as the attendant 
crowd of watchers, that he would beat him at scholarship as well. According to Newton, 
this incident marks the moment when he became the top student in his class (Westfall 13-
14).
What is most interesting about this fight with the bully is Newton’s linking of 
physical dominance with intellectual dominance, so that to achieve superiority, to use 
Adlerian terminology, Newton intellectually trounces all comers. This coupling suggests 
Newton’s approach to scholarship, and perhaps all significant human endeavors, is a 
brutal game of survival of the fittest, and in the end, there can be only one.  Given his 
initial status as prince coddled by his mother, followed by the dethroning and long period 
of isolation at his grandparents’ house, it seems almost inevitable that he would end up 
approaching interactions with other people with an increasing mistrustfulness. 
Additionally, the one area where he truly excels to the point of drawing the attention of 
authority figures is the intellectual, particularly those areas which could be lumped 
together in retrospect as “scientific.” However, those authorities are as much dangerous 
competitors as selfless collaborators: his early story of trouncing the intellectually and 
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physically “superior” bully is matched by his behavior from this moment onward. He is, 
as Dobbs says in Newton and the Culture of Newtonism, a “loner,” but a peculiar loner 
who is involved deeply in other people’s endeavors, many times in vindictive ways, so
that a recent book, Newton’ s Tyranny, which focuses primarily on his relationship with 
Flamstead and Grey, could serve as an apt title for Newton’s life, from his early days at 
King’s, to his days as Lucasian professor at Trinity, to his work at the London mint where 
he rules with a firm and methodical hand (Clark and Clark).
The attention that Newton begins to receive from authority figures, exclusively 
men, following his fight with the bully does offer Newton a set of circumstances that 
allow him to codify his drive to superiority over others, which involves a stark sense of 
hierarchy and dominance. This radical hierarchy applies not just to Newton’s sense of 
place in the flux of human affairs, but in the three worlds in which Newton works 
intellectually—the world of nature, the world of self, and the world of god. These worlds 
themselves, each a form of corrupt text, contain essential pieces of what could be called 
the Holy. Nature’s text, purified of its variations, provides god-determined laws, from 
thermodynamics, to gravity, to vitalism. The self-text, consciousness itself, purified of its 
profanities, provides a pure creation, analogous to Jesus. Finally, God’s literal text, 
purified of its mistranslations, provides prophecy—“what will be” revelations, perhaps 
the complement to Natural Philosophy’s revelations of “what is.” For Newton, these three 
texts and corresponding translations are also arranged hierarchically, so that base “she” 
nature is at the bottom; the self, potentially at least, is between the material world of 
nature and the immaterial world of God the Father, the idealized “He” imperiously placed 
at the top of the heap. In this scheme, alchemy enters conceptually between the embodied 
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profanity of nature and the disembodied sanctity of God, between the purifying methods 
of science and the purifying methods of scriptural interpretation. Alchemy is not in 
Newton’s hands “Base chemistry,” that is, greedily attempting to transmute lead into 
gold, but instead is about the transmutation of the self from a base form to a higher form, 
requiring an active participation of the experimenter himself with the physical processes 
contained in the alchemical experiment. This dual transformation process makes of the 
practice an interesting exercise in power, where a power over the self exercised through 
purification, effects and is evidenced by a concurrent power over the material world. 
Alchemy in this scheme not only raises the spiritual rank of the individual but the secular 
rank as well. Conceptually, this practice of a material reward following a spiritual 
purification elegantly resembles the Puritan work ethic, where God’s chosen reinforce 
their having been chosen in the first place by working hard and receiving His bounty.
Newton’s introduction to alchemy occurs when he is simultaneously a 
disappointment to his mother and a success in school. Following the epic battle with the 
schoolyard bully, Newton moves quickly to almost the top of his class. However, he is 
admittedly lax about farm work and any duties associated with what could be called his 
mother’s world of managing a substantial estate. Apparently to keep him occupied, as 
well as to give him quarters close to school, Hannah arranges for Newton to live with a 
local apothecary at Grantham when he was enrolled at the King’s School there 
(Christianson 12). In return for helping with the chemist’s work, Newton is given room, 
board, and access to the apothecary’s formidable library of alchemic and other texts, as 
well as access to the library at St. Wulfram’s Church in Grantham, which contained 
numerous theological works, including Arian Puritan tracts (White 20). Importantly, in 
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terms of Newton’s possible psychological development within the frame of Adlerian 
psychology outlined above, this period between his reuniting with his mother and his 
entry into Cambridge is a critical stage for psychological development, having, as Erik 
Erickson says of the early and mid teen years, the task of resolving not just issues of 
identity but also establishment of an overall world view, particularly in terms of 
relationships with others (Engler 179-180).
Given the “psychological” basis of Newton’s form of alchemy, that is, a form of 
alchemy that attempts to transform the self, with experiments in the physical realm acting 
as both locii of focus for symbols of transformation and, when successful, evidence of 
increasing purification of the alchemist, along with his introduction to it at a critical 
period of adjustment, my claim is that Newton’s alchemical writings, especially those 
associated with his “mad years,” can be read as both representations of and grappling 
with psycho-social “pathologies” he developed as a consequence of his relationships with 
others during his childhood.  In this manner Newton’s texts revealing his most serious 
practice of alchemy, which according to Dobbs began in earnest in 1668 during his two 
years between his undergraduate and graduate work at Trinity, and culminated in 1693, 
during his so-called Dark Year, can be read as indicators not only of his psychology, but 
of his worldview either implicitly or explicitly informing his work in theology and in 
Natural Philosophy.  At issue in these texts is power, especially the power to transform 
the self and the material world, all drawing the fundamental warrant from a puritanical 
world view operating on the assumption that the grand system of the world is arranged in 
strict rank order. That worldview is, from my perspective, dangerous and dark, where 
binary thought and hierarchical representations rule the conceptual systems, and the one 
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who best understands that hierarchy and those systems, also “rules” within the embodied 
social systems of his day. Ruling, however, is not necessarily a public act. For example, 
Newton was a Member of Parliament in 1688 as the representative from Cambridge. 
However, during that period all that he supposedly did was request an usher to shut a 
window, as there was a draft in the chambers (White 197). Whether this story is true or 
not, Newton’s failure to exercise overt public power in that venue, fitting as it does an 
easy description of the lofty Enlightenment Genius standing above the sordid affairs of 
the polis, also fits a description of a man obsessively concerned with secrecy, and 
working behind the veil, whether of the material world of base elements or the social 
world of base people.
Newton’s working behind the veil of the material world is another way of 
describing not just his alchemical studies but also his psychology itself. His most private 
intellectual endeavor, the work of alchemy which ranges from grappling in numerous 
ways with ancient texts to performing experiments in the laboratory, is, given the 
Adlerian social context of a will to superiority, predicated upon identification and 
maintenance of strict social hierarchies. Within this hierarchy is the “female,” a contested 
region for Newton, as desire for the mother coupled to fear of betrayal, complicated by 
rivalries with the “male,” is symmetrically reinforced by his personal experience and the 
general system of Natural Philosophy, which places the female at the bottom, the root of 
corruption, the earth itself. To recover his mother, and an ideal of the female, Newton 
must simultaneously remove the corruptions of competitors—the presence of the male. 
He must return her to an ideal, unsullied state: a female that is pure essence of female. 
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That essential female that emerges in Newton’s alchemical writing, importantly, 
does not just reflect a problematic category woman but a problematic system of 
categorization itself, of which “female” and “woman” are especially dramatic sites of 
expression of the system’s overall radical hierarchicalization. When Newton engages in 
three alchemical tasks of  “translation—” translating texts of the ancients, commenting 
upon translation of texts of the ancients, and creating new texts of his own—he  provides, 
in his tropes of the female, three inter-related yet different aspects of overall assumption 
about where the female fits in the scheme of things. To get at his complicated and 
ambivalent sense of the female, I next approach three texts drawn from those three 
different alchemical “translation” tasks. These sets of texts lie on a continuum of 
“authorship,” in which the first set of texts, the literal translations, with “La Lumiere 
Sortant des Tenebres” as example, are the least Newtonian, in the sense that he is 
translating the work of others.  The middle set, as commentary on specific texts of others, 
includes his  “commentary” on The Emerald Tablet as an example, and represents a 
middle ground between Newton and the ancient authors. Finally, the last set, with 
“Praxis” as the prime example, represents Newton as his most authorial in that it is 
entirely his work, drawing upon other authorities only as one would draw upon sources 
for one’s own argument. 
In Newton’s direct translation of texts of the ancients, such as “La Lumiere 
Sortant des Tenebres,” the trope of the female reveals both “corruption” and “power” as 
associated aspects. For examples, in describing the role of the true alchemist, Newton 
says:
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The sages use not violent flames nor burning coals like ye vulgar chemists 
but imitates Nature and her work with her fire: a fire vaporous and yet not 
light, a fire which nourishes and devours not, a fire natural and yet made
by art, dry yet causing rain. Nature begins; Art finishes and alone purifies 
what nature could not purify. And unless art make plane the way nature 
will stop (Newton “Cant 3” 281). 
Note first the binary that goes throughout this and almost all of Newton’s alchemical 
writing: sage vs. vulgar chemist. The sage is a “true hermetic philosopher” who has more 
at stake in alchemy than “ the transmutation of metals” as he says to Odenburg in a 1676 
letter (Correspondance, Vol. 2 2). There, he strongly cautions Odenburg about revealing 
secrets in a recent publication to those who are not spiritually pure enough to handle 
them. The sage, in this scheme, operates between the sub- and superlunary in the sense 
that he partakes of corrupt nature, yet goes beyond through an art of purification, 
functioning both as a liaison between the profane and the sacred and as an active catalyst 
to remove of nature the profane and let remain what is sacred. This “nature,” in both the 
quote above and in the system itself, is overtly female. She contains this “fire” this power 
of transformation from impure to pure, yet cannot effect it alone; left to her own 
devices—unless “art make plane the way”—she will “stop,” that is, remain unpurified, 
untransmuted.  The “art” is the practice not of the chemist but of the sage, the real 
alchemist, the ideal male in the sense that he uses what is already in the female to effect 
her own translation—he pulls her up to a higher plane, so to speak. How he does this is to 
use a strange power within her that is full of seeming contradictions: “vaprous and yet not 
light,” “dry yet causing rain,” and, most significantly, “natural and yet made by art.” 
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These descriptors are not to be read as antithetical but as the opposite: as complete 
descriptions whose seeming contradictions are re-solved by changing the rules of 
resolution. Specifically, “natural and yet made by art” describes the effort of the Arian 
alchemist to recover the initial purity of the world by recognizing and then manipulating 
the vestiges of purity that remain even in the most corrupt aspects—here, the earth, the 
female, the lowest of the sublunary. The female isn’t excluded but redirected in this 
scheme, always under the auspices of the male. Consider this description of the feminine 
aspect in the animal, also taken from “La Lumiere Sortant des Tenebres”:
In the feminine sperm of animals the passive elements are predominant & 
in the masculine the active, whence arises the mutual action between them 
in order to generation, to which the acid quality of the menstruum or 
feminine sperm contributes & so in the other kingdoms for ye feminine 
sperm is sharp and pontic and by its nitrous sharpness and crudity 
introduces putrefaction. Without putrefaction tis impossible to attain your 
end, viz the deliverance of the sulpher or seed shut up into the prison of 
the elements. This is the only means: for if the seed be not cast into the 
earth to putrefy it remains unprofitable. Now this corruption is not 
compassed but by a proper menstruum. In animals this menstruum is in 
the womb. In vegetables tis in the earth. In minerals tis in the proper 
matrix which is taken for earth.” (Newton. Appendix C. In Dobbs’ Janus
282)
Here, the trope of the feminine, applied to the animal world, also contains both corruption 
and power, especially the power to move from base to pure. The negatives associated 
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with “feminine sperm” include “sharp,” “pontic,” and “crude,” all giving rise to 
“putrefactions,” the breaking down of elements into constituents through a kind of rot, 
that is, a controlled corruption that, if its course is directed, gives rise to the opposite of 
corruption. The freeing of the “seed” in the elements, literally sulfur here yet figuratively 
the power of purification itself, is “natural” in the animal kingdom and the plant 
kingdom, but in the mineral, the place at which the alchemist inserts himself to practice 
his art, it is in “the construction of the proper matrix which is taken for earth.” In this act, 
the alchemist creates a kind of womb in the experiment, taking on through manipulation 
the generative power of the female while simultaneously not fully identifying with—and 
perhaps becoming infected by—the corrupt “nature” of the female but by taking over the 
processes. In that sense the alchemist usurps the power of creation of the female by 
appropriating her corrupting tendencies in order to go beyond corruption.
However, as Dobbs says of the text above,  “although much of the material … is 
not Newton’s own composition, since the material is abstracted rather than simply 
transcribed, it contains the parts of the book that Newton found important” (280). What 
we have here, then, is Newton’s twist on the received wisdom of the ancients, reflecting 
perhaps more Newton’s understanding and acceptance of the general practice and 
assumptions governing alchemical practice, especially the “true” hermetic tradition, than 
Newton’s own unique invention. Still, as Dobbs notes, we have Newton’s refraction of 
not just ideas but a particular expression of those ideas, in this instance, the use of a 
female trope to describe the relationship between the alchemist and the intertwined 
worlds of nature, self, and spirit.
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When moving beyond transcription, and adding commentary to the alchemical 
record, Newton not only continues the tradition of deploying feminine trope but 
intensifies its use, building upon the concepts outlined above, especially female as base 
and yet also as the source of the power of translation into more purified essences. 
Consider the following from the very beginning of Newton’s “Commentary” on The 
Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus:
The things that follow are most true. Inferior and superior, fixed and 
volatile, sulfur and quicksilver have a similar nature and are one thing, like 
a man and wife. For they differ one from another only by degree of 
digestion and maturity. Sulfur is mature quicksilver, quicksilver is mature 
sulfur, and on account of affinity they unite like male and female, and they 
act on one another, and through that action they are mutually transmuted 
into each other and procreate a more noble offspring to accomplish the 
miracles of this one thing. (Newton “Commentary” Appendix B Dobbs 
Janus 276)
As in the “La Lumiere,” Newton again deploys sharp binaries of male and female, 
associating with female inferiority and passivity, and with the male superiority and 
activity. Here, though, the admixturing is even more pronounced: the male and female 
facets of the world entire, are brought together, unified as attracting complements, to 
produce “more noble offspring.” What is most provocative is the literal offspring to 
which Newton is referring: higher consciousness birthed within the marriage of “The Sun 
and the Moon” as he calls it. Additionally, Newton likens this process of both a chemical 
marriage and a psychological union of what is considered male and female to the very 
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way in which God created the universe: “And just as all things were created from one 
chaos by the design of one God, so in our art all things, that is the four elements, are born 
from this one thing, which is our Chaos, by design of the Artificer and the skillful 
adaptation of things” (Newton “Commentary” Appendix B Dobbs Janus 276). In this 
comparison, Newton reveals his Arian take on alchemy. The Puritan alchemist acts like 
god in creating, and to the extent that God’s creation is accurately mimicked, one gets at 
“the source of all perfection in the world.” One gets in line to reach towards the heights 
occupied by Jesus, not Jehovah’s equal-in-stature son but God’s best work. 
The method of acquiring near Jesus status, as he describes it, is eerily sexual: by 
making “material ascend into heaven through sublimation and then through reiteration of 
the sublimation [by] making it descend to earth,” the alchemist himself acquires “the 
penetrating force of spirit and the fixed force of body” (Newton “Commentary” 
Appendix B Dobbs Janus 276-277). Male, spirit, and “penetration” occupy one pole of 
this vertical continuum. The opposite pole is defined by female, body, and “fixed.” If the 
alchemist does effect the proper transmutation, he will have ”the glory of the world and 
all obscurities and all need and grief will flee from [him]” (Newton “Commentary” 
Appendix B Dobbs Janus 276-277). This transformation, however, involves a strange 
rendezvous, where the poles of the continuum meet in the alchemist, in Newton himself, 
and his role is not only groom and bride in the marriage of the sun and moon, but 
minister as well. This requires not only an internalization of the hierarchy but also a 
systematized violation of the fundamental binary nature of the hierarchy. In terms of the 
feminine, Newton manages to retain simultaneously the negative associations of the 
female while recovering her by drawing an essence of purity and perfection from the very 
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stuff of corruption and imperfection. That place, overtly of the female, contains a 
necessary ingredient—the “black” and “dark Chaos” out of which “the world was 
created” (Newton “Commentary” Appendix B Dobbs Janus 277). Importantly, this 
recovery of the female is not a process of equalization, but the opposite: the female 
association with corruption, passivity, and inferiority is reinscribed through this marriage, 
as Chaos is mastered through ordering, and the “glory of the world” and end of need and 
grief are more on the order of a dowry as reward to the alchemist for taking on and 
purifying newly acquired chattel. 
The transformation of the feminine into an essence of purity—the wife after 
successful husbanding, to extend Newton’s metaphor in the “Commentary” – is best 
described in his “Praxis,” one of the “mad texts” beginning this chapter and Newton’s 
attempt at an alchemical Principia. This work differs from the ones addressed above in 
significant ways. First, it is entirely Newton’s work, and as such, seems arguably more 
indicative of Newton’s personal psychology and “hidden” ideologies. Secondly, the work 
is intended not to function as mildly interpretative commentary on existing works, but as 
a grand work of alchemy, a significant extension of the field itself. Thirdly, the text 
comes at the end of his alchemical work, suggesting a presentation of his culminating 
thoughts, at least his most sustained effort at synthesis of the work of several decades.  
Finally, the text is written at a time of “madness.” The attribution of “madness” to both 
Newton’s texts and Newton’s life at this time doesn’t preclude taking the texts seriously 
as much as it requires a redefinition of serious reading in which comparisons against 
absolute standards of meaningfulness and sanity are replaced with attempts to infer what 
standards are suggested if the text were assumed to be “normal.”
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Given the sole authorship, the intended function, the time of its publication, and 
its “madness,” the following quote from “Praxis,” offering up an extended deployment of 
the trope of the feminine, suggests Newton’s sense of the feminine, and category woman, 
remains problematic:
This preparation Philetha hints by calling the queen ye daughter of ye 
water bearer arising out of his loins & says she is contained invisibly in ye 
water of his silver colored pitcher  & arose out of it.  & That by a strange 
metamorphosis done by magical virtue of nature & that after this rise she 
was naked, that is divested of impurities & beautiful & though a body yet 
she was all spirit & yet able to endure without hurt ye greatest fires that 
can be made & in this state it is properly of matter in which vulgar 
chemists do not work & which is not to be found upon ye earth of the 
living, tis not the earth wee tread on but that which by sublimation hangs 
over our heads, and which the wise call terra virginea foliata. (Newton 
“Praxis” Appendix E Dobbs Janus 297) 
In many ways, this quote by itself demonstrates not only major precepts of alchemy, but 
of Newton’s own twist on it. The invocation of “Philetha” as an ancient authority shows 
that alchemy involves a recall of lost knowledge, not just through reading but through 
multiple translations, into different languages, into different styles, and into different 
“experiments,” that is, testing the results of a purified translation of a text via actually 
mixing ingredients and performing catalyzing acts such as heating or burning. Parallel 
acts of translation occur—of texts and of elements. The “queen” is code not just for a 
particular element, but also for the spiritual aspect that occupies or enlivens the element. 
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In this instance that spiritual element is deliberately feminine, daughter of a masculine 
spirit, and “arising out of his loins” an image reversing the natural state of birth, making 
of the male a “wombed” Father. 
Key here is that what Newton is reporting includes, given the active role of the 
experimenter’s spiritual state in effecting transformations, the parallel actions of his own 
“self”: he, in the mixing of elements, is being “strangely” metamorphosed through 
magical virtue, and his self, or soul, is naked, divested of impurities. Note as well the 
seeming contradictions: all spirit yet still a body; she is material yet indestructible, and 
she is ultimately reduced to pure essence: “matter in which vulgar chemists do not work.” 
Finally, this overtly female aspect of spirit, of both self and elements, is “not upon the 
earth we tread.” Instead, it transcends base earth, the feminized “she” of nature, to be 
somehow “hung over” our heads—yet still intimately and inseparably connected to the 
material, as the effort to perform the physical admixture of alchemical ingredients, when 
it is successful, is involved with a parallel transformation of the alchemist’s spirit. 
The whole of the image above, significantly, is of the pure virgin—not only intact 
but beyond the material, invoking the semiotic complement of the unmentionable and 
unmentioned whore. What seems to be at work in Newton’s approach is a consistent 
deployment of stark binaries, which are then complicated, so that we have, for example,
the body opposed to the spirit, and in a larger sense, the female as body opposed to the 
male as spirit, yet finally mixed—through the art of the alchemist and the “virtue of 
nature.” Nature, the female, is corrupt, yet contains within herself, a transcendent 
function, only to be released by the alchemist.   
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The symmetry between the idealized purified feminine in Newton’s alchemical 
writing and what he had and then lost with his mother is unmistakable. He had a mother 
who was virginalized in a functional sense by the death of his father. Newton’s December 
25 birthday could not have escaped him, fitting as it does so well with his Arian belief in 
Jesus as both perfect creation and as immaculate conception. However, this Ideal Pure 
Woman, resurrected in the trope deployed in his alchemical writings, is killed in reality 
when his mother not only remarries, and literally falls from the pedestal of chaste purity, 
but also when she rejects him. Newton’s banishment, especially as the “real” child, the 
one closest to perfect creation, perceived as a shift in attention to her other children, 
makes his siblings atypical in an Adlerian sense, which sees siblings as models of rivals 
and cooperators. Instead, his step siblings, as well as his stepfather Barnabas, are solely 
rivals, and rivals who get the greatest resource of all: mother’s love. By not only 
disembodying woman but by also removing her corruptions, Newton fulfills a set of 
inter-related desires: he has “woman” without a body that betrays and he has 
“superiority” as a multiple master, over nature, self, spirit, and the affairs of “Men.”  
Thus, Newton’s mad texts can be read another way: as expressions of 
psychological and conceptual madness(es). Newton’s world was mad in the Adlerian 
sense in that what he was offered at the beginning of his life was an overdose of 
relational symbiosis followed by an abrupt withdrawal that led him to codify, in practice 
and in theory, a scheme of the human involving a sense of self as isolated and discrete. 
Denied the reality of the flesh of human contact, Newton seemed bound to replace it with 
an elaborate, if not brilliant, method for transcending the base sphere of the human in 
order to ascend the heights of the spirit, hovering just below Jehovah.  For Newton this 
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self is a form of consciousness that internalizes extreme forms of hierarchicalized, power-
driven social dynamics. In the end, the “self” that emerges in response to Newton’s 
personal experiences and his grapplings with an alchemy informed by Natural Philosophy 
and whose larger ends are drawn from Arian theology, was, for him, at least, as critical an 
ancestor in the genealogy of consciousness as the self initially outlined by Plato. That 
“self,” as an exaggerated model of a “modern” self, ironically drawn for Newton from 
premodern worlds of magic and religious revelation, is a self that is simultaneously 
mechanical, magical, and spiritual. More than a construct that needs to be “cared for,” as 
Foucault describes the sense of individual being in Care of the Self, it is a construct that 
is initially corrupt and through systematized policing, is purified to its single essence, and 
that essence is, as the last quote above notes, an aspect of alchemical “quintessence”—a 
vital life force that transcends both mechanical processes of nature (though it both 
partakes of and infuses all things mechanical) and social processes (though, again, it both 
partakes of and infuses all things social). All the Newtons converge in this attempt to 
purify the “self”-through- translation—the scientist, the alchemist, the theologian, and 
most importantly, the little abandoned boy. That this convergence leaves Newton, as 
Dobbs says, “suspicious, secretive, seldom humorous, indifferent to poetry and music, 
not friendless but never an easy companion” (Dobbs and Jacob 2) suggests that he goes 
“mad” within our present frames of what it is to be human and what it is to do science. 
Read instead as sane comments on the mad world of his strange upbringing and on the 
mad world of Seventeenth Century tug-and-brutal-tussle with his Royal Society 
competitors, these texts suggest, that for our much Idolized Enlightenment Genius, 
brilliant syntheses of disparate fields of knowledge can provide a fine and private place, 
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but none I think do there embrace. The successful productivity of Newton’s effort to 
bring together disparate systems of representation, evidenced by the significant 
codification of scientific methodology in the Principia, comes at a cost, one in which the 
successful scientist succeeds in part through a double failure. The first failure is a failure 
of the family and then the larger society to provide him with a “humane” model of 
relationships with others. The second failure is Newton’s own, whose genius is in 
replicating his familial system in social system in which he finds himself, in behavior and 
texts, and not in truly revolutionizing a community of scholars by creating an atmosphere 
of cooperation and mutual care.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE MINTING OF A THEOLOGIAN AND THE THEOLOGIAN AT THE MINT: ALCHEMICAL 
CHRIST, SCIENTIFIC PROPHESY, AND THE RULE OF GOLD
Betty Jo Dobbs comments in the Janus Faces of Genius that her work on 
Newton’s alchemy is “predicated upon the conviction that to Newton himself all his 
diverse studies constituted a unified plan for obtaining Truth, and it is organized around a 
religious interpretation of Newton’s alchemy, but more than that, a religious 
interpretation of all his work” (17-18). In this chapter, I examine specific selections of 
Newton’s theological writings in order to argue Newton’s work is not only open to 
religious interpretation but also involves in practice, whether in natural science, alchemy, 
or literal scriptural interpretation, conceptually inter-locked forms of  “religious 
interpretation.” By religious interpretation I mean that Newton’s efforts are all forms of 
translation that share the larger end of demonstrating a spiritual order characterized by 
both radical hierarchicalization and systems of  “policing” to maintain that rank order. 
Conceptually, natural science and alchemy are slaved to Newton’s Arian theology, so 
their respective systems of representation are not just influenced by or overlapping with 
his theology, but instead are subsumed under it. To get at Newton’s complex theology, I 
first examine Newton’s form of Arian Puritanism as expressed in his writing, arguing that 
at the center of that theology is a kind of alchemical Christ, where the trope of 
transmutation provides a model of a personal “transubstantiation,” characterized by a 
participation in purity and a mastery of flesh.  Following that, I analyze Newton’s method 
of translation of sacred texts, arguing that the three characteristics of science informing 
his Principia—generalizability, simplicity, and verifiability—also characterize Newton’s 
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“science” of prophetic translation. Finally, I show how these principles, from those 
associated with the alchemical Christ to those associated with scientific prophecy, are 
realized in Newton’s practices as head of the London Mint. There, Newton’s complex 
and idiosyncratic system of systems finds expression in a purifying mechanization of the 
process of money creation, where “things,” from gold coinage, to counterfeits, to 
employees themselves, are policed to find their proper “place” in the system.
The Alchemical Christ
Newton’s form of Puritanism is founded upon principles first advocated by the 
Fourth Century Monk Arias, who denied the reality of the trinity and argued Jesus was 
not God but God’s first perfect creation. Newton’s theological system, though, is more 
than a simple antitrinitarianism. Across Newton’s theological writing, especially his 
unpublished and unfinished works, Newton returns again and again to the question of 
Jesus’ true status in Christianity. In  “Twenty Three Queries Concerning the Word 
Omoousios,” for example, Newton presents a detailed argument against Athanasius’ 
belief in the Trinity, attacking everything from Athanasius’ character to the legitimacy of 
the council of Nicea in determining theological accuracy. In his “Twelve Points on 
Religion,” Newton is even more specific in dealing the ramifications of Athanasius’ error 
and Arius’ true understanding of the difference between God the father and God the son:
1. The [word] god is nowhere used to signify more than one of the three 
persons at once.
2.The word God put absolutely without particular restriction to the son or 
the Holy Ghost doth always signify the father from one end of the 
scriptures to the other.
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3. When ever it is said in the scriptures that there is one God, it is meant of 
the Father. (References without page numbers come from The Newton 
Project, unpublished manuscripts translated and published electronically). 
In these three points, Newton is in part asserting the sharp division between Jesus and 
The Father. More importantly, he is also underscoring how language reflects and 
maintains this division in the scriptures.  Jesus is a lower case “god,” neither human nor 
divine yet somehow partaking of both. Newton elaborates on this placement of Jesus as 
between the Father and the human in point four of “Twelve Points”:
4. When, after some hereticks had taken Christ for a mere man and 
others for the supreme God, St, John in his Gospel endeavored to state his 
nature so that men might have from thence a right apprehension of him 
and avoid those heresies and to that end calls him the word or logos: we 
must suppose that he intended that term in the same sense that it was taken 
in the world before he used it when in a like manner applied to an 
intelligent being.
For if the apostles had not used words as they found them how 
could they have expected to be rightly understood. Now the term logos 
before St. John wrote, was generally used in the sense of the Platonists, 
when applied to an intelligent being, and the Arians understood it in the 
same sense, and therefore theirs is the true sense of St. John. 
Newton is proposing an interesting argument concerning the nature not just of Jesus but 
of the system of the world itself. God the Father is “supreme:” to maintain that Jesus is 
supreme is a heresy. However, to maintain Jesus is a human is a heresy as well. Both 
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heresies involve acts of mistranslation of the book of God. The resolution of these forms 
of mistranslation is, according to Newton, effected by Saint John when he uses the term 
logos. Logos, though, means specifically “intelligent being,” a being capable of making 
sense of the world, a human attribute but not human. As Newton adds in point nine of the 
“Twelve Points on Religion,” it was “the son of God which he sent into the world and not 
a humane soul that suffered for us.”  A number of important assumptions are underlying 
Newton’s argument: First, Newton is assuming St. John is the preferred source of Jesus 
information, making of the other gospels mere sidelights, inherently inaccurate because 
of the multiple perspectives offered. Secondly, language is at the crux of understanding: 
it serves Newton’s purpose here to use the notion of meaning as determined through 
popular usage, but elsewhere he goes to considerable lengths to demonstrate that 
language’s purity has been corrupted by popular usage. Finally, and the grand assumption 
giving meaning to Newton’s complete scheme of the world, is the notion of severe 
hierarchy.  Jesus is a “servant,” he “hath no power in him but what he derives from the 
Father,” he is “dependent upon His will.” 
This subordination of Jesus to Father is repeatedly emphasized throughout 
Newton’s theological writings, and in many instances forms the theme of the text under 
development. Newton’s numerous lists, in particular, tend to work assiduously at either 
confirming the subordination of Jesus to the father or at elaborating from that principle, 
and then outlining a theology. Newton’s “Twelve Points” discussed above is perhaps the 
work most focused on the issue, but in works such as “Twelve Articles on Religion,” the 
sharp delineation between Jesus and the father is repeatedly stated as an article of faith, 
and is treated as foundational to Newton’s theology.   What is most remarkable about 
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Newton’s references to Christ is that by far they tend to undermine Christ’s status rather 
than promote him as “King of kings.” Jesus is not to be prayed to, Newton states in 
“Twelve Articles on Religion,” nor can he intercede, nor can he do anything but act out 
on what the father already decrees. Newton in fact rarely even uses the term Jesus, and 
instead typically deploys “son” or “Son of the Father,” again always underscoring a 
subservient role for the messiah.
What this stripped down Jesus leaves us with in Newton is what I term the 
Alchemical Christ: an image that is simultaneously of the earth and of the heavens, where 
the human not so much worships Christ as God as the human actively emulates the 
realized potential of Christ and transmutes the “self” into a purified essence. The human 
is twice removed from the essence of God, as people are to emulate the Christ who 
emulates God. This doubled removal, though, is not an argument for the hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church. Instead, Newton’s twist on Christ provides a place of insertion into the 
hierarchy that is managed not through adherence to institutionalized religions but through 
systematic application of translation designed to reflect the God order of the universe, 
and that order is overtly subordinating. Newton says in his Theological Notebook 2:  
“The head of every man is Christ, & the head of the woman is the man, & the head of 
Christ is God. 1 Cor 11.3. All are your's & ye are Christ's & Christ is God's. 2 Cor. 3.22, 
23.” Here, the placement category woman as the lowliest of serfs is no accident. It 
directly parallels a system when the feminized earth is the basest, most corrupted “text” 
and the hypermasculinized heavens are the highest. Additionally, the “head” image 
conjures up the trope of the body; the female here is the lowest body, double–headed by 
the man, as both symbol of intellect and of maleness. The man, as the next step up on the 
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ladder, is double-headed by Christ, ruled by both Newton’s sense of logos and the mind 
violently separated from body. Christ is, after all, a strange symbol of being born through 
violent death, a model of purity attainable through agony.
To get at this concept of the Alchemical Christ, however, requires outlining the 
overall structure of Newton’s scheme as presented in his theological writings. The Christ 
that emerges from Newton’s writing is characterized more by what he isn’t—especially 
in terms of traditional Christianity—than what he is. What this Alchemical Christ isn’t is 
a figure equal to or cosubstantial with the father; he isn’t a figure then to be worshipped, 
and he isn’t “God.” In short, this Jesus is more like us than a supreme being, and what he 
is, after isolating what he is not, is a model of how to both participate in the purity of God 
while also mastering the flesh. If one does this, one doesn’t become God but instead a 
Lord—a higher up on the hierarchy that overlays the clockwork universe. These two 
concepts—participation in purity and mastery of the flesh—are the two faces of the 
Alchemical Christ. Additionally, they are expressions of the two poles of the impure to 
pure, body to spirit, earth to heaven continuum.  Christ, in his complicated role as the 
transmuted, is a bending of the continuum:
Who is the Image of the invisible God, the first born of every creature. For 
by him [God the Father] were all things created that are in heaven & that 
are in earth visible & invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions, or 
principalities or powers, all things were created by him & for him. And he 
is before all things & by him all things consist. And he [Christ] is the head 
of the body the church, who is the beginning, the first born from the dead; 
that in all things he might have the preeminence. For it pleased the Father 
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that in him should all fulness dwell Colos 1.15. – In him are hid all the 
treasures of wisdome & knowledg, – For in him dwelleth all the fulnes of 
the Godhead bodily. (Theological Notebook 2)
Here, Christ is described as “the first born of the dead” which results in his 
“fullness” and “preeminence” and hidden source of “all treasures of wisdom and 
knowledge.” Again, he is replete with seeming contradictions: an “image of the 
invisible,” a thing “born of the dead” are both more apt descriptors of a vampire than 
humanized god. This Christ, after all, as Newton maintains, we are to emulate not 
worship: it seems much to ask us to be images of the invisible and to be born of death. 
Nonetheless, these images are also images of transformation via admixture of opposites. 
They are sensible as a model of process when paralleled to the principle of alchemical 
transformation. Consider this description of transmutation from Newton’s “Commentary 
on Hermes:”
This it ought to first be cleansed by separating the elements…without 
violence, and by making the whole material ascend into heaven by 
sublimation and then through a reiteration of sublimation making it 
descend to the earth: by that method it acquires the penetrating force of 
spirit and the fixed force of body. Thus will you have the glory of the 
whole world and all obscurities and all need and all need and grief will 
flee from you. For this thing, when it has…ascended to heaven and 
descended into earth becomes the strongest of all things. (276-277)
This description parallels Christ’s transformation via death and resurrection, in both 
process and product. Christ embodies spirit, Christ descends to the earth and ascends to 
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heaven, and Christ is “purified.” Not insignificantly, that purification results in raw 
power—the “strongest of all things.” 
Christ’s Kingdom may not “be of the earth” in this scheme, but his power is here, 
and the one significant power Newton gives his Christ is the power of Judgment. In 
Newton’s Theological Notebook II, he describes the role of Christ as executer of 
judgment, while also reinforcing that the authority for judgment is yet another power not 
intrinsic to the son but derived from the Father:
. For as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the son to have 
life in himself, & hath given him authority to execute judgment also — I 
can of my self do nothing; As I hear I judg, & my judgment is just becaus I 
seek not mine own will but the will of the father which hath sent me. Iohn 
5.17.
One of Newton’s rhetorical means of supporting these two aspects as the correct 
understanding of theology is his repeated identification of the two most important 
commandments: the first and the “eleventh.” He begins his short unpublished work 
“Irenicum” with a bald assertion of these two commandments’ primacy: 
In matters of religion the first & great Commandment hath always been: 
Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart & with all thy soul & 
with all thy mind. And the second is like unto it: Thou shalt love thy
neighbour as thy self. On these two hang all the Law & the Prophets. 
Matth. 22.27. And the Gospel is that Iesus is the Christ. Whoever 
beleiveth that Iesus is the Christ is born of God, & every one that loveth 
him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him 1 Iohn 5.1.
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Three “Newtonian” rhetorical moves characterize this passage, and are evident across the 
bulk of his theological writings. First, in many instances he structures his discourse in a 
rationalistic form, in that he tends to state one or two central claims early on, and then 
methodically backs them up as he continues. The quote above begins the Ireniucum, and 
functions as its thesis in that the rest of the discourse expands on the two “great 
commandments.” That is, Newton’s overall discourse form is rationalistic, despite any 
inherent irrationality associated with theological reasoning and/or expression via text. 
Critical to Newton’s rationalism, however, is a consistent reductivity. For example, in “A 
Short Schem [sic] of the True Religion,” he specifically collapses the rest of the 
commandments into the first and eleventh: “The first is enjoyned in the four first 
commandments of the Decalogue & the second[love others as self] in the six last.”  
Secondly, his “evidence” consists primarily of quotes and paraphrases taken from the 
Bible and other ancient sources. However, he deploys them in an almost duplicitous 
manner. They seem to speak for themselves, and, as Mandelbrote notes, from the 
beginning Newton’s theological writings were highly criticized for selectivity of quoted 
material, misuse of translations, and semblance of erudition (416). His religious texts at 
times read as a Benjaminian Arcades project, with fragments from a vast array of sources 
deployed. Unlike Benjamin’s approach, though, Newton doesn’t free his material from 
context, allowing for novel interpretations, but instead recontextualizes the passages, 
implicitly arguing throughout, and explicitly in the case of his works on prophecy, that he 
is offering the only valid context.
Newton doesn’t restrain his “rational” discussion to identification of the two most 
important commandments in “A Short Schem [sic] of the True Religion.” Rather, he 
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seems more interested in elaborating on how the human is to behave in light of the 
primacy of these commandments: 
Repentance & remission of sins relate to transgressions against the two 
great commandments. We are to forsake the Devil, that is all fals Gods & 
all manner of idolatry this being a breach of the first & great 
commandment. And we are to forsake the flesh & the World, or as the 
Apostle Iohn expresseth it, the lust of the flesh the lust of the eye & the 
pride of life, that is, unchastity, intemperance, injustice, covetousness, 
pride, & ambition, these things being a breach of the second of the two 
great commandments. 
Sin, in Newton’s system, is an identification of transgression of the two commandments. 
Idolatry, as the quote notes, is the worst transgression. Idolatry here, however, involves 
more than simple worshipping of golden calves: it includes any placement of any person, 
thing, or process on par with God, even to the extent of treating a saint, king, or even 
Jesus himself as a mediator between us and God. Jesus, in particular, is almost a 
minefield of potential transgressions of the first commandment, as Newton demonstrates 
in the “Irenicum” below:
And tho we are to worship him, yet we are to do it without breaking the 
first commandment there is to be (in our worship) no other God but one.
For tho there be that are called Gods, whether in heaven or in earth (as 
there be Gods many & Lords many) yet to us [in our worship] there is but 
one God the father of whom are all things & we in him, & one Lord Iesus 
Christ by whom are all things & we by him. 1 Cor. VIII.5. [Newton’s 
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underscoring]We are not to give the worship of the father to the son nor 
the worship of the Son to the to the father but to worship each with that 
worship which is proper & peculiar to him. We are not to invoke the Son 
in the name of the father but on the contrary to invoke the father in the 
name of the Son. We are not to give glory to the father because he was 
slain for us nor to the son because he created all things, but on the contrary 
we are to conform our worship to the dictates of our Creed. We are to 
worship the father as God almighty maker of heaven & earth & the son as 
the Lord Iesus Christ who was slain for us & hath redeemed us with his 
blood.
 Newton is underscoring more than a sentence here: he is asserting a number of concepts 
foundational to his theology. First, the world(s) do have “Gods many & Lords many.” 
Their reality isn’t at issue: what is at issue is worship, that is, who and how we are to 
acknowledge those as “over us.” Newton’s words suggest sharp demarcations: the role of 
the father as source of all and son a mere expression of that source is demanded by 
Newton’s insistence on separating out the respective dues to be given each. To mix the 
worships—to even thank Jesus for creation—is not just a sin but a major transgression. 
Such a mix up obviously wouldn’t diminish God, but what is threatened is the hierarchy, 
especially the very top of the rank order. Secondly, worship in this scheme is a set of 
practices that always in part reaffirms a certain and signal hierarchical relationship in 
which the son, as Newton says elsewhere, “submits his will to the will of the father, 
which would be unreasonable if he were equal to the father” (“12 Points”). 
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The larger question to be answered when looking at Newton’s concept of the 
Alchemical Christ is not what Jesus is or even what God the Father is but what we are. 
Julia Kristeva, in Crisis of the European Subject, provides a provocative argument 
concerning the human consequences of Protestantism’s understanding of the relationship 
between God the Father and son:
God is threefold in Orthodoxy, but not in then same way as in 
Catholicism: the Holy spirit proceeds through the son for the orthodox 
(per filium); the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son for then 
Catholics (filioque). While this “and” puts father and son on equal footing 
and prefigures the autonomy and independence of the person (that of the 
Son, as well as the believer, which opens the way to Western 
individualism and personalism), the Orthodox “through” suggests a 
delicious but deadly annihilation of the Son and the believer. 
The Father’s omnipotent authority is inalienable…the father is 
divinity-origin. The son is his servant and assistant who by means of this 
servitude—“through” nonetheless raises and deifies himself. Subordinate 
and godlike at the same time, the Son (and with him the believer) is caught 
in an exquisite logic of submission and exaltation that offers him the joys 
and sorrows intrinsic of the master-dialect . . . . (138-139)
This “delicious and deadly annihilation” of the believer, according to Kristeva, sets the 
stage for a conception of a person either absorbed in the “adoration-feminization of the 
Son” or involved in destructive revolt, as the father is so far removed from the human by 
the subjectification of the son, leaving the “incommensurable divine authority” beyond 
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discussion, criticism or negotiation. In Newton’s scheme, more than in the protestant 
Orthodoxy that Kristeva discusses, the issue of further remove from God is exacerbated 
by the denial of the trinity, with the concomitant implicit and conceptually entangled 
assumption of radical hierarchicalization. If Kristeva’s general thesis is accepted, that the 
general Protestant theology’s change in depiction of the Son and Father relationship 
invites a psychological engagement in the joys and horrors of the “Master-slave dialect” 
then Newton’s Alchemical Christ invites an exaggerated response, where the Christ 
image is denied even the vestiges of the godhead retained in Protestantism’s change in 
conception of the trinity. Even Christ, the purist of the pure, is overtly submissive to the 
Father, and that only after the violent transformative process of death and resurrection. 
The human is lowered further in Newton’s scheme, prone not only to violate the second 
commandment, but more dangerously to violate the first: to confuse the vertical 
relationship structure inherent in the world by worshipping the false idol. 
The Alchemical Christ, as I have traced, provides a model of not only a pure 
creation but a method of personal, even psychological, transformation—a transmutation 
from impure false-idol-worshipping sinner, to pure clearly-cognizant-of-rank-order 
“saint,” or at least some sort of Lord over lesser beings. This transformation, in part, is 
effected by systematic “policing” of transgressions. Consider the following from 
Newton’s Fitwellian Museum Notebook:
Threatning my father and mother Smith to burne them and the house over them   13
Wishing death and hoping it to some 14
Striking many 15
Having uncleane thoughts words and actionsand dreamese. 16
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Stealing cherry cobs from Eduard Storer 17
Denying that I did so 18
Denying a crossbow to my mother and grandmother though I knew of it 19
Setting my heart on money learning pleasure more than Thee 20
A relapse 21
A relapse 22
A breaking again of my covenant renued in the Lords Supper 23
The careful cataloguing of Newton’s sins, reminiscent of Dafoe’s Crusoe’s cataloging of 
omissions and commissions on the isle, is telling on a number of levels. First, this listing 
of sins before and after “Whitsunday 1662,” reveals a twin obsession with both self-
monitoring and precise “accounting for.” The long list of sins Newton carefully 
chronicles is followed by a detailed ledger of his lending practices while at Cambridge as 
an undergraduate, showing that Newton is not only transgressive in his own eyes but 
more critically engaging in a form of textual purification, as the act of listing is godlike in 
its precise accounting for transgressions.  In the Notebook Newton parallels this spiritual 
accounting with a literal accounting—his lending of money, at apparently usurious rates, 
to fellow students at Cambridge.  Secondly, the sins listed, from avarice, to lying, to theft, 
to wishing the death of others, are one constellation of transgressions subsumable under 
the second commandment. Other sins listed reveal Newton’s early obsession with the 
first commandment.  For example, the first nine sins on Newton’s list all involve doing 
something untoward on  “Thy day,” such as “making a feather,” “eating an apple,” and 
even “squirting water.” In all, 15 of the 49 sins listed involve some sort of a transgression 
against God himself, by violating some aspect of the first commandment. At least ten 
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more of the sins listed involve some kind of failure to maintain a proper attitude towards 
God, whether by not praying or failing to worship correctly. In this mechanized listing, 
the more horrifying sins, such as his desire for the death of others, seem praised with faint 
damnation, as they get an equal and interchangeable number with all the rest. Much has 
been made by a variety of theorists about Newton’s desire for other’s death as a sin listed, 
but none have commented on the overall trend of Newton’s sins, which by their particular 
selectivity support an early at least implicit sense of the sins suggested by his later 
development of the Alchemical Christ: a notion of the human as placed by God in a 
subservient rung on the ladder of purity, where violations of the essence of purity—God 
the Father Himself—are worse than violations of people’s rights, though attendance to 
both sets of acts is required for transmutative ascendancy towards the Pure.
Scientific Prophecy
The Alchemical Christ, however, constitutes only part of Newton’s complete 
theological scheme of the world. If Newton’s writing of the relation of the Father to the 
Son reflects his Arian puritanical view of an individual human as a base element capable 
of transmutation through unmediated emulation to a level near but always below God, 
then his writings on prophecy reflect transmutation of the history of entire cultures, only 
with the direction reversed, as Newton’s history of the world is a history of descent into 
corruption. The history of the world, starting with the biblical past of Abraham and Noah 
and leading up to Newton’s present, is in a larger sense a history of Idolatry, in which 
God the Father’s stratified system of creation continually lends itself to people mistaking 
aspects of the world, such as kings or processes of nature, with what they really 
demonstrate: God the Father as Lord Creator and Protector. 
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Newton’s approach to ancient texts in general, and specifically certain scriptures 
such as St. John’s, is to employ a “scientific” method of scriptural interpretation, where 
rules of translation consonant with his Natural Philosophy’s rules of consequence guide 
the translator/interpreter’s task.  This science in his theology could be, and historically 
has been, treated as an obvious and for many absurd extension of Newton’s science into 
another area of inquiry. However, Newton seems to have applied a remarkably similar set 
of rules to the set outlined in the Principia in his writing on scripture long before he 
applied the rules to Natural Philosophy.  The question as to which occurred first–the rules 
of consequence in the science and then applied to the system of prophecy, or the rules of 
consequence in the system for prophecy and then applied to the science—has some 
bearing on the issue of Newton’s overall system of systems. Simply, the view of Newton 
as scientist who dabbled in theology—and as such, not insignificantly, as model of 
modern man—is not supported by his own texts’ chronology.  Maurizio  Mamiani 
addresses the issue in the Cambridge Companion to Newton:
According to Frank Manuel, the interpretative rules of the Apocalypse 
were a copy of the Regulae Philsophandi of the Principia, but this 
conclusion is chronologically impossible—the rules of the Principia were 
written almost forty years after those of the Trattato. Obviously the 
inverse must be the case. But how can it be that the Rules of Reasoning of 
the Principia, considered the foundations of the experimental method, are 
a copy of the rules of the Apocalypse? If we bear in mind Newton’s 
intellectual development, the answer is clear. Even before he was 
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concerned with interpretation of the Apocalypse, Newton had developed 
many of his methodological ideas. (396)
Mamiani’s “clear answer” is anything but. Notice the set of rhetorical moves he employs 
in the quote above. He first refutes Manuel’s assertion that the rules were first developed 
in Newton’s science, noting that the Trattato sull’Apocalisse, a 1660’s monograph 
concerning systematic interpretation of the Apocalypse, preceded the authorized version 
of the Principia by four decades.  Then Mamiani reaffirms Manuel’s thesis by noting 
vaguely that Newton “had developed many of his methodological ideas” prior to his 
addressing of the problem of scriptural interpretation. Mamiani, it seems, is both too 
smart to accept a violently inaccurate chronology and too committed to the assumption 
that Newton’s primary frame was “science.”
The simplest explanation for rules of consequence, that is, the scientific method, 
appearing first in his Prophetics and only much later in his Natural Philosophy, is that 
Newton, as first and foremost a theologian, developed a set of procedures for structured 
analysis of religious texts, and then applied those same procedures to the “text” of nature. 
Newton’s method of scientific prophecy in this frame assumes analysis of scripture as 
Newton’s primary model, with the worlds of self (alchemy) and nature (Natural 
Philosophy) as subsets of inquiry. Just as the lawfulness of nature is revealed in the 
structured reading of the book of nature, so, too, is the lawfulness of God the Father 
revealed in a structured reading of scripture. The quest for Newton is not just 
determination of order but more precisely the application of central principles of ordering
to reveal the orderedness of things. Cohen claims Newton is arguing from design, but 
Newton’s own efforts suggest he is more arguing to re-present Design, giving, as Jesus 
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did, a revelation of aspects of the Father, an act of both proof of God and worship. God, 
in this scheme, is not rhetorically but necessarily “unattainable,” as the one who both 
designed the order and introduced order in the first place is logically outside the system 
set in motion, as the creation is always sharply delineated from and subservient to the 
creator. However, unattainable does not preclude partial discovery, or in Newton’s 
overall scheme, more aptly “re-membering.” To “re-member” this formerly known truth 
is to apply a systematic and “scientific” way of decoding texts. In this system of 
representation, Newton directly equates hypothesis with “signification:”
The Rule I have followed has been to compare the several mystical 
places of scripture where the same prophetic phrase or type is used 
& to fix such a signification to that phrase as agrees best with all 
the places, & if more significations then one be necessary to note 
the circumstances by which it may be known in what signification 
the phrase is taken in any place & when I had found the necessary 
significations to reject all others as the ofspring of luxuriant fansy. 
ffor no more significations are to be admitted for true ones then 
can be proved [italics added]. (“Draft Chapters of a Treatise on the 
Origin of Religion and its Corruption”)
Here, Newton is outlining the crux of his system: the fixing of significations in 
the text, that is, determining the perfect meaning of the word written. Not surprisingly, 
Newton’s method is empirical; at least to the extent that he induces a general rule of 
semantics from a variety of instances. These significations, like the hypotheses, are not to 
be feigned: significations non fingo, Newton seems to be claiming, asserting a 
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comparable demand for proof as he demands in the Principia. Here is an aspect of 
Enlightenment science clearly stated: strict verification, complementing the rules of 
simplicity and generalizability.  Verification, proof, in decoding the Bible, however, is a 
different sort of enterprise for Newton the Arian than for Newton the natural philosopher;  
I have not feared sometimes to call in to my assistance the eastern 
expositors of their mystical writers (I mean the Chalde Paraphrast & the 
Interpreters of dreams) following herein the Example of Mr Mede & other 
late writers. ffor the language of the Prophets being hieroglyphical had 
affinity wth that of the Egyptian Priests & eastern wise men & therefore 
was anciently much better understood in the East then it is now in the 
west. I received also much light in this search by the analogy between the 
world natural & the word politique. ffor the mystical language was 
founded in this analogy & will be best understood by considering its 
original. (“Draft Chapters of a Treatise on the Origin of Religion and its 
Corruption”)
This quote is rich in revelations of Newton’s method of biblical text purification.  
Newton seemingly violates empirical science’s demand for an appeal to observations of 
things in themselves by asserting appeal to ancient authorities, yet note his reasoning: he 
seeks analogy between what occurs in “the world natural” and “ the “world politique.” 
He is approaching these texts empirically; his method looks to simplify the message 
across the texts by verifying that simple explanation with demands for “proof” in the text. 
Additionally, he is operating from the outset with an implicit sense of generalization in 
that the simple and verifiable “essence” of God’s message, truth itself, is found across 
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cultures, epochs, people’s, and even religions, with those texts closer to the source, to the 
mystical language which all once spoke, just as worthy objects of study as contemporary 
Christian texts, if no more so. Valid significations, those which carry the analogy 
between the world of nature and the world politique, that is, between the world of nature 
and the world of the human, are valid because of the way god designed the world, a 
world only made intelligible through language. In the beginning, Newton maintains, a 
near perfect isomorphism between language and God’s laws. Jehovah, in this scheme, 
cannot be spoken because of the equation of signifier with signified—the act itself makes 
of the speaker a kind of creator of the creator of all things. Instead, necessary 
approximations are required, close to, ever mindful of God, but still removed. Closest to 
God is the frame of nature itself—the temple of the natural world, as Newton calls it. To 
recognize it, as in recognizing the simple, verifiable, and generalizable beauty of the 
movements of the spheres, requires the inscribing of it. God, in this scheme, was initially 
available in this remote fashion, when a common mystical language unified the world. 
However, the very process necessary to prevent re-placement of God at the top, a 
submission-as-worship that first involved seeing God in the symmetry of nature, 
especially the heavens, seems to invite more distancing, and hence a double fall from 
grace—we as people move farther from recognizing God and our texts parallel this fall, 
ending up, by Newton’s time, as evidence both of hidden truths of God and not so hidden 
proofs of  more arbitrary relations between the signified and signifier. 
This strange system, in which language is simultaneously truthful and deceptive, is 
understandable if one accepts the premises that God is both over—and outside of—while 
also thoroughly implied by the frame of nature. The move here of both people and 
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language is literally and figuratively downward. For Newton, this descent, this process of 
corruption of language and with it, the corruption of entire cultures, occurred in three 
phases: 
1. Primeval state, where symmetry of heavens demonstrates god’s perfection
2. Secondary state, where celestial bodies supplant god, and are idolized
3. Tertiary state, where dead are associated with celestial bodies, and dead 
are idolized. (“Draft Chapters of a Treatise on the Origin of Religion and 
its Corruption”)
What is increasingly lost over time is a true logos, a language that makes clearly 
intelligible the truth of God found in the symmetry of the world. What causes this is the 
pesky “world politique:” the human, over the eons, behaviorally and linguistically shifts 
worship from God, to the heavens, to politics, at each step erasing the true order of things 
while retaining a sense of the authority derivable from that divinely mandated order. 
Language in sacred texts, such as The Apocalypse, has undergone the opposite of 
transmutation: from simple purity of penultimate perspicuity to basely complex 
corruptions of meaning. Along with that descent into plurality, both of languages and of 
cultures, comes a loss of rationality, and with it, an inability to “know” God: “So then the 
first religion was the most rational of all others till the nations corrupted it. ffor there is 
no way (without revelation) to come to the knowledge of a Deity but by the frame of 
nature” (“Draft Chapters of a Treatise on the Origin of Religion and its Corruption”). 
This statement is key to Newton’s theology, in that here he identifies the ideal religion as 
the most rational and identifies two means of knowing God. Critically, he is stating the 
primary motive: to establish an epistemology that allows for accurate re-presentation of 
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God. That God, as Newton repeatedly notes in the “General Scholium” of the Principia, 
is “always and everywhere” while also not directly involved in things. That multiplying
across time of languages, all drawn in Newton’s scheme from an uber mystical language, 
is just a part of the corruption: the real babble here is the babble emerging from a 
language with an unmistakable and perhaps even co-creative direct link between signifier 
and signified to an increasingly leveled relationship, where signifiers refer to other 
signifiers which the provide the signified, with the final product, the text before Newton, 
replete with indirect connections. 
The best way to approach these texts, Newton notes, is in identification of 
common terms and their translated meanings across texts, followed by testing those terms 
against history:
For there is no better way of interpreting scripture then by comparing the 
parts of it & reconciling all the synchronall & all the analogous parts of 
prophesy which can be reconciled without force. Tis certain that the same 
things are described again and again in prophesy: And all the descriptions 
of one & the same thing must be conjoyned that they may interpret one 
another & supply one anothers defects & joyntly make one complete 
description which cannot be misapplied to history. And those 
interpretations are always to be preferred which reduce the parts of 
scripture to the greatest consent & harmony. (“Draft Chapters of a Treatise 
on the Origin of Religion and its Corruption”)
 The sacred texts, as Newton would have it, parallel, and to a degree compound through 
increasing invitations for mistranslation, the human’s headlong falls from grace across 
144
history. Simultaneously, in the case of the Apocalypse of St. John, the text, when purified 
according to the principles of empirical science, “predicts” the history of that fall, as well 
as the human’s violent redemption in the end of days.
Newton’s application of a “scientific” method raises a critical question: where 
does Newton derive the authority for the method itself? The easy answer is that he has 
found the rules of reasoning, the application of Enlightenment science’s primary 
characteristics of simplicity, generalizability, and verifiability, so effective in translating 
the book of nature that their extension into analysis of the book(s) of God makes a sleepy 
kind of sense. However, that claim seems less defensible when the chronology of 
application, as discussed earlier, is considered. Simply, Newton seems to be applying his 
scientific method as a theological method long before he applies it as a scientific method. 
If the Rules are not determined by a natural philosophic epistemology, then from where 
does he derive the epistemological authority for those rules? The key to understanding 
the source of these rules validity for understanding both texts and the natural world is 
cryptically revealed in Newton’s “General Scholium” of the Principia: 
He rules all things, not as the world soul but as the lord of all. And 
because of his dominion he is called Lord god Pantokrator. For “god” is a 
relative word and has reference to servants, and godhood is the lordship of 
God, not over his own body as is supposed by those for whom God is the 
world soul, but over servants. The supreme god is eternal, infinite, and 
absolutely perfect being; but a being, however perfect, without dominion
is not the Lord God . . . .The lordship of a spiritual being constitutes true 
god, a supreme lordship a supreme god, an imaginary lordship an 
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imaginary god. And from true lordship it follows that the true god is 
living, intelligent, and powerful. . .  he is eternal and infinite, that is, he 
endures from eternity to eternity, and he is present from infinity to infinity, 
he rules all things, he knows all things that happen or can happen. . . . He 
endures always and is present everywhere, and by existing always and 
everywhere he constitutes duration and space. Since each and every 
particle of space is always, and each and every indivisible moment is 
everywhere, certainly the maker and lord of all things will not be never
and nowhere. [italics Newton’s] (940-941)
This long quote is tricky to interpret, to say the least. First, Newton is revealing that he is 
anything but a deist: his God is neither oversoul nor the “crossed out” God as Bruno 
Latour characterizes the eventual status of God in the emergent Enlightenment 
Constitution (We Have Never been Modern). Instead, Newton’s God is directly involved, 
as a true lord must have dominion—and as Newton states in a subsequent passage, “not 
only virtually but substantially…. In him all things are contained and moved” though “he 
does not act on them nor they on him” (941). This scheme is curious—on the one hand a 
lord must have dominion, or is not a true lord, on the other hand, this lord of lords doesn’t 
act on things not they on them. Newton’s resolution of this seeming contradiction is as 
elegant as it is sui generis: God’s seeming absence, suggested by the denial of his direct 
intervention, is really a higher order presence: God is only outside of the system in the 
sense that a king is outside the kingdom he rules. In reality, he constitutes time and space 
themselves, providing reality’s “constitution”— the rules of design. This constitution is 
literally enforced: Newton has inertia, gravity, and acceleration all as “forces” in the 
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Principia, a definitional problem for scientists, as it conjures up the occult and Scholastic 
purpose. Cohen goes to remarkable lengths to argue Newton’s use of the term force never 
indicates anything but either a mathematical construct of a kind of semantic placeholder 
in the case of in situ, the Latin term Newton deploys when writing of the “force” of 
inertia (“Some Fundamental Concepts” 96-107). However, when describing, always and 
everywhere covertly in Newton’s case, God’s direct mastering of things, of nature, 
“force” is not only consistent but particularly applicable. The power of God, in this 
constitution, must be pervasive and direct, while also not things-in-themselves. The rules 
of that constitution, in which both transcendence and immanence characterize this 
Supreme Being, are the rules of consequence themselves. Newton’s God is simple—a 
basic essence constant across all worlds, natural, alchemical, and theological. 
Additionally, Newton’s God is generalizable—across time, space, texts, and transmutable 
souls, if transmutation is taken to be also a process of simplification, generalization, and 
verification.  Finally, Newton’s God is verifiable, both in the sense of discernible in all 
areas of inquiry, when simplicity and generalizability are applied, whether in designing a 
grand system of systems for nature or in designing a system of analysis of ancient texts, 
and in being truth itself. Simply, the Rules of Consequence are the highest attributes of 
God: not God himself, but God’s commandments for (and ongoing commanding of) 
creation, in a manner. By following those rules, whether as scientist, alchemist, or textual 
hermeneutist, one reaffirms God’s status as Pantokrator—“universal ruler”—in the 
manner of a servant who carries out the orders of the master, and the primary order—the 
first commandment—becomes a dictate for re-affirming the order of the world. Even 
Jesus’ mandate—the “eleventh commandment”—is an expression of simplicity, 
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generalizability, and verifiability, in that Jesus provides a simple rule containing all the 
specific rules of the Old Testament that can be generalized across situations, making of 
Jesus realized Truth itself, the highest material expression of spiritual lawfulness.
If God is for Newton, as I am maintaining, a being characterized by simplicity, 
generalizability, and verfiability, then an important question arises: why doesn’t Newton 
say so directly? Two answers suggest themselves. First, Newton’s theology is a heresy: 
for his system to work one must accept that the trinity is a corruption, something Newton 
cannot assert without serious consequence from the religious authorities of his day, such 
as those who provide him a sinecure at Trinity College. Secondly, Newton cannot admit 
directly that the basis for empirical science is derived from a Scholastic epistemology, in 
which a set of assumptions about God are treated as the starting point and everything is 
made to fit those assumptions. Such an argument requires reinstilling purpose in things 
and people, the very concept that most of Enlightenment scientists, from Descartes to 
Bacon, to Locke, to Hooke, assume to be the basic error of the late medieval writers.
Instead, Newton creates what appears to be three different “authors” writing three 
different sets of texts—natural, philosophical, alchemical, and theological. Each set 
appears to operate with similar “scientific” methods, again inviting that irresistible image 
of Newton the scientist dabbling in sorcery and religion if one is to find any consistency 
in Newton’s thoughts while also valorizing him as at least a deliberate progenitor of 
secularism. However, Newton’s own theological efforts—not to publish but to write the 
activities of his studies—are better understood as the centerpiece of his overall inquiry. 
The ends of that inquiry—to know God—is also to define a subject position, a self-in-
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relation-to, in many ways for Newton a part defined by its relation to the mathematical 
divine whole. 
Were a theorist to come upon only Newton’s theological writings, and somehow 
be unaware of Newton’s other work, a very different Newton would probably emerge—
an impediment to science, on par with contemporary creationists, only “scientific” to the 
extent that he invokes the authority of empirical method while all the while having a 
secret dogmatic agenda. That Newton, of course, is unsustainable due the reality of his 
scientific texts and his alchemical texts. Instead, reading across the texts in search of the 
author(ity) behind them all, with the basic assumption from the outset that knowledge of 
the divinity is both the common end and the foundation of the whole system of truth-
validation, the Newton emergent is much more complicated, a crowd almost. Yet that 
crowd, I maintain, speaks its truths in one voice, the voice of simplicity, verifiability, and 
generalizability, the voice authorized by the Lord Pantokrator himself. As a potential 
Alchemical Christ, Newton is positioned to both recognize corruption and set in motion 
processes of purifications. As privy to scientifically validated truth of prophecy, Newton 
is positioned to reaffirm the true status of the “body politique” in the hierarchical scheme 
of Jehovah’s things. And as consummate scientist, Newton is positioned to recognize, 
encourage, and take advantage of his understanding of the divine machine nature of the 
world.
The Rule of Gold
By 1695, Newton seemed to have it all: a worldwide reputation as the 
Enlightenment science authority, guaranteed luxurious lodgings and per annum from 
Cambridge, and freedom to pursue his lofty studies on the heavenly spheres with minimal 
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distraction. Certainly, any Enlightenment genius worth his or her salt would have to 
provide a compelling explanation for giving up this life of relative material and 
egregiously contemplative intellectual luxury, especially one with Newton’s much 
advertised aversion to the life of the body as opposed to the mind. Additionally, 
Newton’s behavior up to that time suggests anything but a love of social interaction with 
his intellectual “peers.”
Yet Newton leaves his familiar quarters at Trinity for the last time in 1696, having 
managed to secure a supervisory position as Warden at the London mint. Biographers 
have responded to Newton dramatic departure from the college in a number of ways, 
ranging from speculations as to his termination of his alleged homosexual relationship 
with the fop Fatio (White), to a need to change his life after the breakdown of 1693 
(Christenson), to his desire for power in a more material venue than academia (Westfall 
219-221), to Newton’s answering the “crown call for guidance from imminent citizens” 
(Gleick 158-159). Westfall, in particular, seems to go to the greatest lengths to provide a 
rationale that Newton’s decision, to take on, as he calls it, “A relatively minor 
bureaucratic post in London:”
What attraction would hold him in Cambridge? Certainly not the 
intellectual community; and if a desire for such played any role in his 
decision, it must have tipped the scale decisively for London. Cambridge’s 
advantage for him had always been the uninterrupted leisure it provided 
for him to pursue his studies. As he felt his creative energy subsiding, that 
advantage had evaporated. Indeed his failures in the 1690’s may well have 
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driven him to escape from unproductive leisure into concrete activity. 
(219)  
Westfall hides a number of critical assumptions in this quote. First, he assumes 
that Newton felt he was unproductive in the 1690’s, the time during which Newton both 
worked assiduously on the alchemical “Praxis” (see Chapter Three) and had his “Dark 
Year” of 1693. This assumption is predicated on a belief that Newton, as Westfall notes 
elsewhere, felt the alchemical studies had been a blind alley of inquiry, and had served as 
invalidation of alchemical epistemology—and by extension—a validation of “scientific” 
epistemology. As Betty Jo Dobbs maintains, textual evidence suggests exactly the 
opposite: Newton never gave up on alchemy as a system of representation, only on his 
full mastery of the system.  Also, Westfall is asserting that Newton’s “creative energies 
were subsiding.” If activity both intense and innovative in an area is a creative energy, 
then Newton’s behavior at the Mint, where he revolutionizes the Mint’s working, both in 
bureaucratic structure and efficiency, demonstrates his creative energies were anything 
but on the wane. Instead, they more accurately seem redirected, into the “concrete 
activity” Westfall notes. However, for Westfall, who glosses over the contradiction of 
asserting “subsiding creative energies” while providing a depiction of a man as blazingly 
obsessed with running the mint as writing the Principia, Newton’s behavior is treated as 
an expression of a thinker whose better days are past him, and who is left to pursue the 
deserved material rewards his genius deserved.
I suggest another interpretation, one that treats Newton’s decision to go to the 
mint not as reflective of exhaustion of his intellectual studies but as logical extension of 
them, where the Mint days are not an example of an old academic’s exercising of his 
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prestige in order to get a cushy berth. Rather, Newton’s mint work is a direct application 
of the understanding he has acquired of the books of nature, self, and God.  Each of these 
books, Newton has discovered, require translatory acts of purification, and must be 
systematically policed in order to be understood. Yet, that understanding is not 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake. As Newton notes at the end of the Opticks, 
and if Natural Philosophy in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at 
length be perfected, , the bounds of moral Philosophy will also be 
enlarged. For so far as we can know by Natural Philosophy what is the 
first Cause, what power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from 
him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the Light of 
Nature. And no doubt, if the Worship of false idols had not blinded the 
Heathen, their Moral Philosophy would have gone farther than to the four 
Cardinal Virtues; and instead of teaching the Transmigration of souls, and 
to worship the Sun and the Moon, and dead heroes, they would have 
taught us to worship our true Author and benefactor, as their ancestors did 
under the government of Noah and his sons before they corrupted 
themselves. (Opticks. 405-406)
In many ways, this quote, taken from Newton’s last major publication in Natural 
Philosophy and published in 1704, when Newton is master of the mint, most clearly 
articulates the direct connection between Newton’s Natural Philosophy and his theology. 
Most interesting is his conclusion—that if his Method is followed, the knowledge gained 
will suggest application into Moral Philosophy—the text of the human itself. Note as well 
what he believes it will accomplish—a government akin to that of Noah’s, one whose 
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main justification is to determine proper worship, which for Newton is always and 
everywhere a dispelling of false idols. The structure of nature itself is, for Newton, 
evidence of God’s power over us. Given what I addressed earlier, namely that Newton’s 
overt work in theology demonstrates both what I call the Alchemical Christ, which 
provides a model of purification via violent transformation of the flesh, and a “scientific” 
method of translation, which involves removing corruptions the opposite of sciences’ 
three characteristics (specifically, impurities of complexity, locality, and construction), 
then what Newton implies for moral philosophy is a model of a single “knowledgeable” 
individual, approaching Christ in purity, who, in the world politique, is capable of  
machining the social so that it fits God’s design. 
Instead of departing from his diverse yet systematically inter-locked “readings” of 
the books of nature, self, and God, Newton is positioned to bring those studies’ method 
and laws to bear on another text—the body politique. At this point in his life, Newton is 
more than prepared to translate another corrupt text. Seemingly serendipitously, one 
substance important to natural philosophers, alchemists, and Bible translators alike—
gold—is what is at issue in the workings of the mint. For the natural philosopher, gold is 
a material embodying purity. For an alchemist, gold is a substance that demonstrates a 
transmutation of a soul into a more pure entity. For an Arian theologian, gold in God’s 
texts represents purity, lordship, and high status. 
Seen as a pulling together of all these three senses of gold, Newton’s motivation 
to work at the Mint seems neither reducible to a change of vocation nor an attempt to 
gain wealth, but rather a quest to scientifically transmute the workings of the mint by 
applying God’s commandment to determine proper worship. Rivaling nature’s, the self’s, 
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and the scripture’s degrees of corruption, the London mint is in a dire state when Newton 
begins working there. From the method of working, to the workers themselves, to the true 
status of the warden and the mint in the larger government, the mint at all levels needs 
“purification.” Westfall writes:
Crises wracked the institution… Indeed, the mint was an institution within 
an institution within an institution, all three of which faced crisis.  The 
recoinage engaged every pinch of energy at the mint. The treasury, of 
which the mint was a very minor department, devoted equal energy to 
devising temporary expedients and new machinery to cope with 
overwhelming financial needs caused by the war with France. The English 
state and the revolutionary settlement it embodied balanced precariously 
on the Treasury’s efforts. In 1696, it was not clear that the financial 
demands of the war would be met. If they were not, and national 
bankruptcy ensued, the revolutionary settlement would undoubtedly 
collapse before a second Stuart restoration. (221)
Clearly for Westfall, not only was the state of the mint precarious, the entire government 
was at stake. Indeed, the order of the “world politique” was threatened by the mint’s 
deplorable state. Enter Newton, armed not only with a method and a metaphor—science
and the machine— but also a higher calling: re-cognizing and then manipulating God-the 
Father’s laws, puritanically reasserting the order as a conscious elaboration of God’s 
intention. Like Jesus, Newton, by looking through the frames of  “revealed” nature and 
“naturalized” revelation, has been given the power of exercising judgment over people 
and things. Newton, in a manner, is Jesus’ chiasmus: not a perfect creation but a creation 
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engaged in conscious perfecting. At the mint, Newton’s program of purification involves 
three subprogrammes: policing the mint and its “bodies,” policing the organizational 
structure, and, the most literal policing of them all, uncovering and prosecuting 
counterfeiters.
The mint itself was failing in a number of areas. First, it could not keep to with 
the demand for new coinage. Following a serious devaluation of silver, the Parliament 
had issued a recoinage edict in 1696. However, both machinery and the human operators 
at the mint were inefficient. Additionally, even Newton’s nominal boss, the actual Master 
of the mint, Thomas Neale, was “too distracted to give the recoinage the attention it 
demanded” (Westfall 223). Newton’s responded by conducting detailed time-and-motion 
studies of the whole minting process (White 261), and based upon his analysis, modified 
both machinery and personnel accordingly. Significantly, according to an obviously 
admiring Haynes, Newton “could judge of the workman’s diligence” and was thereby 
able to judge the individual efficiencies of the employees, treating them little differently 
than he did the machines themselves. Newton’s analysis and subsequent control of the 
employees’ behaviors down to the time it took to raise and lower an arm is telling. 
Working bodies are being “purified” into ordered parts of a larger whole, with the end—
successful operation of the mint—the only important measure of the bodies’ worth. 
However, Newton doesn’t stop with the actual internal functioning of the mint. 
Newton, at first thinking that the position of warden made him the real master of the 
mint, was soon surprised to find that although he managed all of the mint’s duties, Neale 
was officially in charge and, though consistently neglectful of the mint’s operations, 
controlled the budget, and thereby controlled Newton at a foundational level.  To return 
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the mint to its proper order, Newton petitioned the Treasury directly a number of times, 
requesting both a raise and control of the purse. In private, he referred to Neale as “a 
Gentleman who was in debt and of a prodigal temper and by irregular practices 
insinuated himself into Ye office” (qtd in Westfall 225). Failing at a number of attempts 
to get the Treasury officials to comply, Newton conducted a typically “Newtonian” 
massive examination of all documents, edicts, proclamations, and records pertaining to 
the mint and its history, and developed an elaborate argument for a return to the mint’s 
true state, where Newton as warden maintains complete control. White writes of 
Newton’s study of the mint’s history and structure:
Here is the dark shadow of the obsessive Arian at work, preparing to 
dispute the validity of the Trinity, scouring the Book of Revelation and 
unraveling the prophecies from the Book of Daniel. Once again he was in 
search of validation of his claims, this was no divine battle but a fight for 
privilege, God was not to be founding the Mint documents, but the 
elevations of Newton’s own ego most certainly was. (264)
White is correct in noting the symmetry here between the Arian and the mint historian, 
but this effort is no shadow. Rather, Newton is always and everywhere the Arian, and in 
this instance he is in full blaze, purifying the corrupted story of the mint.  As the true 
“master,” as proven by the success of his purified mint-as-machine, Newton’s place in 
the hierarchy is that of a high-ranking official in “Noah’s government.” In Newton’s 
system, even “ego” is not a problem; after all, an overseer answering only to the Lord of 
the manor has not only a right but also a necessity to be “above” the lesser, as Jesus is 
“over” the human yet “under” God the Father. That the machine metaphor brings with it 
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an interchangeability of parts, which suggests anyone could in potential re-place Newton 
in the hierarchy, also poses no problem, as Newton has proven his fitness. The increased 
output of genuine gold coins is analogous to the transmutation of lead into gold for the 
alchemist, a material sign of a spiritual purification.
One could argue that Newton’s treatment of the mint’s human and nonhuman 
“machines,” and his attempt to re-machine the political structure of the mint are only 
remotely Arian Puritanical, and are only logical—even secular—attempts to use whatever 
means necessary to promote one’s status. However, Newton’s treatment of 
counterfeiter’s, though certainly methodical, goes beyond hyper-efficiency and obsessive 
engagement. Along with the recoinage issue and the shaky state of Britain’s finances, the 
mint is also burdened with an astonishing outbreak of counterfeiting. In response, 
Newton extends the reach of the mint’s authority in identifying and pressing charges 
against counterfeiters. Not content with merely streamlining the process of investigation 
and interrogation, Newton personally became involved, creating a large network of 
underground contacts, going undercover in London’s shabbiest districts, and even 
conducting interrogations himself in the Tower of potential witnesses reluctant to come 
forth voluntarily. White documents the extent of Newton’s involvement:
Between June 1698 and Christmas 1699 he conducted some 200 cross-
examinations of witnesses, informers and suspects, and in a single week in 
February 1699 he attended seven such sessions and had ten prisoners in 
Newgate Prison awaiting hanging. He treated petty criminal and the grand 
larcenist with equal contempt, once commenting, “Criminals, like dogs, 
always return to their vomit.” (266)
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All of Newton’s significant biographers have grappled with Newton’s behavior at 
this time, agreeing in general as to the near Gestapo tactics—and his “stretching of the 
law” (Christenson 109) in his questionable means of prosecuting the case against the 
famous forger, William Chaloner. In that instance, Newton employed several convicts to 
testify against Chaloner, who, though having an extensive history of criminality, is likely 
to have been innocent of the crimes for which he was hanged (Christensen 109). Where 
biographers differ is in how they explain Newton’s behavior towards those suspected of 
any level of involvement with counterfeiting. Some argue for psychopathology, such as 
Frank Manuel in The Religion of Isaac Newton, who maintains Newton’s ferocity in 
pursuing criminals, and his frequent refusal to grant pardons in even the most 
questionable cases, reflected a form of displacement, where Newton acted out his hatred 
for his step-father on people, the lower class, whom he felt were contemptible from the 
outset. Others, such as Westfall, down play the behavior, attributing it to the brutal times 
and the emergency brought about by the coinage crisis. White is less forgiving: “This was 
the chance for him to wield real power—power over life itself. With a wave of his hand, 
he could have sent a man to the gallows, but he could also show mercy and offer life to 
those groveling at his feet” (268).
White, in my analysis, is the most accurate—as far as he goes. Certainly Newton 
is experiencing for the first time the power of life and death judgment. Yet given his form 
of Arian theology, in which violent death is an essential method of purification for God’s 
first perfect creation, Jesus himself, and that all purifications are, at some level, re-
expressions or re-presentations of a divinely designed order, then Newton’s acts with the 
counterfeiters are not mere psychological aberration, signs of the times, or even a man 
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given a taste of power. Instead, his actions are embodied purifications of the world 
politique, editions and corrections of the book of the human. Given that counterfeiting is 
in many ways a perversion of alchemy, a transmuting of a base element into the 
semblance of gold, the counterfeiter’s actions threaten not merely the money supply but 
the idea of purity itself. What we get with Newton’s brutish tactics here is our only 
example of his full application of his system of systems into the realm of the tiny fragile 
human, where what is at stake is more than accurate prediction of orbits, more than the 
purifying of base elements into pure forms, more than the accurate translation of sacred 
texts, and even more than the translation of governmental systems. What Newton reveals 
as a very energetic, methodical, and Machiavellian prosecutor of counterfeiters is the true 
status of the body in his system: a slave to the order, expendable in the pursuit of 
perfection, and, ultimately, an impediment to perfection when not playing the “part” that 
the machine requires.
What I have traced in Newton’s method and results of approaching sacred texts is 
an epistemology that combines the principles of Enlightenment science with the stance of 
the transmutative alchemist, all the while drawing its primary authority from a very 
complex sense of God. That “scientific” and “magical” sense of God involves not a mere 
removal of the purpose from things but rather the replacement of individual purpose with 
a larger, lawful purposefulness. Newton’s approach to sacred texts is informed by a basic 
assumption that the process of history is one of increasing corruption, and it is the task of 
the translator—the one truly “literate” in reading the bible—to re-cover the once perfect 
understanding of god through application of the Newtonian scientific method. For 
Newton, that recovered understanding is increasing recognition of the radical rank-
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orderedness of all facets of the world. In this vein, Newton’s work at the mint reflects not 
a sidelight to his studies but rather their culmination in the world of the social, where the 
“force” studied and manipulated is the force of money, the power of acquired resources 
that underlies the strength of all governments. In the end, Newton’s Mint work is an 
experiment in application with decidedly mixed results. On the one hand, his system of 
systems arguably saves the empire, and perhaps more importantly over time, provides a 
model of “scientific management” that can maximize the machine-like efficiency of 
human institutions. However, what is lost in this system is a sense of a human value not 
dependent upon a radically subservient role in relation to a distant God. As I explore in 
the next chapter, Newton’s intermingling of both grounding assumptions and methods 
from Natural Philosophy and Arian theology did prove especially productive in the 
development of modern science. In the end Newton’s attempt, however brilliant, has 
serious limits, both in ultimately representing the physical world and in re-presenting a 
humane social order.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ISAAC NEWTON AND NIELS BOHR: KNIGHTS OF THE ABSURD
That Isaac Newton and Niels Bohr are scientists is to state the obvious; volumes 
abound on their respective contributions in physics and mathematics.  This is the old tired 
story of giants of science, redolent of strict objectivity, experimental rigor, and arcane but 
brilliant formulae, somehow capturing, in a modern kind of Sanskrit, knowledge of the 
physical universe. This story, as far as it goes, is “true,“ at least in the sense that they 
have contributed to science, and are very much active voices in many fields of inquiry.
As I have shown in the prior chapters, Newton was much more than a stereotyped 
scientist: both theology and alchemy saturated his work. In this chapter, I position both 
Bohr and Newton as “alchemists,” Newton in the formal sense and Bohr in the 
analogical. Further, both are quasi- Kierkegaardian “Knights of the Absurd,” whose 
general philosophies have at their respective cores a direct rendezvous with paradox. A 
distinctive feature of each of their approaches, in Newton, in his quest for a “unity of 
truth,” and in Bohr, his quest for a “Unity of Knowledge,” is an unmistakable integration 
of fundamental contradiction within a larger framework of order. In Newton, the larger 
system of order is his Arian theology, which subsumes both his “scientific” studies in 
Natural Philosophy and his “magical” studies on alchemy. In Bohr, this larger system of 
order is his frame of “complementarity,” a concept he applies to make sense of not only 
quantum physical experimental findings but also to integrate the larger systems of 
classical physics and quantum physics into a single epistemological framework. Both, 
indeed, are heretics: Newton as a radical Puritan Arian who adamantly denies the 
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existence of the trinity, and Bohr, as an “antiepistemologist,” according to Arkady 
Plotinisky, who critically positions Bohr’s approach as a complex application of George 
Bataille’s general economy model, and Derrida’s post-structural philosophy.
For both, as well, their respective embracings of absurdity entail not only the 
nature of subject-object splits but also, in a Kierkegaardian sense, the nature of subjective 
and objective knowledge and ways of knowing. Newton, the ostensible spokesperson for 
objectivity, particularly in the sense of a radical separation of observed from observer, 
when considered within the larger framework of his studies of alchemy and theology, is 
revealed as less a scientist within a veneer of magic and religion than as a priest who 
dabbles both in science and magic. His goal, treated here as a quest for a unity of truth 
undertaken by a Knight of the absurd, is one effected through a series of translations: of 
the corrupt world into a perfect set of laws, of the corrupt self into a more perfect 
reflection of the creator, and of corrupt text into a perfect prediction after the fact of 
God’s omniscience. His treatment of subject-object distinctions is to work within an 
ensemble of epistemologies: Natural Philosophy, where the object is foregrounded, and 
the subject stands “silent,” a disinterested witness; and alchemy, where the exact obverse 
is at play: the subject, the alchemist himself, is foregrounded, and the object, the 
materials with which the alchemist works, are witnesses to the transmutation of the 
subject. The two seemingly exclusive, if not contradictory, approaches to “truth” are 
reconciled in an existential leap of faith—in the assertion of belief in a radically, and 
significantly, “unitary” God. The darkest of ironies pervades this uneasy ensemblage: 
Newton, whose historical moment is populated by radical social upheaval, an upheaval 
complicit in and contiguous with religious, scientific, and personal “revolutions,” is bent 
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upon both addressing the increasing disorder and thrusting meaning on it.
Bohr, similarly working in a time of political, scientific, and religious disorder, 
has as his goal a quest for a unity of knowledge, which also involves a confrontation with 
subject-object distinctions. He, too, works within an ensemblage of epistemologies—
classical physics, primarily informed by the Natural Philosophy outlined in Newton’s 
Principia, with its central assumption of radical subject-object split; and quantum physics, 
where, in an ironic twist, application of Newtonian objectivity in experimental design 
results in a demonstration of the limits of objectivity as the central method for 
representing truth. Bohr resolves the contradiction between the two systems of 
representation by positing the framework of complementarily, where the central irony is 
that the contradiction becomes not a marginal occurrence to be glossed over to maintain a 
unity of knowing, but rather the driving principle behind unifying knowledge so that 
“knowledge” itself is redefined as that which can be communicated. Since contradiction 
is at the heart of the relationship between quantum physics and classical physics, 
unification, for Bohr, involves an embracing of that contradiction as a fundamental law of 
the universe. In the end, an important difference between the two thinkers is that 
Newton’s leap of faith presupposes a once and future truth—an originary and eventual 
demonstration of the veracity of the faith, which falls short of a true Kierkegaardian 
mastery of irony. Bohr, in contrast, though perhaps initially hopeful for such 
determination of truth, is content with increasing refinement of —but never completion 
of—a process of understanding and communicating that which can be known. 
Until recently, historians and philosophers of science viewed Newton primarily as 
the “father of classical Physics” who worked on gravity, mathematics, optics, and the 
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codification of a general scientific empirical methodology. He stands as a kind of model 
of the mostly solitary genius, working in a disinterested, secular fashion after verifiable 
understanding of the material world. Newton’s work in Natural Philosophy, best 
represented by his Principia and his later Opticks, received widespread recognition, both 
during and after his life. William Blake , in his painting, “Newton” and his poem, 
“Urizen,” directs his Romantic critique to this representation of Newton: the Newton of 
material science, mathematical abstraction, and reduction to surfaces.
6. And Urizen craving with hunger 
Stung with the odours of Nature
Explor'd his dens around
7. He form'd a line & a plummet
To divide the Abyss beneath.
He form'd a dividing rule: 
8. He formed scales to weigh;
He formed massy weights;
He formed a brazen quadrant;
He formed golden compasses
And began to explore the Abyss 
And he planted a garden of fruits
This is the Newton of the falling apple, of the calculus—the objectifying and objectified 
Newton, whose works will serve as both bibles of objects and bibles of objectivity. To a 
certain extent, this is, if not the definitive Newton, then at least a defensible Newton. By 
the age of 26, Newton had not only developed the calculus, his fluxions, he had also 
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provided the most comprehensive and rigorous account of the behavior of light and the 
phenomenon of gravity of any scholar in the history of the Western world. Certainly, it 
has been known from the outset that Newton also worked in theology and alchemy, but 
these two additional areas of Newton’s overall inquiry have been treated as vestiges of a 
more ignorant era—Newton’s blind alleys, so to speak—areas in which he wasted time 
which could have been better spent contributing to human understanding of the physical 
universe. Even immediately following Newton’s death, when the Royal Society received 
Newton’s unpublished papers, all texts dealing with alchemy and theology were deemed 
unfit to publish and were returned to his family, where they languished until this century 
(White 10).
However, as I have traced in the prior chapters, a number of recent scholars have 
looked more closely at Newton’s work in theology and alchemy. For example, Robert 
Markley, in his Fallen Languages, argues that early versions of both Boyle and Newton’s 
scientific work exhibited marked dialogic polyphony in which a tension emerges between 
theology and scientific inquiry (143-146). This dialogic tension, according to Markley, 
was squelched by later redactors, who erased the religious overtones while retaining the 
truth-value power of theocentricism, transferring it to the experimental method itself 
(247). What emerges from such redactions is an edited view of Newton and Boyle which 
better fits the until recently uncontested idea that Newton et al. were purely objective 
scientists closer in epistemology to the average university chemistry professor than to 
seventeenth century eclectic thinkers. Similarly, Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs argues in her 
seminal The Janus Face of Genius that Newton was not only more interested in alchemy 
than Natural Philosophy: his major contributions to physics, notably his concept of 
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“action-at-a-distance” to describe gravity, were the fruits of his lifelong studies in 
alchemy.
For Dobbs, Newton’s work in multiple systems of representation allowed for a 
“self-correcting feature” to emerge—a figure of the cross-pollinations and 
interconceptualizations of his respective fields of study—but a self-correction that was 
more than a rigorous skepticism: it implied a deep conviction in an overall truth:
Newton was not a skeptic. On the contrary he seems to have adopted a 
contemporary response to questions of valid knowledge called the doctrine 
of the “unity of truth,” a position that was in fact one answer to the 
problem of skepticism. Not only did Newton respect the idea that truth 
was accessible to the human mind, but also he was very much inclined to 
accord to several systems of thought the right to claim access to some 
aspect of truth. For those who adopted this point of view, the many 
different systems they encountered tended to appear complementary rather 
than competitive. The assumption they made was that Truth did exist 
somewhere beyond the apparently conflicting representations of it 
currently available. True knowledge was unitary, and its unity was 
guaranteed by the unity of the Deity, He being the source of all Truth. 
(Newton and Culture 9)
If Newton, as Dobbs maintains, was not a skeptic, then what was he? A believer is the 
obvious implication, but of what—science, theology, alchemy? Even a cursory 
examination of Newton’s science, as represented by the Principia and the Opticks, as well 
as factors surrounding their production, and his Arian theology, and his alchemy, suggest 
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that any reasonable balancing between these systems of representation is problematic—
requiring not one but numerous “accountings of” contradiction and absurdity. What really 
complicates the sense of paradox embraced is Newton’s obsessive systematization in all 
three fields of inquiry. The role of the observer, the subject, in particular, when 
positioned in Newton’s Natural Philosophy and alchemy, suggests an absurd 
contradiction.
In Newton’s Natural Philosophy, the subject is necessarily utterly removed from 
the object. In a manner of speaking, Newtonian Natural Philosophy, as outlined in the 
Principia in “Rules of Reasoning” is an “experimental philosophy” in which “nature 
speaks for herself, . . . always simple and always and ever consonant with itself" (795). 
The role of a subjective observer in such a system is one of the detached witness—not 
only assumed to have detachment from that which is being observed, but also constrained 
in participating in making sense of what is observed. Newton notes, “Certainly idle 
fancies ought not to be fabricated recklessly against the evidence of experiments” in his 
“Rules” (795), and even goes so far as to conclude the Principia with his famous 
hypothesis non fingo—I feign no hypothesis (943). Rule four in particular implicitly 
underscores the sharp separation of observed from observer, of object from subject;
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by 
induction schooled? be considered either exactly or very nearly true 
notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis, until yet other phenomena make 
such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions [italics 
Newton’s].  (796)
Note what performs the action of truth verification: the phenomena themselves—not the 
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observer, who not only merely watches but who also is constrained from “contaminating” 
the observations’ immanent truth with transcendent theorizing. At its extreme, such 
radical empiricizing almost completely isolates the subject from even interpreting the 
observations, that is, from finding a larger, unifying meaning across them. It is interesting 
to note as well how Newton uses modes to both underline and complicate his Natural 
Philosophy. When he discusses the various propositions throughout the Principia, his 
mode, as he outlines problem examples, is imperative—“Let line a equal” and so on. 
However, when he approaches hypothesizing beyond the experimental data itself, he uses 
the interrogative—foregrounding its “question-ability” by calling his thrusting of 
meaning onto the observations “queries.” For example, note the following query from 
Opticks:
Have not the small particles of bodies certain powers, virtues or forces, by 
which they act at a distance, not only upon the rays of light for reflecting, 
refracting, and inflecting them, but also upon one another for producing a 
great part of the phenomena of nature? For it’s well known, that bodies 
act upon one another by the attractions of gravity, magnetism, and 
electricity; and these instances shew the tenor and course of nature, and 
make it not improbable but that there may be more attractive powers than 
these. For nature is very consonant and conformable to herself [italics 
Newton’s]. (375-376)
This passage is interesting on a number of levels, including its presentations as one of the 
“Queries.” In this particular quote, the concept of action-at-a-distance is presented as 
“well known,” so self evidently true that it serves as the basis to infer similar “more 
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attractive Powers.” It is also easy to interpret this passage as a prefiguring of what 
Einstein would discover several centuries later, namely that gravity does act on light.
What interests me here, however, is not the prophetic quality of Newton’s questions but 
rather the context in which the principle of action-at-a-distance would arise and the 
concept of “nature conformable to herself” would function as a principle of cohesion.
In contrast to our easy acceptance of action-at-a-distance in contemporary 
understanding of gravity, in Newton’s time it was a highly controversial principle. Even 
Swift satirizes it as  a passing fad in Gulliver’s Travels: 
he predicted the same fate to attraction, whereof the present learned are 
such zealous asserters. He said, that new systems of nature were but new 
fashions which would vary in every age: and even those who pretend to 
demonstrate them from mathematical principles, would flourish but a shirt 
period of time, and be out of vogue when that was determined. (235)
Predominating in the so-called scientific circles of the late 1600’s, especially in the Royal 
Society, was Cartesian mechanics, which necessitated the postulation of an “ether” –a 
“spirit of air” (Shapin 23) to use Newton’s words, which would provide the medium 
through which mechanical action could transpire. For example, prior to Newton, 
explanations of one body acting on another involved the action of the first body carried 
through the ether to affect the second body. Descartes’ mechanical philosophy had 
gravity as arising from the behavior of clusters of matter and spinning vortices that acted 
like whirlpools in the ether. The ether itself was described as weightless and invisible, 
filling up all space and facilitating all action (White 205-207).
In such a scheme of things, in such a system of representation that had come to 
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pervade much of seventeenth century Natural Philosophy, things themselves were inert, 
passive. The surface of things was not only important: it was enough—no need to 
attribute a spirit or a force to things. Yet Newton posits the “occult” force of action-at-a-
distance—ironically to account for observations, confirmed by mathematics, that the 
effect of ether, if any, on bodies was so negligible as to be unimportant.  For the 
mechanics to work, a nonmechanical principle must be included. Significantly, in the 
above quote the move is from “surfaces,” the stuff of Cartesian mechanics, to solids. At 
the minimum this move clouds the picture of Newton as a purely “ocular” empiricist. 
Both Newton’s “discovery” of action-at-a-distance and his “bravery” at publicly 
presenting it seem less remarkable, if not almost unavoidable, if one considers another 
system of representation exclusive of Natural Philosophy: Newton’s nearly lifelong 
studies in alchemy, begun in earnest—ironically, considering the secular direction 
Newtonism, has taken, when he was named a fellow at Trinity College in Cambridge in 
1665. In Chapter Three, I examined Newton’s alchemy in light of its relation to his 
psychology. Here, my interest is on how central principles of Newton’s alchemy worked 
in his system of Natural Philosophy. Attributing an active principle to an object is at the 
crux of alchemy, where efforts to transmute both substance and self from imperfect to 
more perfect states involves direct address to the active principle, the spirits of things. 
And in alchemy the surface of the materials is not the focus: instead, it is the “depths” of 
the substance, imbued with life.
Newton’s alchemical move from surface to depth, from inert stuff to active 
principles, is apparent in the following from the General Scholium at the end of the 
Principia
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Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by 
force of gravity, but I have not yet assigned a cause to gravity. Indeed, this 
force arises from some cause that penetrates as far as the centers of the sun 
and planets without any diminution in its power to act, and that acts not in 
proportion to the quantity of surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as 
mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion to the quantity of 
solid matter, and whose action is extended everywhere to immense 
distance, always decreasing as squares of the distances. (943)
Newton follows this description with his now famous hypothesis non fingo, saying,  “for 
whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called an hypothesis; and 
hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult properties, or 
mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy” (943). Newton seems to be 
fudging here. His action-at-a-distance, used to explain phenomena, does not qualify as a 
hypothesis because he doesn’t speculate as to its cause. Its presence is assumed to be self 
evidently true, as is the “very subtle spirit pervading gross bodies and lying hidden in 
them” (944). A seeming dialogic tension is evident, where two systems of 
representation—experimental philosophy and alchemy—are competing for vocality, for 
truth valuing. In fact, a third system can also be assumed to add to the cacophony—
Newton’s religion, his Arian theology. Consider this from the section immediately 
preceding the above in the General Scholium:
It is agreed that the supreme God necessarily exists, and by the same 
necessity he is always and everywhere. It follows that all of him is like 
himself: he is all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all force of sensing, of 
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understanding, and of acting, but in a way not at all human, in a way not at 
all corporeal, in a way utterly unknown to us. . .  For all discourse about 
God is derived through a certain similitude from things human, while not 
perfect is nevertheless a similitude of some kind. (942)
This unknowable being, however, is somewhat knowable: Newton adds, “to treat of god 
from phenomena is certainly a part of ‘natural’ philosophy” (943). This particular 
statement is clue not only to Newton’s Natural Philosophy, but, as I have been arguing 
throughout this dissertation, also to the entire complex of his approach to knowledge in 
the face of absurd contradiction. Newton in many respects faced exactly the opposite 
problem that Galileo faced, from whom he derives much of his reliance upon the 
experimental method. Specifically, as I noted in Chapter Four, Newton’s Arian theology 
was a direct threat to the religious and political forces of his day, both in his semi-private 
sphere at Cambridge and in the larger sphere of seventeenth-century religion and politics. 
Arian theology maintains that there is one God that cannot be divided into father, son, 
and spirit. In short, Jesus is not God, according to the followers of the fourth century 
monk Arias; he is instead God’s first perfect creation. In this way, Jesus functions as a 
kind of ubermensch between God, the world of perfection, unity, and truth; and nature, 
the world of imperfection, partialization, and corruption. Natural Philosophy, in this 
worldview, is at the very bottom of the perfection-imperfection continuum. Even 
alchemy, with its emphasis on transmutation not of the base elements but of the alchemist 
himself, is closer to perfect than is physics, which is doomed from the start to be less than 
God, though, as the quote above notes, physics still reflects God, as a kind of imperfect 
mirror (Janus 80-84). 
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Newton’s necessarily covert work in theology was paralleled by a comparable 
covert activity in alchemy. Alchemy, like Arianism, is constrained from public 
presentation: Newton even went so far as to admonish Boyle for publicizing alchemical 
secrets—not because they were superstition but because alchemy itself was by definition 
a secretive practice with findings so powerful they were not to be trusted in the hands of 
an initiate, that is, someone without the necessary degree of self perfection to facilitate 
the alchemical process.
One way to contextualize his philosophy—natural, alchemical, and theological—
is hierarchical, a kind of ladder moving from imperfection to perfect, as I argue in the 
Introduction. Natural Philosophy, studying the book of nature, is at the bottom rung. 
Alchemy, with its shift from the passive study of the object, and its concomitant reliance 
on sharp subject-object separation, to the active study of the subject, is the translation 
point from the corruption and disorder of nature to the perfection and unity (read ultimate 
order) of God. Newton’s grand leap of faith involves an unwavering belief in the 
perfection and unity of God, and the paradox of using corrupt nature and corrupt humans 
to get to God can be reframed as a Kierkegaardian double move of simultaneously 
recognizing the  number of central paradoxes while nevertheless asserting a larger 
subjective—and ultimately “unprovable” meaning across the whole shebang. The best fit 
between a true Kierkegaardian existentialism and these three systems of representation is 
in the alchemical process itself. Consider the following from Fear and Trembling:
And yet, and yet the whole earthly form he exhibits is a new creation by 
virtue of the absurd. He resigned everything infinitely, and then he 
grasped everything by virtue of the absurd. He constantly makes the 
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movements of infinity, but he does so with such correctness and he 
assurance that he constantly gets the finite out of it, and there is not a 
second when one has a notion of anything else. It is supposed to be a 
difficult task for the dancer to leap into a definite posture in such a way 
that there is not a second when he is grasping after the posture. Perhaps no 
dancer can do it—that is what the Knight does. (51)
In many ways, this sounds like the process of transmutation described by the 
alchemists—there is a sense of always reaching towards perfection, of becoming rather 
than being. And the critical element in this process is not the object—the stuff of the 
experiments, whether they be lead or acid or fire: it is the alchemist himself who both 
determines the success of the grasp towards perfection and who is the ultimate subject of 
the alchemical study itself. This focus on the subject seems dramatically incompatible 
with natural philosophies focus on the object, especially in light of generalizability of not 
just observations but the very method of observation itself. Yet for Newton, a Knight of 
the absurd, his inherent acceptance of absurd contradiction was glossed over by later
writers who attempted to describe his Natural Philosophy within its own parameters. By 
the time that Bohr begins his work in physics, what remains of Newton is his Natural 
Philosophy, particularly his rigorous experimental method with its sharp separation of 
subject and object. The irony here is that it is neither God nor alchemical revelations that 
spark Bohr to embrace the absurd: instead, it is the experimental findings of physics 
themselves. 
Bohr, Complementarity, and Unity of Knowledge
What Bohr was initially after was an understanding of the tiniest bits of the 
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universe, to study them and their behavior in order to determine if some underlying 
lawfulness is evident. He begins, as do Einstein, Heisenberg, Bell, and a host of others, 
by working within the framework of scientific objectivity. By objectivity I mean here the 
narrow sense of the stance a scientist takes towards an “object” of study in which the 
assumption is made that the empirical observer does not significantly affect the outcome 
of a properly designed experiment. In short, he works firmly within the four rules of 
consequence outlined by Newton in the Principia.
However, in light of the experimental findings of quantum physics, particularly 
those dealing with wave-particle, momentum-position observations, Bohr begins to 
question the very nature of an “independent reality in the ordinary physical sense” and his 
“answer” to the question is complementarity, which is not so much an “answer” in the 
classic sense as it is a new way of framing questions outside of a purely “Newtonian,” 
deterministic, and linearly causal lens. At the risk of over simplification, what was 
discovered in a series of experiments beginning in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century was that it was impossible to account for experimental findings—and by 
extension, the laws of the physical universe—without including the role of the observer 
in the description. In contextualizing the duality of the wave-particle observations in 
physics, Bohr reframes the seeming paradox: “In fact, here again we are not dealing with 
contradictory but with complementary pictures of the phenomena, which only together 
offer a natural generalization of the classical mode of description” (Atomic Theory and 
the Description of Nature 68).  For Bohr, this means not that perceptions of particles 
cause a phenomena nor that the particles cause a perception, but rather that observer and 
observed are inseparable, just as wave and particle studies reveal the “complementary” 
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nature of light. On the face of it, viewed within the framework of “Newtonian” science 
(his Natural Philosophy isolated from his theology and alchemy), the experimental 
findings are absurd: following Newton, one expects to find causal explanations that 
exclude the role of the observer in the study.  Unfortunately, old “intuitive” notions of 
causality don’t work in Bohr’s quantum world: 
In this novel situation, where experimental conditions “determine” the 
behavior of particles, even the old question of an ultimate determinacy of 
natural phenomena has lost its conceptual basis, and it is against this 
background that the viewpoint of complementarity presents itself as a 
rational generalization of the very ideal of causality. (Atomic Theory and 
the Description of Nature 54)
 Bohr elaborates on the quantum physical situation: 
Within the scope of classical physics, all characteristic properties can in 
principle be ascertained by a single experimental arrangement, although in 
practice various arrangements are often convenient for the study of 
different aspects of the situation. In fact, data obtained in such a way 
simply supplement each other and can be combined into a consistent 
picture of the behavior of the object under investigation. In quantum 
physics, however, evidence about atomic objects obtained by different 
experimental arrangements exhibits a novel kind of complementary 
relationship. Indeed, it must be recognized that such evidence which 
appears contradictory when combination into a single picture is attempted, 
exhausts all conceivable knowledge about the object. Far from restricting 
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our efforts to put questions to nature in the form of experiments, the notion 
of complementarity simply characterizes the answers we can receive by 
such inquiry, whenever the interaction between the measuring instruments 
and the objects form an integral part of the phenomena. (Essays 1958-
1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge 4)
Complementarity, as Bohr says, initially suggested itself as a conceptual 
framework “wide enough to embrace the account of the fundamental regularities of 
nature which cannot be comprehended within a single picture” (Atomic Physics and 
Human Knowledge 12). In this instance, he is referring specifically to the findings of 
quantum physical experiments, and the inability for classical models to account for those 
findings. In other words, complementarity “simply characterizes the answers we can 
receive by such inquiry” (4). In this situation, the process involves conducting an 
experiment, translating the results into mathematics—here, Hamiltonian matrix algebra, 
and then translating what the math reveals into “unambiguous language” (3). However, 
this process of translation involves contradiction and paradox at every step. First, the 
experimental findings themselves are absurd—Schrodinger called the photographic 
evidence “repugnant;” Bohr’s initial response was that it was “hopeless.” Secondly, the 
very math used to represent the findings—unlike Newton’s unabsurd calculus—contains 
within in fundamental absurd contradictions. Consider the following formulae for 
uncertainty relations:
(Bohr Essays: 1932-1957: Atomic Theory and Human Knowledge 71)
On at least two levels, fundamental contradiction is evident in this equation. First, 
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the statement p—q reflects the noncommutative function necessary for Hamiltonian 
matrix algebra to work. This is a direct contradiction of a fundamental principle of 
algebra. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, the deployment of the square root 
of negative one also reflects an impossibility: called an “imaginary number,” this 
particular symbol is at the heart of mathematical representation of quantum physical 
behavior.  Much, of course, has been written about the meaning of this number:  I am 
merely pointing out that even in the supposedly rational world of mathematics, in its 
application in arguably the “hardest” of the sciences, a certain irrationality is evident, a 
willful embracing of fundamental absurdity in order to represent the “order” of the world.
Having made the leap to recognize the paradoxical experimental findings, and 
accepting the absurd math behind them, Bohr extended complementarity to description of 
other phenomena beyond the quantum physical, in particular psychology. Though at first 
Bohr was to reflect  “a feature of wholeness inherent in atomic process” (2), his 
development of complementarity matured into a larger framework to account for features 
of wholeness and subject-object complements in many phenomena, not just physical, 
biological, and psychological but also legal, ethical, and even cultural. Bohr begins by 
trying to account for the observations of physical quanta under different experimental 
conditions. When it becomes clear that a “single picture” cannot provide a complete 
description of physical processes, he broadens not just his descriptions but also his 
general epistemology to provide 
a radical revision of the foundation for the unambiguous use of most of 
our elementary concepts....Indeed, from our present standpoint, physics is 
to be regarded not so much as the study of something a priori given, but 
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rather as the developments for ordering and surveying human experience, 
in this respect our task must be to account for such experience in a manner 
independent of individual subjective judgment and therefore objective in 
the sense that it can be unambiguously communicated in the common 
human language.” (Essays: 1932-1957: Atomic Physics and Human 
Knowledge 10)
Most interesting, however, is how his principle of complementarity can be used to not 
only account for different experimental results discovered under different experimental 
arrangements but how complementarity can provide a basis for finding a “unity of 
knowledge,” for addressing what Bohr saw as “the widespread confusion arising from the 
apparently divergent approaches taken by humanists and scientists to human problems” 
which has resulted in “talk about a cultural rift in modern society” (Essays: 1932-1957: 
Atomic Theory and Human Knowledge 8), reminiscent of C.P. Snow’s “two cultures.” 
Important here is to note that Bohr is not asking for a return to a subjectivism or pure 
perspectivism. Rather, he is straddling the margin between subjectivism and objectivism, 
retaining the primacy of the observer of the former while retaining empirical “power” of 
the latter. His general epistemology addresses his sense that “the integrity of living 
organisms and the characteristics of conscious individuals and humans cultures present 
features of wholeness, the account of which implies a typical complementary mode of 
description” (Essays: 1932 -1957: Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge 7). In short, 
Bohr provides a radically different framework of knowing in which humans can find a  
“proper balance between our desire for an all-embracing way of looking at life in its 
multifarious aspects and our power of expressing ourselves in a logically consistent 
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manner” (Essays: 1932-1957: Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge 80). And behind 
his attempt to provide this new epistemology is also a pragmatic concern with living. As 
he says, “the problem of unity of knowledge can hardly be separated from the striving for 
universal understanding as a means of elevating human culture” (Essays: 1932-1957: 
Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge 81).
More than just another way to describe the counter-intuitive findings of quantum 
physics, Bohr’s complementarity is a hybrid of Newtonian systems of representation in 
which an uneasy marriage is effected between the objective method of Natural 
Philosophy and the subjective method of alchemy in order to return to the enterprise of 
human inquiry in all areas a way to provide a more or less complete description of life, 
whether psychic, social, or political. Bohr’s frame of complementarity is less a “theory” 
than it is a “faith-based” accounting for multiple systems of representation needed to get 
an “exhaustive” description of nature and examining the interrelationships between those 
systems of representation. As Bohr notes in reference to the complementary description 
of wave particle light behavior, each system of observation—the experimental 
arrangements—is a limited or closed system. Absurdly, each system both excludes the 
other while simultaneously is dependent upon the other. In short, these systems of 
representation both help “determine” what is selected in the observation and what is 
selected out. 
The starting point for Bohr’s development of the frame of complementarity was 
recognition of the limits of  “Newtonian” physics, with its sharp separability of subject-
object and its concomitant assertion of linear causality. Simply, he began attempting to 
describe both the wave-particalization evidenced on the photographic plates and its 
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mathematical counterpart, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations. Newton’s leap of faith—
his resolution of contradictions and paradoxes both between and within his systems of 
representation—is a default to a belief in the unity of truth, and that truth was always and 
already reflective of the Arian unified god. Bohr’s leap of faith, however, is even more 
complicated: he not only recognizes absurd contradiction as a central facet of human 
experience, he raises such absurdity to the level of a law, and by doing so, is able to offer 
a more-or-less complete epistemology which allows for conflicting systems of 
representation—such as classical vs. quantum physics—while also suggesting that such 
conflict is necessary to understand the order of the universe. In the end, his greatest faith 
is in the possibility of a unity of knowledge, which is intimately tied to the idea of that 
which not only can be observed but that which can be communicated in “common 
language.” Note in the quote below how he brings together the incompatible systems of 
classical and quantum physics via language:
In this context, one sometimes speaks of  “disturbance of phenomena by 
observation” or “creation of physical attributes to atomic objects by 
measurements.” Such phrases, however, are apt to cause confusion, since 
words like phenomena and observation, just as attributes and 
measurements, are here used in a way incompatible with common 
language and practical definition. On the lines of objective description, it 
is indeed more appropriate to use the word phenomenon to refer to only 
observations obtained under circumstances whose description includes an 
account of the whole experimental arrangement. In such terminology, the 
observational problem in quantum physics is deprived of any special 
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intricacy and we are, moreover, directly reminded that every atomic 
phenomenon is closed in the sense that its observation is based on 
registrations obtained by means of suitable amplification devices with 
irreversible functionings…. In this connection, it is important to realize 
that the quantum mechanical-formalism permits well-defined applications 
referring only to such closed phenomena. Also in this respect it represents 
a rational generalization of classical physics in which every stage of the 
course of the events is described by measurable quantities. (Essays: 1932-
1957: Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge  73)
The very simplicity of Bohr’s prose hides the conceptual leaps he is requiring of the 
reader. Phenomena, for example, is limited to just those observations obtained under 
experimental conditions. However, observation in this instance—despite Bohr’s attempt 
to return it to its classical physical objectivity—necessarily includes the observer, in 
short, the experimenter herself. Even if findings can be reduced to closed systems 
emergent of the world and the instruments of measurement, the act of choosing one 
particular experimental arrangement over another involves directly the observer’s 
choice—and that choice helps determine what is discovered, and what is discovered—by 
Bohr’s own account—involves a subjective choice as to objective design. If anything, 
complementarity may be better considered an “irrational” generalization of classical 
physics. Indeed, complementarity, with its emphasis on the role of the observer, could 
easily be positioned as a twentieth century alchemy in which, in an ironic twist, Newton’s 
subjective methodology of alchemy, with its emphasis on interactions between subject 
and object, and on active principles of matter, is combined with his experimental method, 
185
so that Bohr both subjectifies objectivity and objectifies subjectivity.
In doing so, Bohr makes a radical leap of faith in which he not only recognizes 
paradoxes and contradiction; he makes paradox and contradiction the central tenet of his 
complementarity. In this, he is a scientist-knight of the absurd: just as Newton introduced 
the concept of action-at-a-distance, borrowed from alchemy, to the theory of gravity, so, 
too, does Bohr bring into play an occult action-at-a-distance, a sort of observer gravity, in 
which the act of observation has nonmechanical consequences for what is being 
observed. In many ways, Bohr is a better fit with Kierkegaard’s concept of the Knight 
who blissfully embraces contradiction—not as a threat to but as a source of his faith. 
Newton, in contrast, less makes his faith than assumes he is given it, via the Bible, a 
priori, and remains, to borrow from Kierkegaard, one who carries the “jewel of faith” and 
is partially “delusive, because [his] outward appearance bears a striking resemblance to 
that which the infinite resignation and faith profoundly despise…. To Philistinism” (49). 
In the end, though Newton the crusty old Puritan seems to be the master of 
unintended irony, it is Bohr who more successfully embraces the absurd, who makes a 
movement of faith not against, but in light of, the absurd. His faith is saturated with 
irony: he believes in the unity of knowledge even as he recognizes the absurdity of 
finding a language commensurate with reality. He believes in the objective method even 
as he undermines it by foregrounding subjectivity. And he believes in “exhaustive” 
descriptions of nature even as he recognizes the confusion inherent in all descriptions. 
Perhaps even more remarkably, Bohr’s complementarity, in his development of it, begins 
as a frame for “oppositional” activity at the quantum level, then is extended to provide a 
frame for “oppositional” physics of the Classical and the Quantum, and then is extended 
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to provide a frame for entire—and even opposed—epistemologies. For Newton, despite 
the power of his system(s), moves in the opposite direction—an ever narrowing gyre 
towards an assumed and closed truth. Newton, perhaps a squire of the absurd, is among 
the shrinking giants upon whose shoulders Bohr stands as a Knight, as a twentieth 
century alchemist, and as an “antiepistemologist” who believes devoutly in the effort 
after knowledge.
In the next chapter, I return to Bohr and Newton’s respective epistemologies, 
using Bohr’s concept of complementarity and goal of a “Unity of Knowledge” as a way 
to subsume both Newtonian and postNewtonian sciences under a larger epistemology, 
where seeming paradoxes and contradictions function instead as productive 
“complementarities.”
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CHAPTER SIX
CONSTELLATION, UNCERTAINTY, AND INCOMPLETENESS: PROJECTING A HISTORY OF 
THE FUTURE
My focus in this chapter is on examining potential limits in that powerful system 
for representing things-in-themselves known as modern or Newtonian science. By 
modern science I mean that system of knowledge determination characterized by three 
primary principles: simplicity, generalizability, and verifiability, as outlined in Newton’s 
Principia as the “Rules of Reasoning.” Specifically, there corresponds to each of the 
“modern” characteristics of Newton’s science a “postmodern response,” one that in each 
instance reflects a limit in that characteristic’s ability to accurately “re-present” the reality 
of the physical world. At the crux of each of the post-modern responses is the issue of 
variable human in the equation of truth. Niels Bohr’s  “complementarity,” when applied 
as a way to resolve seeming oppositions between these “modern” and “postmodern” 
concepts, offers up a redefinition of the basic structure of scientific epistemology, one 
that shifts the underlying mode of truth-validation from “either-or” to “not only-but also,” 
simultaneously retaining the power of  “scientific” representations while also exposing 
certain limits in those systems of representation. Additionally, a Bohrian reframing of this 
set of seeming oppositions offers up interesting possibilities for both a human and 
humane science. By “human,” I mean one that accounts for the participation of the 
human, that collection of tiny fragile bodies, in any representation of reality, from the 
human’s  “co-creation” of the particle in the collapse of the wave packet, to human’s 
creative acts that make sense of observations with the stories of theory. By humane, I 
mean a science that is accountable to us human folk, one that will use all means in order 
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to invite a just “mode of subjectification.”  The exploration of limits is crucial to this 
enterprise. As Foucault says in “What is Enlightenment?”, the primary task is to 
“characterize the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as 
an historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out 
by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (316). 
That such an effort to get at an acceptable mode of  subjectification will involve 
addressing “objectification,” or more critically, Latour’s “quasi-objectification,” is a 
given: Newton’s system(s) of representation in its various manifested appropriations has 
been revolutionary in consequence, both in technological developments interpenetrating 
cultural, social and psychological spheres, and in the technologizing of the human 
(Latour). Shapin’s four aspects characterizing the general change in knowledge following 
the “scientific revolution” highlight the true extent of objective science’s permeation into 
the human world: the mechanization of nature, the depersonalization of natural 
knowledge, the attempted mechanization of knowledge, and the use of “reformed natural 
knowledge to achieve moral, social, and political ends” (13). Donna Haraway’s trope of 
the cyborg may, in fact, be more than metaphoric. From genetic advances that have left 
humanfolk at the threshold of recoding the body, to physical advances that allow for a 
sundering of the atom, “science,” that is, Newton’s intertwining of mathematical, 
theoretical, and observational systems of representation, is arguably the grandest of the 
conceptual actions-at-a-distance. That Newtonian science’s epistemological power over 
the physical would be extended to other realms, areas such as the psychological, the 
social, and the cultural, seems inevitable, in retrospect, especially in light of Foucault’s 
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understanding of the history of this “modern” epistemology, more as an “attitude” than as 
a “period.” 
Similarly, Foucault repositions the postmodern period as a set of  “countermodern 
attitudes.” According to Kern in The Culture of Time and Space, the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries’ unprecedented eruption of technological innovations suggested 
a “cultural revolution of the broadest scope was taking place, one that involved essential 
structures of human experience and basic forms of human expression” (6-7). As part of 
that “revolution,” Walter Benjamin, Werner Heisenberg, and Kurt Gödel expose in their 
respective fields of study limits inherent in objective science. By exposing limits, I mean 
each theorist responds to a critical inadequacy of science’s characteristics to re-present 
the world, especially a world that necessarily includes the human. Further, each of these 
characteristics also roughly matches one of the three systems Newton brought together—
simplicity empowers theory, generalizability empowers observation, and verification 
empowers mathematics. These three “ postmodernists” question, at different levels, the 
representational powers of their respective characteristics. Walter Benjamin, working in 
literary, political, and theological studies, offers a response to simplicity: constellation, a 
manner of representation that redefines conceptual rigor as that which liberates historical 
“facts” from their oppressive context. Similarly, Heisenberg, working in quantum 
physics, offers a response to the characteristic of generalizability: the uncertainty 
principle, a manner of representation that underscores both the probabilistic nature of the 
physical world and its ontological coupling with the human, the observer. Finally, Gödel, 
working in metamathematics, offers a response to verification: the incompleteness 
theorem, a kind of rule of representation that substantiates the fundamental inability of 
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any mathematical system to prove all statements. With each of these thinker’s systems, 
the move is three-fold: an exposure of epistemological inadequacy, a re-introduction of 
the human into the system, and an expansion, rather than a displacement, of what could 
be called the epistemological frame. 
Why Bohr?
It is that last move, what I am calling expansion of the epistemological frame, that 
seemed to demand an even larger frame—one that, perhaps ironically, “accounts for” the 
various responses’ seeming oppositions to a fundamental characteristics of 
Enlightenment science. To provide that frame-of-frames, I employ Bohr’s concept of 
complementarity. 
Bohr, also an early twentieth century figure, could have functioned as a stand-in 
for Heisenberg, especially in his early work. However, Bohr’s complementarity works 
also a larger level, one that accounts for its application at lower levels. To clarify: in 
Bohr’s early work, especially those pieces written in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, his 
complementarity is directed primarily at reframing the results of specific experiments, 
with their corresponding mathematical representations, involving the activity of quanta. 
He writes in his 1927 essay “Atomic Theory and Mechanics,”
…it seems to follow that, in the general problem of quantum theory, one is 
forced with not a modification of the mechanical and electrodynamical 
theories describable in terms of the usual concepts, but with an essential 
failure of the pictures in space and time on which the description of 
natural phenomena has been hitherto been based. This failure appears also 
in a closer consideration of impact phenomena. In particular, for impacts 
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in which the time of collision is short compared to the natural periods of 
the atom and for the very simple results are to be expected according to 
the usual mechanical ideas, the postulate of stationary states would seem 
irreconcilable with any description of the collision in space and time based 
on accepted ideas of atomic structure. (34-35)
Note Bohr’s strong language—the “general problem,” “essential failure,” and 
“irreconcilable with any description.” What Bohr is attempting to make sense of, 
specifically, are the wave-particle findings that led Heisenberg to develop his famous 
“uncertainty principle” to describe the experimenter’s inability to measure both co-
ordinate (position) and momentum of  “wavicles.” Bohr’s complementarity, at this point 
in his application, is applied at the “lowest” level: accounting for “special” circumstances 
set up by the experimenter, requiring also “special” mathematics such as Hamiltonian 
matrix algebra. However, Bohr suggests the second level of application in the above 
quote—the potential general failure of classical mechanics to account for all 
observations. 
Bohr’s second level extension of complementarity from the special case of 
“complementary” quantum action of waves and particles to the “complementary” nature 
of classical and quantum mechanics characterizes his writing almost immediately after he 
uses the concept to argue for a revised accounting of quantum physical experiments. In 
his 1929 essay “The Atomic Theory and the Fundamental Principles Underlying the 
Description of Nature,” he writes,
The invocation of classical ideas, necessitated by the very nature of 
measurement, is, beforehand, tantamount to a renunciation of a strictly 
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causal description. Such considerations lead immediately to the reciprocal 
uncertainty relations set up by Heisenberg and applied by him as the basis 
of a thorough investigation of the logical consistency of quantum 
mechanics. The fundamental indeterminacy which we meet here may…  be 
considered as a direct expression of the absolute limitations of the 
applicability of visualizable phenomena, a limitation that appears in the 
apparent dilemma which presents itself in the question of the nature of light 
and matter. (114)
Bohr’s “renunciation” of classical ideas is more than a simple rejection of 
Newtonian laws. Rather, he is arguing for an enlargement of the system in which 
classical physics and quantum physics are “complementary,” both needed for an 
“exhaustive description” of nature, and both described relationally, with the same 
concepts used to make sense of wavicles—subject-object split, mutual exclusivity and 
interdependency—now extended to not only the “experimental behavior” of particles but 
also to the systems of understanding themselves. This move is radical:
Niels Bohr’s approach implied the abandonment of determinism; in 
absolute contrast to Newtonian physics, complete knowledge of the present 
may provide only statistical information about the future. Also abandoned 
would be realism, at least in the form of naïve realism, according to which 
any physical quality—position, speed, and so on—had a precise value at all 
times. ( Whittaker “Preface” xiii)
Where complementarity at the lowest level functions exactly as Whitaker 
describes—a seeming abandonment of both determinism and naïve realism--
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complementarity at the second level offers up an explanation of the relational nature of 
physic(s) themselves. At the second level, Newtonian—and Einsteinian—determinism 
and realism are part of the frame of description of phenomena, such as astrophysical, and 
are complemented by the nondeterministic and “informed” materialism of quantum 
physics.  
What distinguishes Bohr’s approach from other physicists such as Einstein’s, 
Heisenberg’s, Schrödinger’s, Bell’s and others, is that he doesn’t stop with applications 
and articulations of first and second level complementarity. In his 1958, Bohr states in 
“The Unity of Knowledge:”
The aim of all our argumentation is to emphasize that all experience, 
whether in science, philosophy or art, which may be helpful to mankind, 
must be capable of being communicated by human expression, and it is on 
this basis that we shall approach the question of the unity of knowledge. 
Confronted with the great diversity of cultural developments, we may 
therefore search for those features in “ multifarious, often mutually 
exclusive, aspects.  (14-15)
This quote addresses is what I have been treating as Bohr’s third level application of 
complementarity, where the principle is extended to “account for” all areas of inquiry, 
that is, account for all systems of accounting. Of central importance to Bohr, the 
standards of  “communicated by human expression” and “helpful to mankind” 
characterize his grand epistemology, with features, originally derived from quantum 
physics, such as mutual exclusivity and interdependency, employed on a continuum from 
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algorithmic application to heuristic exploration, critical concepts redefined and becoming 
more analogical as the level increases.
Also highlighted at the third level are the three criteria I mention earlier, 
characteristic of the three thinkers’ respective responses: exposure of epistemological 
inadequacy, re-introduction of the human, and an expansion, rather than a displacement, 
of what could be called the epistemological frame. However, Bohr doesn’t just account 
for these characteristics. Instead, he makes them central to his scheme of unity. A critical 
concept at issue for Bohr is an “element of wholeness… foreign to classical physics” 
(60). Life itself, he maintains, that is, “the place of living organisms within general 
physical experience,” also can be framed as a set of complementarities (“Light and Life 
Revisited” 23). That element of wholeness, significantly, may be a description of a nexus 
between things-in-themselves, consciousness, sensation, and even “peoples,” not only 
subsuming without violation the laws at every level, but ultimately defined by a nearly 
Gorgian sense of logos: “truth” is ever bound by what could be called Bohr’s Law of  
“common language,” that is, a language understandable to the extent that we are able to 
share the experience. As Bohr notes in “Quantum Physics and Philosophy, “The integrity 
of living organisms and the characteristics of conscious individual and human cultures 
present features of wholeness, the account of which implies a typically complementary 
mode of description” (7). 
I say Bohr’s complementarity may be a description of a kind of epistemological 
nexus. Bohr’s own writing, though clear at the sentence level, reflects more an effort after 
a language to account for a unity of knowledge than a clearly articulated model of such a 
“nexus.” Plotnitsky’s tour de force analysis of Bohr’s approach as a complex intertwining 
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of Bataille’s General Economic model with Derrida’s poststructural destabilization of 
language, though provocative in itself, also suggests an inherent problem with what 
Plotnitsky calls Bohr’s “anti-epistemology” (Plotnitsky Complementarity). Though Bohr 
is committed to employing multiple “epistemologies” to capture not just an element of 
wholeness but what he perceives as an elemental wholeness characterizing all complex 
systems, he falls short of the mark. A “common language,” one would assume, would not 
require the strenuous application of two particularly abstruse theories in order to decode 
it. 
Perhaps I intend to complement Plotnitsky’s effort. As he used two complex 
theorists to explain Bohr, I am using Bohr to explain three arguably complex theorists, 
treating Bohr more as a way to ask questions than as a broad answer. Bohr’s  
foregrounding of  the human in the highest sense, the ethical, that characterizes much of 
his later writing, is not trivial.  One factor clear in Bohr is science is a means to an end. 
More broadly, he not only recognizes but also actively seeks diversity—of 
epistemologies, of nation-states, and of culture itself.
Therefore, I have chosen Bohr’s complementarity as a way to both decrypt and 
combine the following “post Enlightenment” thinkers’ respective responses to 
Enlightenment science, that enterprise emerging fitfully in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. By the early twentieth century, that science, having permeated the very 
consciousness of Western culture, approached what could be called of crisis of knowing. 
Across a continuum of fields, that which had come to be known as “science” seemed to 
have reached a critical mass of inadequacy of representation.  From the extremes of its 
extension (as in literature and politics), to its narrowest application in the so-called “hard 
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sciences” (as in physics and mathematics), the epistemological frame, brought together 
and articulated in the Principia, seemed to demand new forms of response-ability. 
Walter Benjamin: Ad Astra Per Aspera; Ad Aspera Per Astra
Sometime between 1924 and 1928, Walter Benjamin writes:
Kepler, Copernicus, and Tycho Brahe were certainly not driven by 
scientific impulses alone. All the same, the exclusive emphasis on an 
optical connection to the universe, to which astronomy quickly led, 
contained a portent of what was to come. The ancients’ intercourse with the 
cosmos had been different: the ecstatic trance. For it is in this experience 
alone that we gain certain knowledge of what is nearest to us, and never of 
one without the other. This means, however, that man can be in ecstatic 
trance with the cosmos only communally. It is the dangerous error of 
modern man to consign it to the individual as the poetic rapture of starry 
nights. It is not; its hour strikes again and again, and then neither nations 
nor generations can escape it, as was made terribly clear by the last war, 
which was an attempt at a new and unprecedented commingling with the 
cosmic powers. (To the Planetarium 92-93) 
This is a curious passage. Benjamin—literary critic, Marxist theorist, and Judaic 
theologian— combines in it an implied history of science, a relational definition of the 
human and the cosmos, and a critique of modernity’s emphasis on the individual. And 
“combines” is a tragically inadequate verb to describe his method. His history of science, 
aphorized in this passage but elaborated elsewhere, is a history of loss of experience. In 
the above passage, not only the ancients, those certainly premodern, but even the earliest 
199
modernists—“Kepler, Copernicus, and Tycho Brahe”—are motivated by a desire for not 
just an individual human but a collective coupling with the physical world. Important 
here is “ocularity:” the reduction of experience, grasped as a sensory whole, now 
becomes a single sense—vision, that which is most distancing. The move in part is from 
an experience of deep metaphor, a whole-for-whole substitution of things-in-themselves 
as a gestalt of perception, to the superficial report of metonymy, where the part, that 
which can be seen, re-presents the whole.  Note Benjamin’s language to describe the 
relationship between the cosmos and the human—“intercourse,” and “commingling,” the 
first term organic, intimate, sexual, noetic, the second term distancing in its hint of 
chemical reaction, less a fulfillment of than a subverted desire for a kind of completeness, 
a drawing to an isolate analog of a communal experience in which we once gained 
“certain knowledge of what is nearest to us, and never of one without the other.” 
Benjamin’s phrase “never the one without the other” could be used to describe his 
critique of modernity’s valorization of the individual as well as his overall “critical” 
approach. In the case of his critique on the Enlightenment’s focus on the individual, 
Benjamin consistently argues for recognition of both the general phenomena of 
increasing isolation of the person and the material consequences of such isolation: the 
unspeakable horror of the modern at its most material, the machined nightmare of World 
War One (“Storyteller”).  “Never the one without the other,” applied to Benjamin’s 
overall approach underscores his more-than-dialectical stance towards ostensibly 
competing systems of knowing, such as radical Judaic mysticism and equally as radical 
Marxist materialism.  Like Bohr, Benjamin is both exposing and responding to 
modernity’s epistemological inadequacy, seeing in “progress” not a process to be 
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celebrated but one to be lamented.  Progress, Benjamin maintains in “Thesis IX” of 
“Theses on a Philosophy of History,” is a storm that “irresistibly propels” the angel of 
history “into the future while his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grow 
skywards” (258).
However one describes Benjamin’s response to the limits of modernity, it isn’t 
“simple,” either in method or in revelation. Consider the following from Benjamin’s 
“Thesis XVIII” from “Theses on the Philosophy of History:” 
Historicism concerns itself with establishing a causal connection between 
various moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that reason 
historical. It becomes historical posthumously, by events that may be 
separated from it by thousands of years.  A historian who takes this as a 
point of departure stops telling the sequence of events like the beads on a 
rosary.  Instead, he grasps the constellation, which his own era has formed 
with a definite earlier one. Thus, he establishes a conception of the present 
as the “time of the now” which is shot through with chips of Messianic 
time. (263)
In this short, maddening paragraph, Benjamin asserts the totality of his system—
the inadequacy of efforts to simplify understanding by an application of linear causality 
to “account for” human history, and the response-ability of reframing understanding as a 
constellation of forces, factors, and influences. In part, the conceptual error of 
“homogenous time” contributes to this mistaken approach to history (“Thesis XVII” 
262), the very concept of time upon which Newtonian science is based. Benjamin’s  
“constellation” goes beyond providing a kind of collage of determinants: the historian 
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engages in an active creation, an ongoing collective salvation, “conceiving” a present 
characterized by moments of opportunity to recover interconnections, in which 
“homogenous time” is disrupted. For Benjamin, this experience of linear time stoppage is 
a requisite stance in order to invite a “messianic moment” in which, in the case of history, 
one recognizes the fact outside the oppression of its interpretive frames. Critically, one 
captures, in that moment, a recognition of the interpretive frames themselves:
Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts but their arrest as well. 
Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tension, it 
gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad. A 
historical materialist approaches a historical subject only when he 
encounters it as a monad. In this structure he recognizes the sign of a 
messianic cessation of happening, or, put differently, a revolutionary 
stance in the fight for the oppressed past. He takes cognizance of it in 
order to blast a specific era out of the homogenous course of history. 
(“Thesis 17” 262-263)
Benjamin’s Leibnitzian monad is not as much a simplification as it is a disruption: 
the monad, taken to be a unit of consciousness, glitters into awareness through the 
historian’s thwarting of its flow in time. “Progress” and “homogenous time” are more 
than erroneous concepts: they are conceptual shackles that enslave the masses of 
moments. The complex constellatory relationships of the monad to other factors aren’t 
dispelled; the monad, Benjamin seems to be saying, is conscious to the extent its formerly 
hidden-in-the-time-stream meanings are allowed to break free of the illusion of linear 
progress. One “saves” the moment, rescuing it, raising it from the death of assimilation 
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into a context that enslaves. Assimilation, in a Piagetian sense, is an apt interpretative 
frame: the fact is not just denied its alternative description; it is distorted to the end of 
reaffirming its oppressive context, which for Benjamin is also a context of oppression. 
Additionally, this epistemological effort breaks with a simple sense of time itself, 
creating time instead that is full, heterogeneous, and complex with meaning. The past 
itself is humanized via materialization, seen as even “oppressed.” Yet, alternatively, the 
human is saved as well, collectively raised from the dead, as the messianic act allows a 
“revolutionary” re-cognition of the fact. Historical  “Truth,” in this method, is neither 
deterministic nor teleological. Instead, it—pardon the expression—involves a complex 
determination of the teleology of the now.
Consider in contrast to Benjamin’s complex manner of configuring truth the 
following, Newton’s first rule of consequence from the Principia:
Rule one: No more causes of natural things shall be admitted than are 
both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena.
As the philosophers say: Nature does nothing in vain. And more causes 
are in vain when fewer suffice. For nature is simple and does not indulge 
in the luxury of superfluous causes. [italics Newton’s] ( 794) 
In the above, Newton is asserting formally Enlightenment science’s 
characteristic of simplicity, or parsimony, a concept generally credited to William of 
Occam, who developed his now famous “Razor” to describe his commitment to the belief 
that the simplest explanation is always the best. Certainly, Newton’s deployment of the 
idea in the Principia is overtly limited to conducting science on the “natural” world, or at 
least he is not explicitly extending it to the “social,” as in a “science” of history for 
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example. Yet simplicity, Benjamin seems to assume from the outset, is not only a 
primary characteristic of “modern” historicism but also historicism’s fatal flaw—the 
assumption of a “simple” progression of historical facts, counted “like beads on a 
rosary.” “Beads on a rosary,” as well, is no innocent image: Modernism is akin to the 
mother church, its ostensible “historians” priests droning a mindless prayer, sanctifying 
linear progress.
Like Bohr, Benjamin expands, rather than just displaces, what could be called the 
epistemological frame. Simplicity, Benjamin seems to be saying, is not only limited as a 
representational rule: it is the very crucial limiting factor, preventing adequate 
representation. Both homogenous time and linear causality reflect simplicity’s 
limitations. Benjamin’s “constellation,” as response to simplicity itself as a rule of 
epistemology, is an attempt to complicate the representation, to recapture a lost 
wholeness that is at the root of  “experience” versus “information.”   In  “ Storyteller,” 
Benjamin elaborates:
Villemessant, …characterized the nature of information in a famous 
formulation: “To my readers,” he used to say, “ An attic fire in the Latin 
Quarter is more important than a revolution in Madrid. “ This makes it 
strikingly clear that it is not longer intelligence coming from afar, but the 
information which provides a handle for what is nearest that gets the 
readiest hearing.  The intelligence that came from afar—whether the 
spatial kind of foreign countries or the temporal kind of tradition—
possessed an authority which gave it validity, even when it was not subject 
to verification. Information, however, lays claim to prompt verifiability. 
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The prime requirement is that it appear “understandable in itself.” Often it 
is no more exact than the intelligence of earlier centuries was. But while 
the latter was inclined to borrow from the miraculous, it is indispensable 
for information to sound plausible. (88-89)
In a manner, the shift Benjamin is describing is in verbs for not just the 
relationship between human and language but that between human, language, and things-
in-themselves.  Simply, the move is from re-late to in-form, and the shift in genre is from 
the complex and multilayered “story” to the simple and transparent “report.” For 
Benjamin, to tell a story is to provide a moment of participation, where “facts” are less 
“truths” than means to an ongoing act of collective “truthing.” At its best, experience of 
and as storytelling invites Wisdom—the “epic side of truth” (“Storyteller” 87). No facts 
are simple in this system. They are just part of a larger effort to make intelligible – and 
oddly co-create—the “web” that binds us together. Information, in contrast, is simple, but 
that simplicity comes at the cost of descriptions of inter-relations: one doesn’t “listen” to 
information, as in Benjamin’s description of the story, but rather one is merely—even 
simply—filled with information, so wrenched from experience that meaningfulness is 
reduced to that which is merely closest materially. 
Significantly, Benjamin’s expansion of the epistemological frame involves the 
most intriguing—and perplexing—aspects of his “theory.” Unlike so many associated 
with the Frankfurt School, from Adorno, to Marcuse, to Habermas, Benjamin is both—
simultaneously, alternatively, and coin-spinningly—a theologian and historical 
materialist. The first  of his “Theses” on a philosophy of history cleverly makes the point. 
In it, Benjamin describes a legendary automaton, dressed as a hookah-puffing Turk, 
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capable of beating all chess players. However, the real power behind the automaton is 
hidden under the table by a system of mirrors:
A little hunchback who was an expert chess player sat inside and guided 
the puppet’s hands by means of strings. One can imagine a philosophical 
counterpart to this device. The puppet called  “historical materialism” is to 
win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services 
of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep at of 
sight. (253)
Unlike Bohr’s complementarity, where systems of representation are arranged 
horizontally, Benjamin is describing a peculiar vertical system of systems, in which 
materialism hides the intelligence behind its hand: the “wizened” theology, the “little 
hunchback.” This double move of hiding from sight while affirming theology’s critical 
role in providing the “intelligence” behind historical materialism may account for many 
past and current appropriations of Benjamin’s work, which tend to highlight the Marxist 
aspects.  Benjamin, it could be said, hid his wizened metaphysics under the table too 
well, providing ready—and so frequently lyrical—quotes to shore up a weary Marxism 
while failing to provide a manner in which to engage, as Benjamin himself had done, 
with ideas: artfully juxtaposing the systems of mysticism and materialism in productive 
denial of contradiction. 
Benjamin, it should be reiterated, is not offering a traditional “physical” 
description and explanation of the world but rather a “constellation” of possibilities for 
understanding the world. That world from the outset is a human world, where the role of 
the “tiny fragile human body” is not just noted as a “fact” but is reinscribed as the focus 
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of inquiry—and, interestingly, as the mystical and material “source” of all knowing. In 
contrast, Werner Heisenberg was a physicist, working directly and indirectly with Bohr, 
addressing one of Newton’s central concerns: the nature of light in order to shed light on 
“nature.”
Werner Heisenberg: Uncertainty of Generalization and the Generalization of 
Uncertainty
Newton’s second and third Rules of Consequence stress Enlightenment science’s 
principle of generalization. Newton writes in the Principia: 
Rule 2 Therefore the causes assigned to natural effects of the same kind 
must be, so far as possible, the same.
Rule 3 Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted [i.e., 
qualities that cannot be increased or diminished] and that belong to all 
bodies on which experiments can be made should be taken as qualities of 
all bodies universally. (795)
These two rules offer a purity of explanation, a clear causality applicable across 
circumstances. What generalizability allows for is a global understanding of localized 
phenomena. To effect such a conceptualization, generalizability requires a systematic 
exclusion of the human as determinant in the reality equation. The experiment is a very 
special means to the end of deriving generalizable laws of causality.  In a manner, the 
experiment as a method of observation could be described as an activity in which a 
scientist carefully maintains a sharp split between subject and object via experimental 
“control,” and then manipulates potentially universal causal elements to both test and 
generate laws.   Significantly, the experiment is the purest method of science, mainly 
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because it objectifies, literally dehumanizes an “fact,” thereby reaching the apex of  C. S. 
Peirce’s “method of science:” “It is necessary that a method should be found by which 
our beliefs are determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency, 
something upon which our thinking has no effect” (Buschler 18.) Frank Kerlinger, in 
Foundations of  Behavioral Research, says this stance of “self-correction” for 
determining a “reality outside the scientist’s personal beliefs, perceptions, biases, values, 
attitudes, and emotions” is perhaps best expressed by the word “objectivity” (7).
Until the early twentieth century, most scientists in physics assumed such a strict 
objectivity, and a concomitant generalizability of laws derived from structured 
observations of the physical world. Responding to a set of findings in which the 
competing theories concerning light, wave and light-quanta, were both demonstrable 
experimentally, Werner Heisenberg developed what has come to be known as “the 
Uncertainty Principle,” which in its simplest form asserts the unknowability of quantum 
reality before measurement.  A number of figures were involved in setting the stage for 
Heisenberg’s development of the uncertainty principle. Schrödinger’s attempted 
resolution, for example, offered an explanation based upon equation of the wave function 
with the density of charge (Whitaker138-143). In response, Max Born demonstrated that 
Schrödinger’s equation only worked if it were treated as calculating the probability of an 
electron’s location. The replacement of “certainty” with “probability” was at the crux of 
the dilemma but in a maddening way: the observer herself realized the probability in the 
moment of observation.  In 1929, Werner Heisenberg said the following at the first of his 
series of lectures at the University of Chicago on the “Physical Principles of Quantum 
Theory”:
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Although the theory of relativity makes the greatest demands on the ability 
for abstract thought, still it fulfills the traditional requirements of science in 
so far as it permits a division of the world into subject and object (observer 
and observed) and hence a clear formulation of the law of causality. This is 
the very point at which the difficulties of atomic theory begin…. in 
classical physical theories it has always been assumed that this interaction 
is negligibly small, or else that its effect can be eliminated from the result 
based on calculations from the “control” experiments. This assumption is 
not permissible in atomic physics: the interaction between observer and 
observed causes uncontrollable and large changes in the system being 
observed, because of the discontinuous changes characteristic of atomic 
processes. (The Physical Principles of Quantum Theory  2-3)  
In this statement Heisenberg is directly acknowledging the epistemological 
inadequacy of classical physics. At issue, as he indicates, is both causality and the 
subject-object split underlying empirical science.  What has not failed is the structured 
observation itself: the experiment. Experiments work, consistently showing what could 
be called a global law of localized causality. However, what constitutes “causality” itself, 
what can be expressed as simple laws generalizability to a host of phenomena, is in 
dispute. Classical physics not only maintains an observer is isolated from the 
phenomenon under investigation: it draws its authority from that principle of  “rigorous” 
objectivity. The situation is beyond just a difficulty in controlling for the influence of the 
observer: the observer’s relationship with the phenomena “causes uncontrollable and 
large changes in the system.”  Einstein, generally treated as a radical theorizer, comes off 
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as the most resistant to questioning traditional science’s epistemological inadequacy 
suggested by the quantum physical experiments, referring to the observer effect as 
“spooky action-at-a-distance” (Jammer 181-189) and arguing repeatedly with physicists 
such as Bohr over the inappropriateness of replacing certainty with probability 
(Whittaker 239-243).
What is most interesting about Heisenberg’s and other’s responses to the 
epistemological inadequacy of Enlightenment science is that it is directly related to the 
reintroduction of the human into the system of knowledge, quite literally as the 
experimenter, and quasi-literally, as the “causative” factor extended by the experimental 
apparatus. For Heisenberg, what emerges is the “uncertainty principle,” which he also 
calls “indeterminacy.” Simply, the physicist can measure either the position of a particle 
or its momentum. Before measurement, the quantum exists in an indeterminate state—a 
“probability wave packet” that is “collapsed” into reality when measured, also known as 
the “Projection Postulate” (Whitaker 195).  This necessarily reintroduces the human into 
the scheme of things, but in a manner that less dispels objectivity and replaces it with 
subjectivity than one in which the very opposition “subjective-objective” no longer holds:
In classical physics science started from the belief - or should one say 
from the illusion? - that we could describe the world or at least parts of the 
world without any reference to ourselves. This is actually possible to a 
large extent. We know that the city of London exists whether we see it or 
not. It may be said that classical physics is just that idealisation in which 
we can speak about parts of the world without any reference to ourselves. 
Its success has led to the general ideal of an objective description of the 
210
world. Objectivity has become the first criterion for the value of any 
scientific result. . . .  Certainly quantum theory does not contain genuine 
subjective features; it does not introduce the mind of the physicist as a part 
of the atomic event. But it starts from the division of the world into the 
'object' and the rest of the world, and from the fact that at least for the rest 
of the world we use the classical concepts in our description. This division 
is arbitrary and historically a direct consequence of our scientific method; 
the use of the classical concepts is finally a consequence of the general 
human way of thinking. But this is already a reference to ourselves and in 
so far our description is not completely objective.  (“The Copenhagen 
Interpretation of Quantum Theory”)
Notice Heisenberg’s seeming vacillation: on the one hand, objective reality 
exists—London is there, of course, that metaphoric tree continues to fall in the 
forest whether observed or not. Indeed, objective reality has served us well, and 
has become “the first criterion for the value of any scientific result.” On the other 
hand, the separation of world into subject and object is “arbitrary”—an “historical” 
consequence of the success of representation of the scientific method, more a 
heuristic than an algorithm, one that has worked again and again, not only at 
accurately representing the “lived in” level of the physical world but also as a kind 
of “test” of the fancy theorizing and experiments of the scientist. Objectivity, as in 
the radical separation of observers from observed, is the very starting point of 
experimentation, even in the quantum realm. But what classical objectivity isn’t, 
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and what is revealed by the findings contextualized under the term “uncertainty,” 
is an a priori, Kantian rule. 
With Heisenberg’s uncertain response, Kant’s entire system is undermined, 
with the worlds of the noumenal and the phenomenal convoluted, combined, and 
utterly complicated. Heisenberg maintains that after the uncertainty principle is 
incorporated into our understanding of the physical world, then:
Kant's arguments for the a priori character of the law of 
causality no longer apply…. A similar discussion could be given 
on the a priori character of space and time as forms of intuition. 
The result would be the same. The a priori concepts which Kant 
considered an undisputable truth are no longer contained in the 
scientific system of modern physics. (“The Development of 
Philosophical Ideas”)
Significantly what Heisenberg implies with his rejection of a Kantian a priori
frame, along with admission of the productivity of objective classical 
representations, is that extension of the complications of the objective-
subjective opposition derived from quantum physics could also function as a 
heuristic for framing observations. That is, the implication left is that the 
nuanced reintroduction of the human into the equation for reality necessary for 
resolution of the quantum dilemma could offer possibilities for a larger 
reframing of scientific epistemology itself, if not for general epistemology.
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Though not to the extent Bohr extended his complementarity, 
Heisenberg does offer interesting ideas for expansion, and not displacement of, 
the epistemological frame of Enlightenment science. Just as with Bohr, the 
expansion or modification of epistemology is intimately related to the 
constraints of language:
It is only after attempting to fit this fundamental complementarity of space-
time description and causality into one’s conceptual scheme that one is in 
the position to judge the degree of consistency of the methods of quantum 
theory (particularly of the transform theory). To mold our thoughts and 
language to agree with the observed facts of atomic physics is a very 
difficult task, as it was with the case of relativity theory. In the case of the 
former, it proved advantageous to return to the older philosophical 
discussions of the problems of space and time. In the same way it is now 
profitable to review the fundamental discussions so important to 
epistemology, of the difficulty of separating the subjective and objective 
aspects of the world. Many of the abstractions that are characteristic of 
modern theoretical physics are to be found discussed in the philosophy of 
past centuries. At that time these abstractions could be disregarded as mere 
mental exercises by those scientists whose only concern was with reality, 
but today we are compelled by the refinements of experimental art to 
consider them seriously. (The Physical Principles of Quantum Theory  65)
Heisenberg is suggesting, between long passages in which he traces the genealogy 
of the mathematics underlying the uncertainty relations, that a quasi-scholastic effort may 
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be required to provide an effective manner of understanding “modern science.” 
Specifically, he is brushing the modernists’ “make it new!” commandment against the 
grain, noting almost as an aside that “the philosophy of past centuries” should be taken 
“seriously” as it hasn’t been with “scientists whose only concern was with reality.” One 
cannot but think of Newton’s “hidden” work both in alchemy and theology, where the 
ideas of the ancients were valorized and where, in the case of alchemy, the rule of the 
“experimenter” was considered not as a potential site of  “interference” with 
transmutation, but as a co-determinant, more aptly as part of “the interaction between 
observer and observed [that] causes uncontrollable and large changes in the system being 
observed.” Perhaps most intriguing in the above quote is Heisenberg’s use of the term 
“reality”: usually, it’s a mark of a good scientist to be concerned with reality. 
However, it seems Heisenberg is trying to describe a better scientist—one 
concerned not with reality but with changing the definition of how we come to know 
reality. Perplexingly, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations seem more to describe reality 
than to explain it.  Just as Benjamin’s “constellation” as response to simplicity could be 
framed as a Bohrian complementarity, so too can Heisenberg’s “uncertainty” be framed 
as a complement to science’s generalizability. As with Benjamin’s, Heisenberg’s 
response involves a recognition of modernity’s limits in accurate representation, the need 
to reintroduce the human, and the expansion of the epistemological frame. Part of 
Heisenberg’s studies, however, involved a specialized area of “knowing” called 
mathematics, specifically in his case, Hamiltonian matrix algebra. One of Newton’s 
greatest accomplishments was his combining of structured observation, theory, and 
mathematics in order to provide a means to triangulate on reality. Quantum physics fits 
214
this triangulation as well—the structured observations of the experiments, the theories of 
uncertainty and complementarity, and a math that reflects the probabilistic nature of the 
quantum world. 
Our final thinker, Kurt Gödel, looks neither to complicate the ideal of simplicity 
in science nor to demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional generalization. Instead, he is 
responding to Enlightenment’s science’s third characteristic—verification—and he takes 
on the very language of truth, mathematics itself.
Kurt Gödel: Incomplete Math and the Math of (In)completion
In 1931, Kurt Gödel wrote the following in his “On Formally Undecidable 
Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems,”
The development of mathematics towards greater precision has is well 
known, to the formalization of large tracts of it, so that one can prove any 
theorem using anything but a few mechanical rules. Then most 
comprehensive formal systems that have been set up hitherto are the system 
Principia mathematica on the one hand and the Zermelo-Frankl axiom 
system of set theory (further developed by J. von Neumann) on the other. 
These two systems are so comprehensive that in them all method of proof 
today used in mathematics are formalized, that is reduced, to a few axioms 
and rules of inference. One might therefore conjecture that these axioms 
and rules of inference are sufficient to decide any mathematical question 
that can at all be formally expressed in these systems. It will be shown 
below that this is not the case, that on the contrary there are in the two 
systems relatively simple problems in the theory of integers that cannot be 
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decided on the basis of the axioms. The situation is not in anyway due to 
the special nature of the system that have been set up but holds for a wide 
class of formal systems. (145) 
In these few lines, written in a lucid and unostentatious prose, Kurt Gödel, 
metamathematician, theoretical physicist, and logician, managed to outline a discovery 
concerning the very heart of mathematical epistemology: the determination of the “truth” 
of a statement. As simply as can be stated, Gödel determines, using strict and rigorous 
application of the rules of formal logic, that there will always be a true but unprovable 
statement outside any system of logic. The two axiom systems to which Gödel refers—
the Principia Mathematica system of Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead and the 
Zermelo-Frankl/von Neumann system – form, at the time of Gödel’s writing, the basis for 
all but the most experimental mathematical systems used by scientists in a variety of 
fields. Note, however, Gödel’s extension of his findings: it will hold for a “wide class of 
formal systems.” Gödel, so frequently careful in expression, is very conservative in that 
simple assertion: the implications of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, as his discovery 
has come to be called, is a dramatic expression of the epistemological inadequacy of 
modern science. 
To trace the real epistemological consequence of his findings one need look no 
further than Boyer’s popular The History of Mathematics:
In its implications the discovery by Gödel of undecidability as was 
disturbing as the disclosure by Hippasus of incommensurable magnitudes, 
for it appears to foredoom hope of mathematical certitude through the use 
of obvious methods. Perhaps doomed as a result, is the ideal of science—
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to devise a set of axioms from which all phenomena of the natural world 
can be deduced. Nevertheless, mathematician and scientists have taken the 
blow in stride. . . . .(611) 
Note Boyer’s apocalyptic language—“disturbing,” “foredoomed,” “doomed as a 
result,” “the blow”—it is as if it is the end of the mathematical world. Gödel has left a 
blasted heath of “certitude,” it seems, and the very ideal of science, a rule set capable of 
universal verification, is fundamentally impossible.  Just as Benjamin “responded” to 
simplicity, and Heisenberg to generalization, Gödel is responding to the last, and perhaps 
most critical, characteristic of Enlightenment science: verification. Consider Newton’s 
last Rule of Reasoning in the Principia:
Rule 4—In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from 
phenomena by induction should be considered nearly or exactly true 
notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until other phenomena make 
such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. (796)
There it is—the rule governing the determination of the truth of  “propositions 
gathered from phenomena.” Newton is demanding verification, specifically here for the 
construction of propositions by induction—setting up structured observations of things-
in-themselves to both determine and test “rules.” However, things-in-themselves, even in 
terms of their empirical observations, are secondary to their inducted characteristics: 
Newton is describing only the base level of verification, that of proposition development. 
Gödel is responding to the next level of verification—the manipulation of those 
propositions within a formalized system of truth-value determination. In short, Gödel’s 
studies involve attempts to develop an ideal mathematics, a symbolic logic capable of 
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determining the truth of any statement. Gödel’s study of the possibility of such an ideal 
math, using metamathematics, which “is not concerned with the symbolism and 
operations of arithmetic, but with the interpretation of these signs and rules” (Boyer 612), 
offers up both a qualified semiotic method to study math and what could be called a 
qualified semiotic interpretation: a re-introduction of the human into the mix. 
The question as to what extent Gödel’s incompleteness directly indicates self 
referentiality, that is, provides proof of a human as co-determinant,  hinges on the idea of 
a truth outside the system of logic.  The “outsideness” of the unprovable but true 
statement suggests the statement is inside the human, which is trivial at one level, but not 
when the statement's truth and unprovability are “determined” by the human. The human 
does more than contain the statement—the human necessarily constructs the statement 
and somehow determines the statement's truth. In most cases, the self-referentiality 
argument is taken from what has become the almost clichéd non mathematical 
demonstration of incompleteness: start with a Universal Truth Machine (UTM), which is 
capable of unerringly determining the truth of statements. Truth, with such a machine, 
then is that which can be proven, the basic equation.
Now, feed statement, call it G for Gödel, into the machine. We now have 
statement G(UTM). If G(UTM) is indicated true, then the machine is lying; that is, the 
machine—the internally consistent logic—is not a Universal truth machine, because truth 
and provability is the basic equation for UTM's functioning, and it therefore can't agree to 
the statement’s truth because it overtly denies the basic equation. However, if G(UTM) is 
deemed false, then it violates the first part of its definition—that it is true.
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To be brief, what this all means is that formal logic's apex, math (this includes 
"maths" as it applies to all formalized systems for handling number sets), is incomplete in 
and of itself, but determination of truths outside the system(s) is still possible. Self-
referentiality, as indicated in the above nonmathematical example, comes in part from the 
G, the deployment of Gödel as the statement. One could, in fact, replace G with “I” for 
“incomplete” and the example would still work. However, whatever symbol is used to 
refer to the statement, self-referentiality necessarily enters the system, as the generation 
of unprovable statements themselves requires not a formal mathematical system but an 
intuitionist one. Gödel’s overall position, despite the unsettling nature of his 
incompleteness system, is decidedly realist, that is, Platonist. For the realists, the 
existence of mathematical objects is as “real” as the existence of physical objects. Other 
mathematicians, called variously “constructivist,”  “nominalist,” and “predicativist,” 
aimed at placing “mathematics in a conventionalist role as the ‘syntax of language,’ thus 
separating it from physical science, which itself was to rest finally on empirical findings” 
(“Gödel’s Life and Works” 29).  The latter group, by approaching mathematics as one 
would a language, seems at first glance closer than Gödel to offering a point of 
conceptual insertion of the human into the reality equation.
Undeniably, Gödel’s interpretation of his own theorem is that it supports his sense 
of the independence of mathematical objects from our ideas, constructions, and thoughts.  
Mathematical objects, such as his “true but unprovable” propositions, require 
“mathematical intuition” to find “the source of genuine mathematical knowledge. The 
intuition can be cultivated through a deep study of the subject” (“Gödel’s Life and Work” 
32). That intuition, Gödel maintains, is in addition to formalized testing of propositions. 
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However, what still remains in Gödel’s system of systems is the human as an even more 
complex and active participant in knowledge perception, where a pure logic denied is 
also a chance for development of a cluster of logics. That those clusters are framed as 
systems to “sense” and not “construct” mathematical reality does not eliminate the human 
from the equation. Rather, Gödel highlights the role of the human as a higher-order 
perceiver of mathematical reality, where, almost in contrast to Heisenberg, the very 
positivity of a mathematical object, its ability to have a reality imperceptible by a system 
of mathematical sensing such as Russell’s and Whitehead’s, increases the human’s 
power. Choice of the real is a choice between either formally verifying or 
intuitionistically sensing the mathematical object. Intuitionist approaches to math are not 
simply feeling a proposition. Rather the term refers to an alternative approach to math 
that allows for presentation of propositions without, among other things, an initial 
demand for a strict formalist consistency. Prior to Gödel, such approaches were not 
uncommon, but the move had always been to treat those propositions as hypotheses and 
then test those intuitionist statements within a formal system. Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem puts the human in an interesting place in epistemology: the human actively 
chooses between hitherto hierarchically ranked systems of verification, with a Bohrian 
“exhaustive description” of the world of mathematical objects possible only through an 
interdependent yet mutually exclusive application of both formal mathematical 
approaches and intuitionistic approaches.
Although Gödel devoutly argues against the idea of mathematics as a constructive 
language, he does not address a possible implication of his incompleteness theorem for 
language itself as a means to knowledge. To the extent that the ideal of an argument is 
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based upon modeling the “pure” truth validation of mathematics, what is suggested by a 
realization that that ideal is not just temporarily but definitively incapable of perfect 
knowing?  
Certainly the argument structure of analytic philosophy is mathematical in its 
basic parameters, whether math is viewed as the model or the apex. As varying shades of 
mathematically based logic systems, all systems of argument are necessarily, in light of 
Gödel’s theorem, incapable of proving all statements. In fact, as with the math, a logic’s 
very “truth-ability” may be well tested by its inability to prove true but unprovable 
statements. And if that is so, then the true but unprovable statement—and its very 
outsideness of the logic—is foundational for the logic to work. As Gödel notes in his 
“Postscript” to the notes of the Second Conference on Epistemology of the Exact 
Sciences in 1930:
The assertion of the consistency of the system in question itself belongs to 
the propositions undecidable in that system. That is, a consistency proof 
for one of these systems can be carried out only by means of inference that 
are not formalized in the system itself. For a system in which all finitary 
forms of proof are formalized, a finitary consistency proof, such as the 
formalists seek, would thus be altogether impossible. (205) 
The editors of Erkenntnis, who had accepted Gödel’s paper on undecidability, but had not 
released publication before the conference, requested Gödel’s “Postscript.” What the 
“Postscript” clarifies, in part, are comments Gödel made concerning both undecidability 
and formal consistency.  What Gödel is asserting above is not just the impossibility of a 
system capable of proving all statements, but more critically, the very verifiability of a 
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system’s consistency is dependent upon such statements. Thus, a verification system can 
never verify itself, that is, use its own means to determine the truth-value determination 
power of those means. Instead, it must appeal to the authority not just of a different 
system but more specifically to a system that it cannot verify. 
The key to Gödel, perhaps, is to note how the three characteristics of a post-
modern response combine in his system. His recognition of formal systems’ inadequacy 
also becomes the basis for his expansion, and not displacement, of the epistemological 
frame. In other words, taken together, unprovable true statements and formal 
mathematical systems provide in their inter-relationship an overarching possibility of 
sensing the “wholeness” of the world of mathematical objects. The critical term here is 
“inter-relationship,” conceived as functioning as a form of Bohrian complementarity. The 
very consistency of the logic system is dependent upon the failure to prove the 
undecidable, and the truth of the undecidable statement is mutually exclusive of its proof 
from the formalized system. 
That complementary relationship extends to the idea of “exhaustive description” 
of the world of mathematical objects, where the two means, formal and intuitionist, 
mutually exclusive yet interdependent, are both needed to provide a means of complete 
verification, of both objects and systems of object recognition. Critically, the role of the 
human in this expansion of the epistemological frame is that of completionist: the one 
system of truth-value determination in which the incompleteness theorem does not hold is 
the human herself.
Towards a Human(e) Science and a Science of the Human
Almost tentatively, Foucault writes in “What is the Enlightenment?”:
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I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity as an attitude rather 
than a period of history. And by attitude, I mean a mode of relating to 
contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the 
end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that 
at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself 
as a task. No doubt, a bit like what the Greeks called an ethos.  And 
consequently, rather than seeking to distinguish the “modern” era from the 
“premodern” or “postmodern,” I think it would be more useful to try to 
find out the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, as found itself 
struggling with attitudes of “countermodernity.” (309-310)
What interests me most about this quote is Foucault’s definition of attitude: a 
“mode of relating to contemporary reality,” involving thinking, feeling, and acting, and 
marking  “a relation of belonging.” Enlightenment’s science’s three characteristics—
simplicity, generalizability, and verifiability—are, I have assumed from the outset, 
characteristics of the “attitude” of modernity. Relatedly, I have treated Benjamin, 
Heisenberg, and Gödel as early examples of what Foucault would call “attitudes of 
‘countermodernity’” However, what drives Foucault’s analysis is also a limit: the 
ultimate reduction of human activity to expressions of  “relations of power.” Foucault 
himself is an example of an attitude of counter-modernity: truth-games, ostensibly 
unbiased epistemologies, are complicit with at the minimum and disguising at the 
maximum “power games” (“The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of 
Freedom” 294). Foucault’s near equation of power games with truth games suggests he 
seems to neither replace or nor expand the epistemological frame but rather to displace 
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the whole idea of epistemology. My sense is, despite Foucault’s brilliance, his method is 
recognizably dialectical, even if forever holding in abeyance a “synthesis.” In a larger 
sense, Foucault responds to Newton’s and others’ thesis of  “unity of truth” with its 
antithesis, “will to power” under the guise of “will to knowledge,” j’accusedly
problemitizing the Enlightenment’s claim to truth while nevertheless offering little by 
way of functional response.
Not so Benjamin, Heisenberg, and Gödel: in each, in different ways, the move is 
counter-reductive and more overtly aimed at re-covering “modern” epistemology.  Bohr’s 
meta-epistemological frame of complementary allows for not so much a synthesis as a 
new, and I maintain, productive manner of configuration of knowledge that suggests the 
possibility of a human(e) science and a science of the human. Conceptually, Bohr’s 
approach invites a description of horizontal levels of application.  Benjamin’s response to 
simplicity, constellation, can be framed not as antithetical to simplicity but as a 
complementarity ensemble, perhaps one that could be called “Holicity.” Similarly, 
Heisenberg’s response to generalization, uncertainty, can be framed as the 
complementarity ensemble “Glocalicity.”  Finally, Gödel’s response to verification, 
incompleteness, can be framed as the complementarity ensemble “Veraticity.” 
Approaching all phenomena, in this system, would require both “sides” of the 
complement, as well as the “sides’” interactivity in terms of mutual exclusivity and 
interdependency. Additionally, each complement calls into question the subject-object 
split, requiring more a continuum of separation rather than a binary opposition.
Each of the complementarities reflects not so much a description of wholeness but 
rather a new manner of attempting to capture features of wholeness, whether in the 
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physical world, the social, or the psychological. All of these complementarities express 
the three characteristics of what Foucault calls the “attitude of post-modernity,” which in 
my analysis includes recognition of inadequacy of modernity’s epistemological frame to 
account for wholeness, a re-introduction of the human into the equation, and finally, an 
expansion, not a displacement, of modernity’s epistemological frame. Importantly, these 
complementarities are not answers in themselves but rather conceptual sites for reframing 
the very questions we ask, along with set of ways to “verify” those answers. In short, 
these complementarities disrupt the frame of binary opposition, freeing knowledge from 
the demand for hierarchicalization.
The “importance” of these findings, though, is, like the evidence of the 
photographic plates that so perplexed twentieth century physicists, only determinable 
after the fact of their extension to the ethical.  It is the ends to which epistemology (ies) is 
put that provides the final “completeness” theorem, and that end should be, could be, and 
already is the human. If a principle, a necessary precondition of argument as Aristotle 
says in On Rhetoric, is not just akin to but a form of a true but unprovable statement, then 
the full completion is a circle: the principle is the alpha and omega of logic, and its 
translation via argument into a course of action is the very root of ethics. The science 
Foucault tracks in his studies of the Greeks was a techne of the self, an ethos, as he puts 
it. A problematic techne, certainly: though it offers a possibility of liberation, it also, and 
if one accepts the gist of Foucault’s interpretation—more often—subjugates the human. 
Thus we have the Scientific Management of the human, a techne of the self that is 
characterized by simplicity, generalizability, and verifiability.  The human gains and 
loses in this method of systemizing the self and placement of self into a system: how 
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powerful our factories and assembly lines, from our production of textiles to our minting 
of graduate students! Yet how horrifying the literal and figurative “objectifications” 
conjured by this modern epistemology. From the machining of warfare, to the 
production-consumption model of “knowledge,” modernity, with “science” as my point 
of interrogation, must be held accountable for and to the human.
The theorists I selected are among those whom, I think, hold modernity 
accountable. All three move the “human subject” from the periphery of knowledge to the 
center of knowing: Benjamin’s human seizes time itself and stops it; Heisenberg’s human 
turns probability into reality; and Gödel’s human completes the inherent—and 
inhuman—incompleteness of truth-language itself. Such approaches offer examples of a 
human science, but with the exception of Benjamin, an inherently “humane” science, one 
driven by its ethical ends, is still elusive.
The answer to the question of a human science, as well as a manner to approach 
the larger issue of Bohr’s desired “unity of knowledge,” may be in the extension of these 
developments to “retranslation” of  “category human” itself. To offer as productive 
definition the human as a constellated subject rather than only as a simple object suggests 
a “liberating” techne for understanding and a techne for liberation from a mechanical 
sense of being. Similarly, to view the human as an active participant in the realization of 
probabilities, from the most foundational level of  “realizing” light, to the semiotic level 
of “realizing” political potentialities, provides a context for human as having inherent and 
multi-leveled agency. Finally, to see the human as the penultimate completionist of not 
just “truth” but of methods of knowledge themselves suggests a stance neither person-to-
object, nor self-to-other, nor even person-to-person.
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Rather, it suggests a god-to-god rendezvous between people, where all 
communicative acts have the possibility of being “completions of creation.” As Walter 
Benjamin says, “All higher language is a translation of the lower, until in ultimately 
clarity the word of God unfolds, which is the unity of this movement made up of 
language” (“On Language as Such” 332). For Bohr, that “higher language” is always held 
to the standard of a “common language capable of communicating experience” (“Unity of 
Knowledge” 81). However, he viewed that task of translation as an ongoing process, as 
an endeavor to achieve harmonious comprehension of ever wider aspects 
of our situation, recognizing that no experience is definable without a 
logical frame and that any apparent disharmony can be removed only by 
an appropriate widening of the conceptual frame. (“Unity of Knowledge” 
82)
That comprehension, Bohr writes at the height of the Cold War, always had 
implied an ethical responsibility. Given the human consequences of  “modern” 
knowledge, that response-ability takes on a new urgency:
When the fate of all peoples is inseparably connected,  . . . collaboration in 
mutual confidence, based upon appreciation of every aspect of the 
common human position, is more necessary than ever before in the history 
of mankind. (“The Unity of Knowledge” 15-16)
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